

THE
ETHICAL THEORY
OF HEGEL

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The ETHICAL THEORY

of

H E G E L

1770-1831

A Study of the

PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT


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
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TO

SIR HENRY JONES, LL.D., F.B.A.

THE GREATEST TEACHER WHOM

I HAVE KNOWN



PREFACE

THIS book was written for the most part before the war, and, save for a slight revision in the early part of 1915, is untouched by war influences. In spite of the long delay which has ensued before publication, I have thought it better to leave my work as it stands. No doubt a very much better book could be written, but any alterations which I should be inclined to make at present would alter the purpose which the book is intended to serve. My intention was to write not on ethical and political theory but on Hegel, and I have made no attempt to recast the Hegelian doctrine in the light of our present knowledge. A reconstruction of our modern problems and outlook on the basis of Hegel's teaching would be an exceedingly valuable contribution to knowledge, but it is a larger task than is attempted here. The first step toward it is a reasonable knowledge of the authentic Hegel himself, and it is only this step that I have tried to take. Much of the criticism of Hegel current to-day and in the last few years appears to be vitiated by an unsympathetic and somewhat inaccurate interpretation of Hegel, and my endeavour has been to provide an account which will make his view more intelligible. Accordingly criticism has been reduced to a minimum, and has been undertaken only when the comprehension of the theory itself seemed to demand it. Nothing which I have seen since the book was first written has led me to alter my view of Hegel's teaching.

My indebtedness in carrying out this work has been great. What I owe to the literature will, I hope, be sufficiently

obvious from the text. My greatest debt, however, is to Sir Henry Jones of Glasgow University, under whose influence I began this study and from whom I obtained not only valuable detailed assistance in the study of Hegel but also the impulse and encouragement which led me to attempt the work. He has read through the manuscript and enabled me to make it a better book than it could otherwise have been. Portions of the manuscript have also been read by Professor J. W. Scott of Cardiff, Professor A. R. Lord of Grahamstown, and Principal Hetherington of Exeter University College. They are not responsible for my views and mistakes, but they have given me valuable advice. In the labour of preparing the book I have been greatly helped by my wife.

HUGH A. REYBURN.

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN,

August 1921.

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INTRODUCTION

ONE of the difficulties in the study of Hegel's philosophy is that of finding a starting-point. The theory is a closed circle and does not seem to contain any convenient means of ingress. The approach which Hegel himself provides in the *Phenomenology* may well seem as formidable a fastness as the castle itself, and sometimes the method which recommends itself most is simply to break in at any point where the wall looks less forbidding than usual. To those who adopt this course the *Philosophy of Right* has some attractions. For one thing, the treatise is an elaborate re-mapping of ground which Hegel has dealt with on more than one previous occasion, and consequently the style is less burdened by the task of expressing novel ideas. This does not mean, of course, that the style is good, but it is not quite so cumbersome and abstruse as in some of his other writings, and the plan of thought is steadily worked out. Moreover, the work is an expression of Hegel's mature thought and gives his final views on ethical and political subjects. Behind it lies his whole system, and difficult passages can be supplemented from various sources; on ethical points we can refer to his other ethical writings, and on points of general importance we have the *Larger Logic*, the *Encyclopaedia*, and, of course, the *Phenomenology* to help us. The notes, too, which were collected and added to the first edition of the *Werke* are very useful, and throw brilliant side-lights on the main principles. The language of these is freer and more vivid than that of the text, though perhaps it is also less strict and reliable.

But the *Philosophy of Right* has another attraction; for the subject is one with which every reflecting man cannot but be familiar. It is practically impossible in a civilized

community to keep aloof from the earnest questioning concerning moral conduct, the nature of the state, the rights of labour and property, and in general the relation between the individual and society. And in these days we are forced to listen to some one, be he a newspaper editor, a street orator, or a politically minded acquaintance, who is eager to add his authority to that of the law and the prophets, and to instruct us on all questions of right and justice. Everyday experience often makes it possible for one to detect the general bearing of Hegel's argument in this sphere, even when his expressions are unusual ; for, after all, Hegel too was a good citizen and lived in the common atmosphere.

At the same time there is much that may be strange to us in Hegel's view. Judgements of his, with which the plain man concurs, are linked up by Hegel with logical and metaphysical doctrines which seem very remote from the point at issue ; and as one reads one finds out gradually that the short introduction to the *Philosophy of Right* is a substitute for a very large scheme of thought in which there are examined many important principles which one is apt to assume uncritically from time to time as occasion arises.

This book is intended to help any one who chooses ethical philosophy as his point of attack in the study of Hegel, and feels the need of some extraneous aid, greater than that which Hegel supplies in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*. It does not profess to say all that can or should be said on Hegel's ethics by way of exposition, but it endeavours to develop the main content of that section of the philosophy in such a manner that its relation to the whole and the principles on which it rests may become apparent.

I do not intend to discuss the development of Hegel's thought ; my desire is rather to present it in its mature form. It will be well, therefore, to state here at the outset where that mature view is to be found, and on what works and in

what degree reliance is to be placed. Hegel had a constant interest in ethical and political subjects, and the first group of writings which we may mention consists of minor treatises on what is sometimes called 'practical politics'. He first broke ground by a discussion of the conditions of the state of Würtemberg in 1798, and this was followed in 1802 by a severe criticism of the German confederation. In 1817 Hegel returned to the affairs of Würtemberg, and in 1831 he wrote a trenchant review of English reform legislation. These writings do not all appear in the standard editions of Hegel's works, and are most easily found in a volume entitled Hegel's *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, edited by Lasson. They are, however, only of indirect philosophical interest, and we need not discuss them by themselves.

The second group of writings consists of two early treatises on ethical subjects, both dating about 1802; the first of these was published in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, edited by Schelling and Hegel, and is entitled *Concerning the Scientific Modes of Treating Natural Right*, and the second is a sketch of the *System of Ethics*. Both are contained in the volume of minor writings just mentioned. These works are to be used with caution. They are of extreme importance for the history of Hegel's thought, since they show his view in a stage of germination. For his final standpoint, however, they are not authoritative except in a negative sense. They were written when Hegel was still under the influence of Schelling; and, while the criticism of previous thought which they contain is not cancelled by the more mature view, they are tinged not only in expression but also in principle with some presuppositions which Hegel afterwards discarded. The *System of Ethics* in particular is a difficult work to understand fully, because in it the general attitude, which may be broadly called Hegelian, is very imperfectly worked out, and is crossed by other tendencies. Accordingly, in my exposition, I have

used these writings only to indicate how Hegel distinguished himself from those prior thinkers of whose inadequacy he had convinced himself at this date.

The third section of his ethical and political works consists of one volume, the *Phenomenology*. This was published in 1807 and marks Hegel's breach with Schelling. It is thus the first treatise which presents the special standpoint of Hegel's own thought. The *Phenomenology* occupies a peculiar position: it is both a part of philosophy, and an introduction to it. It is an analysis of the various attitudes of thought to the world and a review of the various phenomenal appearances of mind. It exposes the way in which each typical form of mind organizes itself, the relations which it maintains to its object, and the kind of object which it apprehends. It begins with the simplest attitude to the world, and passes stage by stage to the highest and most adequate. At each step it has a twofold task: it explains the nature of the point of view in question, and it does so in such a way that its inadequacies become plain and force us to pass to a more satisfactory standpoint.

At a certain point of this process Hegel reaches the ethical consciousness, explains its structure and function, and discusses its adequacy and validity. This examination, of course, is important for our purpose, and I have made free use of it. But there are two qualifications to be kept in mind in this reference. The first of these is that the *Phenomenology* is an analysis of actual phases of consciousness, or to put it otherwise, it deals with types of facts; and consequently the correspondence is not absolute between it and the analysis of the *Philosophy of Right* which considers the arrangement of the principles of the ethical world, not in their definite embodiment as phenomenal attitudes of mind, but in their interrelation as categories of the world. There is, of course, a very considerable agreement, for, as we shall see, these categories

are themselves objective principles realized outwardly. But, nevertheless, one must not conclude *a priori* that the stages of the two treatments are necessarily the same. Assuming that the two works are consistent, one is justified in supplementing the analysis of a principle in one from the analysis of the other ; for example, one can use the discussion of the moral consciousness in the *Phenomenology* to amplify the discussion in the *Philosophy of Right* of the kind of realization obtained by moral will which takes moral principles to be supreme. But one must not assume that the phase of mind which succeeds the moral consciousness is simply the embodiment of the next ethical category. The *Phenomenology* has to take into account a further inter-play of subject and object which is not necessary to the direct analysis of categories. The other point is a qualification of this. When he wrote the *Phenomenology* Hegel had in the main reached his final position, but the principles of his thought still required to be worked out and were subject to revision. I doubt if the division of the categories of mind which he finally adopted was altogether clear to him at this time, and this is borne out by certain changes of terminology. The word 'mind' is used in the *Phenomenology* to denote what is later called objective mind, and the account of the development of practical mind into objective mind, given with great care in the *Encyclopaedia*, does not appear in the *Phenomenology*. The *Phenomenology* is a 'voyage of discovery', and the first survey of the country travelled is not quite accurate. I think that if Hegel had written the *Phenomenology* when the plan of the *Encyclopaedia* was clear in his mind, the correspondence of the stages of the two works would have been closer at certain points.

Another writing which stands by itself is the *Propaedeutik*, a transcript of the lectures which Hegel dictated in philosophy from 1808 to 1811 to the higher classes of the Gymnasium at

Nürnberg. The lectures are as simple as Hegel could make them—though they must have been out of the reach of school-boys—and it is significant that he himself used the ethical approach to philosophy in this course as the most fitting for junior students. The tripartite division of the philosophy of mind, characteristic of his later work, appears here. But the final titles are not yet reached. The stages are (a) mind in its motion, (b) practical mind, and (c) mind in its pure exposition. The whole treatment of ethical mind is called practical rather than objective. The framework, however, is laid down, and the chief weakness is in the transitions.

In 1817 the first of the mature expositions of Hegel's ethical philosophy appeared in the *Encyclopaedia*. This work is a complete, but brief, statement of Hegel's philosophy as a whole—lacking, however, the approach offered in the *Phenomenology*—and his more specialized works are fuller statements of various positions adopted in it. In 1821 Hegel published the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, in which the ethical and political portions of the *Encyclopaedia* are handled by themselves. Both of these works are authoritative. The *Encyclopaedia* was enlarged and revised in 1827 and in 1830. In it Hegel refers to the *Philosophy of Right* for details, and, conversely, one has to turn to the former work for the context in which the latter is set. From the nature of the case there is a better balance in the *Encyclopaedia*. The *Philosophy of Right* points out the way in which the principles of right realize mind and give it objectivity; and it is more concerned to show how the infinite self-contained whole which mind intrinsically is, comes to the light of day, than to display the insufficiency of the whole field of right. In consequence, the latter work speaks of the infinity of mind and the rationality of the will without further qualification, whereas the former is careful to note that this infinity is itself finite and the rationality not final. I see no reason to suppose, however,

that there is more than a difference of emphasis, and I have tried to read the two books together.

The *Philosophy of Right* is an expansion of a part of the whole scheme ; the last portion of it itself is greatly expanded by Hegel in his lectures on the *Philosophy of History* given from 1822 to 1831. I have used this work to amplify certain points.

The introduction to the *Philosophy of Right* presents considerable difficulty. It is a brief attempt to place the reader in a position to begin Hegel's philosophy in the middle. I have chosen a somewhat different approach, and have drawn on various writings from which his general doctrine is to be gathered. The earlier portions of the *Encyclopaedia*, of course, are relevant, and I have made some reference to the *Larger Logic* which Hegel wrote during 1812-16. I have avoided discussion of peculiar doctrines of his philosophy of nature as far as possible, but I have introduced it wherever it seemed necessary to understand the general position.

I am very conscious of the imperfection of the treatment given here. The presuppositions of the ethical standpoint are not sufficiently expounded, and I have had to be extremely dogmatic in my references to Hegel's *Logic*. This I regret, but it seems inevitable. The full exposition of the *Logic* would occupy greater space than this book itself, and cannot be given propaedeutically. I regret also that I have not been able to carry forward my account into the region of what Hegel calls absolute mind. But again the task is so involved that I have had to content myself with little more than a bare indication of the problem which has to be solved by succeeding portions of philosophy. In reference to both these fields I have tried to adopt Hegel's own point of view, and have not developed any criticism. Throughout the exposition I have not attempted to conceal the fact that I agree very substantially with Hegel's treatment ; and I have often ventured

to put his argument in the terms which most naturally express my own opinion. Nevertheless the absence of criticism on any point is not to be taken as a sign that I regard Hegel's view there as valid for all time. My first object has been exposition, and the criticism in which I have indulged has been subordinated to the purpose of making the development of the argument clear.

Almost a century has passed since Hegel published the *Encyclopaedia*, and the world has not stood still in the meantime. Some forms of social life which were present to Hegel have decayed, and passed into the keeping of history ; other forms have developed since his time ; and our knowledge of political life is both more accurate and more extensive than his possibly could be. As he himself might say, the world has become more mature and philosophy has now a more complete construction over against it to be built into an intellectual kingdom. But in spite of this undeniable immaturity of some parts of Hegel's view, I feel sure that what is needed in social philosophy is development and not revolution. One important step which must be taken if we are to profit by the advance which has been made is to appropriate the truth of the philosophy which has come down to us. Hegel is the last great original thinker in the main line of the evolution of philosophy, and I doubt whether the new philosophic movements of our own day have mastered his thought. These movements are not at all to be ignored or despised, and they contain truth which Hegel did not reach. But at the same time we must keep in touch with the main stream, and we can find it nowhere more fully than in Hegel. Whenever the limits of his social experience seemed to me to obscure the *rationale* of his argument I have indicated my criticism : but throughout I have put his view in the best light I could and have tried to speak for him.

It may be well to indicate in this introductory statement

the divisions of my argument. I have tried to show at the beginning the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy as a whole, and the first chapter contains a brief account of his Logic with special reference to the dialectic. The account, of course, is purely introductory, and the conception of the dialectic is expanded at various later stages of the discussion. The second chapter considers certain topics of the Logic in order to make clear the nature of the principles with which we have to deal in ethical philosophy. The third chapter is occupied with the philosophic attitude and has a special reference to the standpoint of ethics. The fourth chapter is continuous with this and sets forth Hegel's general conception of mind. The fifth chapter considers the analysis of these categories of mind which are dialectically prior to ethics and presupposed in it. The next two chapters, the sixth and the seventh, deal with abstract right, the first division of the world of right; in the succeeding two, eight and nine, the principles of morality are expounded and examined. Chapters ten, eleven, and twelve discuss the third main section of the subject, the ethical world proper. And I have concluded with a chapter which indicates very briefly the limits of the ethical world.

With regard to Hegel's technical terms my procedure has been as follows. The important phrases, *an sich* and *fur sich*, I have rendered by implicit, inherent, or intrinsic in the one case, and explicit, or very occasionally, independent, in the other. To the phrase *an und fur sich* I have had to surrender, and have usually substituted the word absolute. *Dasein* is translated by definite mode or definite being. I find that by many translators *Wirklichkeit* is usually rendered by actuality, *Realitat* by reality; but this use led me into considerable difficulty. The significance of the word reality in English philosophical writing is too profound to admit of this use, and it is much nearer the term *Wirklichkeit* as

Hegel uses it. Accordingly I have translated *Wirklichkeit* by reality and *Realitat* by reality. It should be noted that the terms are not used indiscriminately. *Bestimmung* I have allowed myself to render by determination, category, characteristic, nature, or even principle as the context suggests. There is no fixed equivalent in English, but the significance can generally be given fairly accurately. *Begriff* and *Idee* are rendered respectively by notion and 'idea'—the quotation marks indicating that 'idea' is not to be understood in anything but Hegel's technical sense. Other words present less difficulty.

I have usually taken advantage of Wallace's translations from the *Encyclopaedia* and Professor Baillie's translation of the *Phenomenology*. I have consulted versions of other parts of Hegel whenever they were available, particularly that of the *Philosophy of Right* by Dr. Dyde, but I have preferred to make my own translation. Unless otherwise stated, the references to Hegel's *Werke* are to the edition of 1832-40; the exceptions being the early treatise of 1802 *Concerning the Scientific Modes of Treating Natural Right*, for which references are given to the edition in 1913 of *Hegel's Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* by Georg Lasson as well as to volume I of the *Werke*, and the *Philosophy of History* which is quoted from the third edition of the *Werke*, dated 1848.

CHAPTER I

THE LOGICAL BACKGROUND

THE *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, with which we are chiefly concerned in this book, is the last important systematic work which Hegel himself published, and it has Hegel's general system as a background. In order to understand it we have to begin some distance off. I propose in this chapter to discuss some important aspects of his logical theory, for in it the roots of his ethical doctrines are to be found. In the next chapter I shall explain in greater detail some of the principles which his logic lays bare, and on the comprehension of which the interpretation and judgement of his ethical philosophy depends.

Philosophy for Hegel covers three main provinces, logic, nature, and mind; and the sciences of these three realms give us progressive, yet inter-related, analyses of reality and experience. Hegel's view of logic is remote from that of the ordinary text-book. What is usually called formal logic occupies itself chiefly with an account of various processes of thought whereby inferences can be consistently drawn from assumed premises. This analysis is generally prefaced by a statement, partly logical, partly grammatical, partly psychological, of the 'elements' of thought—the pieces with which the game is played. By logic Hegel means something more important than this: he offers an analysis of the fundamental constitutive principles of the content of all experience; and the specific forms of 'right reasoning', as detailed in the usual formal logic, occupy a subordinate place in the whole. In order to see how he reaches this position we may look at the matter from two points of view; firstly, the necessity of the case, and secondly, the historical development—mainly with reference to Kant.

Logic in the narrower sense attempts to be a self-contained body of doctrine with a recognized sphere and a special method. It separates itself from the theory of knowledge and from metaphysics, and it claims that its own province is

capable of scientific treatment without reference to the wider problems—e.g., the relation of knowledge to reality, and the ultimate nature of things—which come within the scope of the larger philosophical sciences. The claim is at first sight supported by actual achievement: text-books are numberless; they are written by men of the most diverse views on epistemology and metaphysics; and yet there seems to be established a certain *consensus gentium* regarding the substance of the science. Closer examination, however, disturbs this superficial appearance. The average text-book professes to be merely an introduction; it repeats the traditional views on the traditional topics with little attempt to weave the material into a whole. A concluding chapter sometimes takes up the problems which have been slurred over in the actual exposition itself, and points to epistemology and metaphysics as the proper field for their fuller treatment. The disagreement between the writers becomes acute at this stage; the nature of the ‘reference’ of thought to reality is variously interpreted, the relation between the ‘laws of thought’—probably briefly mentioned at an early stage, and postponed for discussion until the end—and the minor laws of inference is treated in many mutually exclusive ways, and many solutions are given of the problem of the meaning of the ‘form of thought’. The problems are not pressed home until the body of logic has been laid forth, and yet it is the solution of these and other similar questions which should mark off the subject-matter and determine the treatment. The apparent unanimity is due rather to *vis inertiae*, to the acceptance of a traditional logical datum, than to a genuine harmony concerning the nature of right reasoning. If a student seeks to go beyond these introductions, he speedily discovers that the postponed logical problems contain the very substance of logic, and that the boundary wall between logic and metaphysics falls when he approaches it.

It may be taken for granted that logic deals with true thought. If so, is it possible to analyse the nature of true thinking without reference to the object of knowledge? The word, thought, is without doubt an ambiguous one, and covers a fatal tendency to confuse the act of thinking, a psychological subject-matter, with the object or content known. The question of a distinction between ‘object’ and ‘content’

is passed over for the present : it seems clear that it is a distinction within a single point of view, both falling within the vision of the thinker himself and being distinct from that which a spectator, occupying the psychological standpoint, notes as the elements and laws of the temporal act of thinking. The same ambiguity attaches to the word, *experience*, when the act of experiencing is confused with what is experienced. In both cases the two meanings are inseparable aspects of a single process, and neither apart from the other is more than a one-sided abstraction :¹ for the psychological standpoint is that of an external spectator, and it is obvious that a spectator does not see all that there is unless he apprehends the content present to the subject himself ; and, on the other hand, the subject's own knowledge is limited if the psychological aspect, the process of the content, is beyond his view. At the same time the aspects are not to be identified in a crude and immediate fashion. Whether or not either attitude is capable of including the other—a point we need not determine at present—it is clear that in the ordinary case the process apprehended by the psychologist and the content apprehended by the subject are widely different ; and one must avoid filling up gaps in the analysis of one side by material borrowed from the other without a definite justification. In our question the term, *thought* or *thinking*, refers to the content of thought, to that which is apprehended ; and the problem concerns the possibility of stating the fundamental laws of apprehending thought in complete isolation from that which is apprehended ; in other words, the independence of logic.

The independence of logic may be maintained in two ways. On the one hand the ambiguity of the term, *thought*, may be exploited, and psychological laws of the order of thoughts in time may be offered as logic. This device hardly needs criticism. The other method is to draw a sharp line between the content of thought and the 'real' object, and to declare that the content—all thought-forms as such—is subjective. This is, for example, Lotze's method in logic. The fundamental objection to the procedure is that it involves a dualism between knowledge and reality, which makes knowledge possible only by an unending miracle. If all the forms of thought are subjective, if its modes of connexion answer to

¹ Cf. below, chap. IV. p. 80.

nothing in the real world, how can the result give us a content in any way like the trans-subjective world of things? Moreover, how can the exponent of such a view know that the laws of thinking are subjective and its results objective? Such knowledge implies independent acquaintance with the real world in order to compare it point for point with the content of knowledge. The argument need not be elaborated farther: it is clear that this view of logic is so far from being free from epistemology and metaphysics that it is based on a view of knowledge which separates knowledge from things, and it has sufficient information about reality to distinguish the laws of the latter from the modes and principles of the content of thought.¹ This contention, however, by no means settles the question. Perhaps if we give up the untenable dualism between the content of knowledge and the object known, we may devise a distinction within the content of knowledge between subjective modes of organizing the material apprehended and objective principles of things. But such a distinction, although a genuine one when regarded in a certain way, is an abandonment of the original scope and task of logic. It gives up the problem of analysing the forms of knowing as a whole, and breaks up the total content into two sections without exposing what they have in common. If logic identifies its object with one of these divisions there remains room for another logic, more faithful to its primary duty, which will lay bare the principles involved in any apprehended content, whether existing in external nature or not.

Hegel's logic claims this larger task. If logic is to maintain itself as the science of the principles of the content of knowledge, it must cease to diminish its stature to the measure of the merely subjective, and must advance to an analysis of the structural principles of a thought which can apprehend any object. But it is obvious that such an analysis is metaphysical as well as logical. It is conversant not only with the principles of thinking, but also with those of that which is thought; and it cannot but seek to determine the conditions of an intelligible world, the only world with which we have any concern. Naturally, if reality is identified with

¹ For an acute criticism on historical lines of the attempt to separate logic from metaphysics v. Adamson, *A Short History of Logic*, pp. 1-163, reprinted, with additions, from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

actual existence in space and time, and metaphysics identified with the science of such a reality, then logic is wider than metaphysics. But such is not the sense of metaphysics in which Hegel's logic is metaphysical. Existence in space and time is part of a wider whole ; and there are principles which are operative in things, but which cannot be said to have existence in this limited sense. This point may become clearer at a later stage of the argument ; at present it is enough to note that from the present point of view the object of metaphysics is the entire scheme of things, the wholeness of the world, of which existence in nature is but one mode. Logic, as metaphysical, is the science of the principles of a thought whose content is the whole, the absolute, the real, or whatever else be its name.

Having found the standpoint of logic, we may refer briefly to its limitation. The known world, for Hegel, falls into two main divisions, viz., nature and mind. These are part of one world known by a single apprehending consciousness, and therefore subject to the fundamental laws which make knowledge and an object intelligible. But nevertheless each realm has forms and laws of its own ; each has a character which cannot be attributed to the other, and it works out the basal principles of intelligible objects in its own way. For our present purpose it is perhaps better not to regard the special laws of these realms as new principles ; they are rather more concrete developments of the fundamental forms of all knowledge, fresh and separate ways of exemplifying them, articulations of them, their expression in new media. This throws into relief the community of spheres, and it is to these underlying principles of both realms that logic is limited. The philosophy of nature is the account of the principles as they appear in the outward world ; the philosophy of mind exposes them in the shapes which they take in conscious life ; logic is the discussion of them by themselves, without reference to their higher special embodiments.

We may now consider briefly the historical development of Hegel's position from that of Kant. Kant had inquired into the conditions of synthetic *a priori* judgements. Mathematics offered him a type of these judgements, and he raised the question, How is it possible for such knowledge to be universal and necessary and yet to apply to objects ? Mere analysis

which keeps within the realm of mental concepts had, for him, an obvious universality, but it could not add to our knowledge of things, could not prophesy new conjections in experience. Its breadth was due to its shallowness. On the other hand, empirical knowledge provides a synthetic union of diverse elements of experience, but it dare not transcend the present moment and the actual synthesis given. But these strange judgements of mathematics speak confidently, not depending on experience, and yet giving us fresh knowledge of objective things! In order to explain this kind of knowledge Kant found it necessary to carry over that activity of knowledge, in accordance with which its decrees possess universality in the realm of mind, into the province of actual experience. If the objects of experience, he argued, are amenable to the universality which belongs of right to thought and which cannot be obtained empirically, then thought must have a share in the constitution of the objects of experience.

The problem soon broadened out from its original form. Previous philosophy, Kant thought, had gone on the assumption that the task of knowledge is to correspond to an independent object out of essential relation to knowledge, and scepticism had been the outcome. For if the object is *ex vi termini* beyond knowledge and independent of it, there is no guarantee that the content known stands in any relation to the independent and unknown real. Taking his stand, therefore, on the validity of knowledge, Kant asks, What must be true of the object in order that it may be known? The boasted independence of the object quickly disappears under this treatment, and Kant discovers one condition of knowledge after another to which objects must conform if they are to be intelligible. These conditions, Kant thought, do not hold of the independent object, the thing-in-itself, but they govern the phenomenal object, that which can be known. Kant, however, does not dismiss the conception of the independent object, but continues to contrast it with the known object; and by virtue of the opposition condemns the latter as subjective.

The extent to which Kant transcended this crude dualism does not concern us here, because the thing-in-itself never disappears from his argument. Even when other reasons are offered for the subjectivity of the known object, e.g. in the

antinomies, the conflict within experience has ultimately no other basis than the original dualism of mind and outward reality. The various minor collisions, e.g., between sense and understanding, understanding and reason, constitutive and regulative principles, practical reason and theoretic reason, and so forth, are all modifications of the primary uncritical supposition; and if it is withdrawn their substance has vanished. So long as they remain unchecked, the influence of the thing-in-itself persists. That is to say, Kant's inquiry into the conditions of an intelligible world is conducted under the guidance of a firm dualism of subject and object, in accordance with which universality and form are attributed to the former, particularity and content to the latter. If experience manifests universality, he argues, it is mind-made and subjective. From this Hegel dissents.¹ For Kant, in so far as he is a dualist, the distinction between subjective and objective coincides with that between knowledge and what is beyond knowledge. And, although his main contribution to epistemology is a new sense of objectivity which falls within experience, yet there remains in the background the original conception of the objective as independent and trans-subjective. Such a distinction is, for Hegel, unmeaning. The unknowable is the most absurd of all conceptions, and the least interesting to rational beings; it is a direct contradiction in terms. The only significant distinction between subjective and objective falls within the field of knowledge; it marks off various contents from one another, and does not separate the knowable from the unknowable. When the trans-subjective thing-in-itself vanishes, the contrast between it and the phenomenal or subjective object loses all point; and hence the phenomenal objectivity which Kant had set up within experience developed for Hegel into real objectivity. With this change of attitude came a great change of content. The fundamental principles which make experience possible were, for Kant, few in number, and the principles of pure thought involved amounted only to twelve. Hegel pushed the analysis much further; he found logical principles continuous with the categories and principles of the understanding both above and below them; and thus in place of Kant's limited list there arises the whole elaborate structure of Hegel's logic.

¹ Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, § 41, Zusatz 2, WW. VI. pp. 87-9.

Before dealing with any of the details of this scheme we may summarize Hegel's position. Kant found an *a priori* element in experience, a universality which transcended the given; but he wrongly identified it with the subjective, the mind-made. Hegel swept this identification aside. These principles, he argued, apply to the known as such, subject as well as thing; they are doubtless principles of thought, but they are no less principles of the world; they go beneath the opposition of subjective and objective, they characterize all experience, and are not more truly called mental than are particular laws of nature—nor less so. Kant's Critique professed to be epistemological, an inquiry into the nature and limits of the knowing faculty; Hegel's investigation is frankly logical and metaphysical. It deals directly with the known world, and investigates the knowing which apprehends objects.

Hegel's objective standpoint has given rise to the charge that he proposes to evolve the world out of his own inner consciousness. The criticism may mean many things. It may imply that Hegel sat down in the seclusion of his study, shut out in so far as he could all reference to common experience, and concocted an arbitrary scheme from the idiosyncracies of his private fancies. This is a matter of evidence and need not raise the general question of the ultimate relation of reason and science; for such capricious imaginings are condemned as much by the sanity of thought as by experimental knowledge of fact. Hegel must not be prejudged on this point, for he claims that his method is not private and fanciful but open and rational. On the other hand the criticism may cut deeper. It may rest on the assumption that reason and the truth fall apart, and that a theory may be wholly rational and yet untrue. From this point of view, to evolve the world out of one's inner consciousness means simply to exercise a rational and critical activity. It is only in this sense that Hegel would admit the truth of the statement, and his whole theory is a denial of the accompanying supposition that apart from and beyond reasonable knowledge there is anything with which knowledge is in any way concerned. It should be clear from what has been said that from Hegel's standpoint the nature of the cognitive subject is fundamentally one with that of his world. The constitutive

principles of his rational mind are also those of that which he apprehends. Thus it is true that in unfolding the nature of mind Hegel is analysing or remaking for knowledge the principles of things ; but it is no less true that the evolution of an *arbitrary* scheme in the mind is not the analysis of reality—it is not the analysis of mind itself. By bringing the world and mind into harmony Hegel has made metaphysics possible, but at the same time he has made logic, the key, more difficult by extending its content and forcing it to wait on the nature of things. Sometimes Hegel's argument seems capricious and fine-spun, but in general there is no reasonable doubt of his conviction that, in the order of learning, experience is prior to rational thought.¹ We live before we reflect on life, and a wide experience is necessary for the ingathering of the meaning of experience. Indeed, one of the more striking characteristics of Hegel's own thought is its persistence and perseverance ; and his contempt for fanciful speculation and for formalism is unbounded.² Experience, or fact, is the basis of all thought and all science ; and a philosophy which cannot cover life and is built in abstraction from the considerations of practice is a futility of the understanding.

But experience is only the beginning. What is given is not the final truth, not the finished perfect work which alone deserves the name of the real ; it is rather a problem, a vague we-know-not-what. Thought has to interpret the datum, and solve the problem ; and the succession of general principles by means of which we attempt this interpretation is the content of logic. One of the most fruitful ways of regarding Hegel's Logic is to look upon it as a protracted and thorough study of the relations of unity and difference, or of universal and particular. Each category, or determination, is a general principle by which we seek to make experience a consistent whole and render it a concrete universal ; and each has its own way of relating the two root factors, viz., unity and difference.

Before discussing any of the categories themselves, however, it is necessary to glance at three preliminary points ; the connexion of the categories, the order of their exposition, and the motive power of the development.

¹ V. *Encyclopaedia*, §§ 6–9, and notes ; WW. VII. p. 18.

² V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II, *Vorrede*, in particular pp. 55–6.

In the first place, the principles of thought are interconnected. For a genuine empiricism the world is not a whole but a series of numberless parts—parts in no wise connected with one another. The series can be a unity for an apprehending consciousness only if it is thought under principles which hold it together and connect its various portions. Every principle of thought has this function, and the task of knowledge is to discover them. Kant, as we have seen, gave these principles a subjective turn, and supposed that they were foisted upon the material of knowledge, and that the mind made its objects. Hegel is quite aware of the activity of thought here, but he recognizes the objective side also. The laws and principles in question are those which constitute the world; they are those which things must contain if they are to form an intelligible world at all—and what is not intelligible is not a world. But it is not enough that there should be a variety of laws discernible in the objects of knowledge. A number of separate principles would give us, not one world, but as many worlds as there are special forms of unity. Moreover these worlds would be absolutely out of relation to one another, and could have no commerce. Moreover, they could not be known to one and the same mind; indeed, to speak more accurately, we should have no right to call them all *worlds*, for to be a world is to possess a special type of unity, and *ex hypothesi* the types are all different. Mind is a unity, intelligence is the same in principle in all its activities, and all the objects it can know must belong inherently to the one scheme of things. If the objective anarchy which we have suggested were the case, we should need as many minds as there were principles in order to apprehend them, and the mind would be shattered into fragments. If the mind is to be a unity, its object must also be a unity and constitute one world. But the various portions of the content of knowledge can form a whole only if unifying principles themselves cohere; for the principles are the unity of the world. That is to say, what Kant calls the synthetic *a priori* principles of knowledge, or what we may call the constitutive principles of what is known, are linked together and form a rational and coherent whole. Their own interconnexion is, on the one hand, the essence of the unity of the intelligible world, and, on the other, of the rationality of the

knowing mind. We are not dealing with two quite differently organized things, a mind and a world; we are dealing with the fundamental principles of the intelligible content of rational thought; and the coherence of both aspects depends on the coherence of the principles themselves.

The second point is the order of the philosophic exposition of these principles. Hegel's view of this is somewhat complex, and is to be fully understood only when the complete exposition is mastered. The peculiar method he adopts is called by him the dialectic, and I shall have to recur to it at various stages of the discussion. The point to be indicated here is an obvious and somewhat superficial one. Hegel sets out from the barest and emptiest of the principles of possible thought; he begins at the bottom and works upwards. The main alternatives seem to be either that of beginning anywhere and working at random, or that of beginning at the top and working downwards. The first of these alternatives is plainly inadequate. It is not a method, but the failure of one; and it cannot exhibit the categories in their rational inter-connexion. Lotze seems to think that it is the only possible attitude for a modest mind; but if this be so, then it seems clear that the mind in question has not pushed its investigation of experience far enough to reach the level of philosophy. It is still preoccupied with the order of learning, and has not attained to the order of explanation. Such a process is preliminary to philosophy, and Hegel himself went through it¹; but he did not put his results forward as logic until he had emancipated himself from the adolescence it implies. The other method is that expressly enunciated by Spinoza, and Hegel rejects it. Spinoza begins with the whole, with substance, the final reality. But the difficulty immediately arises: If we start with the perfect principle why do we go further? Spinoza makes progress because what he calls the whole is not really such, but has beyond it another world of 'modes'—in general, *Natura naturata*.² Hegel calls this method that of emanation. 'It is a series of

¹ For the history of the development of Hegel's logical theory v. Baillie, *Hegel's Logic*.

² In his *Larger Logic* Hegel points out the greater concreteness of the mode when contrasted with the absolute or substance: *WW*. IV. pp. 184-99.

deteriorating stages', he says, 'which begin with the complete, with the absolute totality, with God. God has created; and from Him have come forth radiations, reflections, and likenesses, of which the first is most akin to Him. The first production also shows activity, but less completely, and so downwards . . . to the negative, matter, the extreme of evil. Thus the emanation ends with the lack of all form'.¹

There is a sense in which we must begin with the whole. Until we become aware of the wholeness of being we are not on philosophic ground, and are unable to trace the inter-relations of the principles of experience. The order of the dialectic process is guided by an ever present consciousness of the highest stages, and it is not until we reach the last of the three main divisions that we see clearly by what path we have come. At first it is not explicitly known to us that the principle we use is that of single reality: we begin with the poorest possible way of characterizing things and pass upwards to more concrete attitudes of thought. This order may be regarded in two ways; it is a process from abstract to concrete, and it is a movement from the external to the internal. The effort of thought at first is to take one thing at a time; the unities which thought imposes on things are very loose, and express but few of their relations. As thought rises in the scale its principles become more concrete, they gain wealth and depth. That is to say, they express the object more truly. They present more adequately its relations to its context and to the whole system of which it forms a part; and that is why Hegel uses the word, concrete, in this connexion.

The other way of characterizing the movement gives us a point of transition to the discussion of its motive power. The lower categories are abstract because they are external. Most of reality lies beyond their grasp; things are presented singly, and thought does not see how each determines the nature of the others and enters into their being. In Hegel's view the Nemesis of such thought is that it turns into its opposite. Take the simplest example. The first category of the Logic is being. The simplest, barest, and least affirmation we can make is that indicated by the word 'is'. But if we say no more than this, what have we said? We must strip off the idea of a 'thing'; the assertion is not that such and

¹ WW. VII. p. 35.

such a definite object is, for a 'definite object' involves much more than does mere 'being'. We are to say 'is', and nothing else. But when we have said this our meaning is indistinguishable from 'nothing'. If we take away all the particular qualities of things, we abstract from them everything by means of which we distinguish what is from what is not. Being which is not existence in some place and time, and under some special circumstances, and so forth, is as good as non-existence—it is the same as non-existence. Hegel's contention is that if we are in earnest with our thought and carry it as far as it will go, such a category changes in our hands and shows a meaning which we try to exclude from it. This state of things can be mended only when we adopt a more concrete principle which includes both aspects as part of itself. That is to say, the implication of the one aspect in the other is at the first level a force compelling thought from outside; at the second level it is part of the content of thought itself. When we force reality, as it were, into one of these primitive categories and try to take it abstractly, it avenges itself by turning into another form. The neglected aspects appear in spite of us, and the despised unity of the system as a whole reveals itself by forcing a half idea to turn into its opposite. This change, however, is not part of the category itself. That is to say, the change is immediate for the thinker who uses such principles; he does not apprehend the inner nexus which produces the conversion, and each term is, for him, unmediated by its opposite. Generally speaking, we are offered the alternative of unity or difference by these bare and elementary forms of thought; and the abstractness of our choice amends itself by the unforeseen passage of the one element into the other. In the higher reaches of the dialectic the various aspects have been incorporated by thought to such an extent that the process is not from one aspect to its complementary by this primarily negative path, but is a more straight-forward development; and Hegel speaks of it as mere play.¹

This brings us to the third point, the power behind the process. This has been said to be contradiction.² But such

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VI. § 161 and note.

² For a discussion of this view v. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 5 ff.

a view is shallow ; for one immediately asks, What is behind the contradiction ? Contradiction itself is the immediate opposition of one phase of an object by another ; but at the back of it is the power of the whole. We may use Hegel's theory of tragedy to throw some light on his Logic at this point. Hegel finds the essence of tragedy to lie in a conflict between spiritual forces which belong to one system and which ought to be in harmony. The catastrophe is the assertion by the whole of its complexity against the one-sidedness of some imperfect aspect. When the conflict is between two individuals, each, from the tragic point of view, is dominated by some aspect of the whole good, perhaps an ethical claim such as the duty to one's kindred, perhaps a wider end, such as natural justice, honour, or the ambition of a strong man ; and this is followed to the exclusion of all else. The devotion to this abstract ideal, good in itself but imperfect when set against the rest of life, brings the agent into collision with other factors and with the whole ; and in the conflict the tragic hero is overthrown. The final note of tragedy, however, is not loss. Over and above the confusion and destruction of that which is imperfect and by the nature of things transitory there is the assertion of the full and rounded character of reality. The positive side, of course, is not fully developed in tragedy, but if it be utterly lacking the tragedy is imperfect and inartistic—it is merely a pitiful tale. Behind the sympathy with the fallen there must be a feeling of the greater good which the agent himself was unable to grasp, and his fall is a vindication of the deeper truth. We need not discuss any of the details of the exposition ; the only point of present importance is that the fate which destroys a tragic hero is not a mere external force, it is in him as well as about him.

Mr. A. C. Bradley gives excellent expression to the situation thus. ' If . . . this necessity were merely infinite, characterless, external force, the catastrophe would not only terrify (as it should), it would also horrify, depress, or at best provoke indignation or rebellion ; and these are not tragic feelings. The catastrophe, then, must have a second and affirmative aspect, which is the source of our feelings of reconciliation, whatever form they may assume. And this will be taken into account if we describe the catastrophe as a violent self-

restitution of the divided spiritual unity. The necessity which acts and negates in it, that is to say, is yet of one substance with both the agents. *It* is divided against itself in them; they are *its* conflicting forces; and in restoring its unity through negation it affirms them, so far as they are compatible with that unity. The qualification is essential, since the hero, for all his affinity with that power, is, as the living man we see before us, not so compatible. He must die, and his union with 'eternal justice' (which is more than 'justice') must itself be 'eternal' or ideal. But the qualification does not abolish what it qualifies. There is no occasion to ask how in particular, and in what various ways in various works, we feel the effect of this affirmative aspect in the catastrophe. But it corresponds at least with that strange double impression which is produced by the hero's death. He dies, and our hearts die with him; and yet his death matters nothing to us, or we even exult. He is dead; and he has no more to do with death than the power which killed him and with which he is one.¹

Now logic in principle is even more than tragedy; for it is the express reconciliation of the subordinated elements, and the rational completion of lower principles in a whole into which they are carried without remainder. Logic is not encumbered by the actual living man, and the dialectic is not a history of personal sufferings which cannot be made good. Although at first dialectic changes are external and unintelligible to the mind which uses elementary principles, yet these changes themselves are seen by fuller knowledge to be a self-evolution of the complete truth. In its higher stages thought has to include the lower categories, and the elements of perfect knowledge are known by it as opposites.² But although tragedy and the dialectic differ in completeness, the power is the same; it is the whole. Thought is one system, and lives in every member. When a part in its finitude is taken as the whole, its truer nature breaks through in the form of contradiction, and cannot be satisfied until it renders explicit the fullness and truth against which the imperfect assertion sinned. The imperfect aspects can collide only because they have a proper relation and ought to be reconciled. The dialectic thus is a development of reason from

¹ *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, p. 91.

² Cf. below, p. 40 ff.

within, and its moving force is the implication of the whole in every part and the systematic continuity of the knowable world.

Such then is the general logical standpoint which Hegel adopts, and we shall have to recur to it in our discussion of the method of the other branches of philosophy. At present, however, we must be content with this outline, meagre as it is, and proceed to discuss some of the special principles which the dialectic of logical thought contains.

CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTAL LOGICAL CATEGORIES

WE have seen that the dialectic is the process by which the principles of knowledge pass for thought from abstractness to concreteness, and that the moving force of the development is the logical compulsion exercised by the whole system within each of its fragments. We must now look at some of the special stages of this development in order to be able to determine the logical nature and position of the main conceptions which we must use in ethics. For this purpose it is desirable to pay special attention to some of the categories of the second division of the Logic, viz. the sphere of essence. It is not possible, of course, to deal with them all in their proper order and succession, but we may gain sufficient for our purpose if we take a suitable selection. I propose to indicate the general division of the Logic and to refer very briefly to the general nature of the categories of the first section. In connexion with the categories of essence I shall begin with the conception of 'thinghood' because it throws some light on the relation of mind to nature, and is of importance in any discussion of the transparency or opaqueness of nature to moral purposes. I shall then pass to the conception of substance, which has to be examined carefully for two reasons ; firstly, because it, together with its subdivisions, manifests the full nature of the non-spiritual world, and contains within it the principle of necessity and external determination, and secondly because it is the stepping stone to the notion. The notion is itself the key to mind and the spiritual world in general ; it is the logical principle of which the free self is the concrete realization. We may, therefore, consider somewhat closely the development of the dialectic from substance through causality and reciprocity into the notion.

Hegel's logic falls into three main divisions or stages : first, the categories of being ; second, the categories of

essence ; and third, the categories of the notion. These may be regarded as three main ways in which unity and difference may be presented in thought. Taking the matter in broad outline, there are three modes in which we may apprehend these two aspects. We may be offered any of three alternatives—(a) unity *or* difference, or (b) unity *and* difference, or (c) unity *because of* difference. Under the control of the categories of being we may say simply that a content 'is', and the negative aspect (non-being) may for the moment be entirely excluded from the explicit content of our thought. Or again we may say that it is one, excluding multiplicity ; or many, excluding unity. This is the poorest form of thinking, and corresponds to the most superficial aspect of objects. The inadequacy of such principles is obvious and need not be laboured. In full truth every aspect of the intelligible world is in profound harmony with every other, and contains within it a reference to the whole. Hegel's proof of this lies in the complete dialectic : the full implication of the whole in each aspect or fragment is not made fully clear until the end, viz. the stage of the notion (in the wide sense) ; the defects of the categories of being are, at their own proper stage, shown only externally, and fresh light is shed on their true nature at each step in the argument. The thinker who uses the categories of being, however, is far from apprehending this truth. He tries to isolate each aspect and to take it merely by itself. Each thing is itself, he says, and not another ; and he is quite unaware of the deeper nature of each element whereby it has community with every other element and with the whole. We have seen the fate which overtakes this kind of thought. If we try to grasp reality under these categories it eludes us ; reality will not be confined in these abstract forms, and the strange result which greets us is that it is Protean and changes as we hold it.¹

In the categories of essence this false simplicity and externality of thought begins to disappear. The thinker notes a distinction between the aspects of appearance and essence. The surface show of a thing is not its whole truth ; behind that show there is a certain identity and permanence—an essence. As we progress in this series of categories we gradually discover that things are inter-connected ; and

¹ Cf. above, p. 12 f.

we now see that we have not said the complete truth when we affirm that a thing is itself—it is *also* bound up with the rest of the universe and contains implications of the whole within the four corners of its being. We may take ‘thinghood’ as our first example of these principles of essence.

This is a very common category of ordinary thought, but it is not so simple as it may appear at first sight ;¹ and Hegel identifies it with the principle of sensible perception. We may note that a thing is not a simple quality, it is a totality of some sort standing in relation to differences ; it is a thing with many properties. Each of these properties is distinct from the others, each has a being of its own and does not modify the others. The properties lie side by side, as it were, untouched by one another, and their relation is that of indifference. But at the same time they all come together ; a thing is not a mere name given to a random collection of entirely unrelated qualities. In the *Phenomenology* Hegel points out that the unity in question is found chiefly in space and time. The treatment of thinghood in the two *Logics* is naturally more abstract, and Hegel speaks of the form of unity without pointing to the mode of concrete experience in which it is primarily manifested. Since we are not concerned with logic purely on its own account, it seems permissible to introduce here the type of experience which Hegel mentions in the *Phenomenology*, and has in mind in his discussion in the purely logical analysis. ‘This salt’, he says, ‘is a simple “Here” and at the same time manifold ; it is white and *also* pungent, *also* cubical in shape, *also* of a specific weight, and so on. All these many properties exist in a simple “Here” where they inter-penetrate one another. None of these has a different “Here” from the others ; each is everywhere in the same “Here” where the others are. At the same time, without being divided by different “Heres”, they do not affect each other in their inter-penetration ; its being white does not affect or alter the cubical shape it has, and neither affects its sharp outline, and so on. On the contrary each is simple relation-to-self, it leaves the others alone and is related to these merely by

¹ There are three accounts of the nature of thinghood ; *Phenomenology*, WW. II. pp. 84-99 ; *Larger Logic*, WW. IV. Abschnitt 2, Kap. 1 ; *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VI. § 125 ff.

being *also* along with them, a relation of mere indifference. This "also" is thus the pure universal itself, the "medium", the "thinghood" keeping them together.'¹ But there is more than this to be said about a thing. We have seen that the properties are different from one another, and this involves that they do stand in some relation to one another. If they were utterly and merely indifferent they would not even be distinguished, i.e. they would not be determinate qualities. The attributes of a thing, then, involve in their being a rudimentary opposition to one another. But in holding its properties apart the thing develops a further aspect in itself; it becomes more than a mere togetherness or inter-penetration of the properties. 'The process of distinguishing them, so far as it does not leave them indifferent, but effectually excludes, negates one from another, thus falls outside the simple "medium". And this, consequently, is not a mere *also*, a unity which is indifferent to what is in it, but a "one" as well, an *excluding* repelling unity.'² Thinghood thus implies a certain activity; the thing shuts out other properties and holds its own together. It is more than the sum, or the place, of its properties—it is something behind them, something which *has* them and which refuses to have others. It is an essence.

In this conception of thinghood we have the factors of more developed thought, at least in germ; but they are confused and not set in their proper relations. A thing is not a perfectly coherent object of thought. This does not mean that 'things' do not exist; indeed the analysis of thinghood is almost identical with the statement of the meaning of existence for Hegel. To exist is to present oneself thus in space and time; and if this form of presentation turns out to contain contradiction, the conclusion is not that it does not exist, but that existence itself is an inadequate and abstract mode of thought and reality. We may give definite names, for the sake of convenience, to the aspects of thinghood; the surface show, the attributes which when regarded as belonging to the thing are called properties, these are the immediate aspect, and the thing which has the properties is the mediate aspect. Thinghood is one of the many ways in which thought tries to relate these two

¹ WW. II. pp. 86-7, Baillie's trans. I. pp. 107-8.

² *Ibid.*

sides. In his *Logic* Hegel shows that this conception fails in its task by noting how the essential, or mediate, aspect is upon closer scrutiny deposed from its proud position of identity with the real nature of the totality, and becomes itself a surface show; it ceases to be *the* principle of union and becomes one term among others requiring relation and organization. We may take a shorter route here. The thing falls into two discordant aspects, unreconciled in thought. On the one hand the thing is its properties; if they are abstracted there is nothing left behind. On the other hand the thing is other than its properties, it is that which *has* them, their substrate or bearer. It is thus one *and* many. But it provides no reconciliation of these two aspects; it contains both, but they are simply conjoined. There is nothing in the positive aspect to explain the negative power of the thing, its capacity for distinguishing its own properties and refusing others. 'Togetherness', in fact, is the mere name of unity without the substance, an abstract identity resting on differences which are at the same time beyond and outside it. The thing is an effort to think the surface show and apprehend its deeper self, but the attempt is not fully successful. The whole sphere with which we are dealing, viz. that of the categories of essence, is infected with the flaw manifested here. In essence unity is taken along with difference, but the inner nexus of the two is not apparent.

Before passing to our next category, the conception of substance, and determining the advance made by it on thinghood, we may note that when Kant endeavours to distinguish sharply between the subject of knowledge and the things of experience, he is, in effect, led to ascribe the characteristics of thinghood to the subject. The weakness of the conception of the thing is that it is an abstract unity, presupposing differences which it cannot supply. It involves its properties and yet is distinct from them. This is also the nature of the transcendental unity of apperception. The 'I think', according to Kant, gathers the manifold into a synthetic unity, and is conscious of its own identity only in the unity of its synthetic act. But at the same time Kant assures us that the pure ego is an analytic unity or pure self-identity, and that it does not include the concrete detail which it implies. That is to say, it belongs to the realm of

essence in Hegel's sense of the word ; for the defect of all the categories of essence is that in their nature they involve other factors which are also external to them. Indeed, for theoretic reason, the transcendental ego is in a more evil plight than the thing, for the latter is at least present—at the minimum it is the unity of the 'here', and has spatial identity—but the pure ego must be abstracted even from space, it is pure identity as such and has no realization.

We may now come to the last main subdivision of the realm of essence, viz. reality ; and in particular we may consider the transition from the conception of substance to the notion. As Hegel's analysis goes deeper it endeavours to lose nothing that has been already gained ; the distinction of mediate and immediate, or of essence and appearance, must therefore remain in the higher categories, but it must be thought in such a way that its incoherence disappears.¹ Kant had already analysed substance in a somewhat one-sided way. He began with the fact of change, and found that change implies identity ; change is change of something. If objects consisted of a *mere* succession in time we could not be conscious of change ; each impression as it appeared would be all, and the problem of permanence would not arise for us. Change is essentially a principle of contrast, and has meaning only by reference to an underlying substance which has the change and remains one and the same throughout. Kant's conception is very much that of an indestructible matter² whose appearance alters and which takes different shapes, but whose quantity is constant. Kant's analysis, however, is incomplete and one-sided. Substance, like the other categories of essence, is a correlative conception. Kant presupposes the one aspect, viz. difference or change, and deduces the other : Hegel tries to bring out the nature of both alike. Generally speaking, the elements of substance are those of thinghood over again at a deeper level and more closely bound together. Change, Kant has taught us, in order to be perceived must be determinate and must proceed in accordance with a rule. A *mere* flux would not be per-

¹ For a slightly different view of the progress of the Logic—particularly in regard to causality—v. McTaggart's *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*.

² Energy is an equally good form of the principle.

ceived as a unitary process at all, and hence not even as a flux. This determinate character of change is brought to the forefront by Hegel in his analysis of substance and accident. Substance advances beyond thinghood in two points. Firstly, the two aspects, essence and non-essential, are brought closer together, they are even identified; secondly, the accidents are thus conceived as not merely indifferent to one another, but as standing in a determinate relation and as forming a totality.

1. The unity of the thing and its properties is a loose one; the thing is the medium of the properties, and can often be deprived of one of them without loss of identity. A house may be painted a different colour and yet be the same house.¹ Substance, however, is its accidents; it appears in them and exists only in appearing. The word, substance, is sometimes used in an abstract and one-sided way as referring to a mere identity behind or beneath its attributes, a mere substrate. This interpretation Hegel considers to be inadequate.² He prefers to speak simply of essence when the object is so conceived, and to retain the word substance for the object, which is thought under the conception that is here analysed. The sense he rejects can be found as the guiding conception of certain would-be philosophical physicists. In the effort to penetrate to the nature of 'matter' the thinker sometimes forgets that in the appropriate category, viz. that of substance, the essence exists only in appearing. The accidents of substance are, of course, the subordinate and even the unessential aspects; but this is falsely taken when it is supposed that they can be brushed aside as non-existent or as subjective. Sometimes in the effort to think matter the investigator strips off each of its properties and functions as unessential and superficial. But unluckily at the end, instead of discovering what matter is, he finds in his hands a bare identity with no intelligible content—the mere emptiness of ultimate abstraction. Too often the thinker proclaims the bankruptcy not only of his special category but of reason as a whole. The inner nature of things, he says, is an inscrutable mystery, and no human wit can read the riddle which has baffled him. The mystery, however, is of his own making,

¹ V. *Encyclopaedia*, § 125 note, last sentence.

² V. *Larger Logic*, WW. IV. p. 221.

and he has failed to find the meaning of matter because it has been identified with a substrate which has no attributes, and is in truth nothing at all.

Substance exists only in appearing; it is not the mere togetherness of thinghood, but a more intense unity constituted by the accidents in determinate relation to one another. How is this unity to be understood? Perhaps the physical conception of energy is the clearest instance of it. Energy remains constant in quantity through all its changes, and is a permanent amid variety. Yet it exists only in its forms, it is not a colourless substrate of which the definite forms are illusory appearances. The destruction of one of the forms would destroy it itself. When we think by means of the conception of substance we organize the material of knowledge into a whole such that the details are set in their place by a necessity which flows through them. Their difference, thus, is not the last word about them, for each of them is the embodiment of the one substance; their nature is to reveal the immanent whole.¹

2. Substance appears in its accidents as power or necessity. Kant, approaching the question from one side, had asked the nature of the principle which made it possible for mind to have duration or permanence presented to it in the object; and he found that there is required for that end the permanence of the phenomenal substrate itself, an enduring object which is the bearer of all change.² Hegel, rejecting the one-sided approach and bringing both aspects, change as well as permanence, within the scope of the deduction, renders the conception as that of substance appearing as power in its modes. Substance gives itself actual shape by establishing one form or accident, then passes into another, so that the first accident is withdrawn by it and replaced by another. Substance is thus a category of necessity. The full meaning of necessity is not yet realized, and will appear only later; but substance differs from thinghood in that its attributes are not indifferent to it but express it and constitute a determinate order by virtue of this inner power which 'posits'

¹ 'Substance, as this identity of the appearing, is the totality of the whole, and includes the accidents; and the accidental is the whole substance itself' (*Larger Logic*, II. p. 221).

² V. *Critique of Pure Reason*, First Analogy.

them. Each is only what substance makes it, and cannot stand when substance withdraws itself and takes another shape.

The nature of substance, thus, may be summed up in three phases : the self identity of substance and the variety of the accidents ; the immanence of substance in the accidents ; the power of substance over the accidents.

We may now look at the defects of this conception when taken as a final category. Briefly, they spring from the fact that the unity of substance is abstract. The two aspects, universal and particular, have been brought within the compass of one thought, but they are still external to one another. Substance is the self-identity of the process, and although it exists only in the variety of the accidents, yet it does not include that variety as part of its own nature. The explanation which uses substance as its highest principle dissolves the particular in the universal ; it traces the universal in the particular, but it does not take the universal concretely. If the conception of physical energy is used in such a way that it embodies this principle, then explanation will consist in tracing the identity of the quantity of energy in the consecutive forms ; potential energy will be resolved into an equal quantity of kinetic energy, that into heat, and so on. The constant quantity of energy will be regarded as the reality, and thought will be satisfied when the quantitative identity is demonstrated.

The defects of this method of thinking are obvious, for no account is given of the transformation from the one mode to the next. The change of the accidents falls without substance ; and when the accidents are resolved into substance their aspect of difference and variety is lost. The essence of the situation appears to be this. Substance is the all-pervading power in each accident and is the reality of each ; but in referring an accident to substance we do not organize the accidents into a systematic whole, but merely dig within each for the hidden identity. We find, e.g., that the quantity of energy in question is present in the kinetic form and are satisfied ; we do not trace the peculiar nature of the kinetic form back into potential energy and forward into heat. That is to say, we do not regard the differences as fundamental to substance, and so we explain each form not by its context

but by its immanent principle. Substance thus is to be identified with merely inner necessity, and has not yet developed into a system of inter-acting parts. But substance can have necessary power over its accidents only if its power appear in the accident itself, for substance exists only in appearing. The necessity of the whole ought to have an adequate manifestation, and should appear in each accident as the power modifying and determining the others. That is to say, the inward necessity must also appear outwardly. Since the accidents manifest substance they ought to show in themselves the power of substance, i.e. they ought to determine one another. Hegel puts the point thus: 'The show, or accidentality, is intrinsically substance through the power; but it is not posited as this self-identical show. [The accidental is the evanescent.] Thus substance has as its actual shape or positivity only the accidental, and not itself; it is not substance as substance. The relation of substantiality reduces itself to substance which reveals itself as formal power, but whose differences are not substantial; in fact, it is only the inward of the accidents, and the latter are only in substance.'¹

Hegel's general meaning may be expressed in another way which will apply more directly to the ethical questions we have to consider afterwards. Substance is conceived as the underived and supreme, but the thought is one-sided. Substance is the ground of the accidents, and they receive their justification and truth from it; their immediate appearance is traced back to substance and based on it. But, on the other hand, substance does not ground itself in its accidents, it is prior to them and does not develop through their change. What is posited is the accident and not substance: substance is the original, the underived. Now this conception has, perhaps unwittingly, been used by many thinkers who treat of freedom. Freedom is represented by them as that which is not bound, that which acts in the world but is not enthralled by it. Time, change, and accident, they say, do not enter into freedom; and the attempt to explain a man by his time, his parentage, his training, and so forth, they regard as a weak surrender to the forces of determinism. The inward freedom of the will, on this view, cannot be bound by the

¹ *Larger Logic*, WW. IV. p. 223.

acts in which it appears, and hence is untouched by any actual consequences it may produce. Kant's teaching leads to something like this: for him freedom is merely inward; we ought to act, he holds, *as if* we were members of a kingdom of ends. Libertarianism carries the conception to the extreme. Naturally, too, the determinist accepts the same view of freedom, and the rival schools strive within the unity of a common assumption. The indeterminist accepts this underived existence as a fact, while the determinist, on the other hand, is unable to find room for it within the world of knowledge. Now, we must discern that the category of substance is not adequate to freedom: the conception is in truth self-contradictory. Substance makes the most important of all assumptions—it assumes itself. This difficulty is often felt in regard to freedom. One of the arguments for determinism is that the will is bound by the character; actions spring of necessity from the nature of the agent, and he has no control over his character. The utmost reply the indeterminist can make to this is that the agent is not determined by external circumstances, i.e. by environment. But this reply, even supposing its truth, is not sufficient. For the whole man is more than a bare character; he is a living concrete agent, with both structure and function, an indissoluble unity of inward and outward. And when a separation is made between the two aspects, the character is no more equivalent to the man as a whole than is environment; it becomes a force working in him from behind, and its externality is as real as that of circumstances, although that takes a temporal form while this is chiefly spatial.¹ That is to say, for ethical purposes the alleged underived character of man's nature comes to the same thing as external derivation. The self has no power over itself, and the mysterious inborn nature of it is an alien force.

This is the characteristic defect of the categories of essence. Substance must have accidents, it exists only in its accidents; but yet it gains nothing by going out into them. It is *in se* and not *in alio*; yet it is only in going forth into finitude. The two aspects, mediate and immediate, universal and particular, unity and difference, infinite and finite, original

¹ Hegel indicates the sublation of the past in the identity of thinghood in the *Encyclopaedia*, § 125.

and derivative, or however else one likes to name them, lie side by side in the categories of essence. They are both present, but they are not harmonized. The terms are correlative, and each has a nature of its own. Substance is the permanent and powerful, the accidental is the unstable and impotent; and their mutual implication is merely another factor along side the others, on equal terms with them. Each term, as it were, falls into two; on one side it is private, on the other it has outward relations: but the two aspects are not reconciled, they merely go together.

In the effort to find more adequate principles of thought we have to do two things. Firstly, we have to incorporate the element of difference more thoroughly within the positive principle; secondly, we have to regard the positive principle not merely as underived, but as self-derived. Hegel begins to perform the first of these tasks within the realm of essence itself, and thereby provides the transition to the third and last main section of the dialectic where the second task is also accomplished.

Substance is present in each of its shapes; in a sense, then, each accident is substance. Hegel at this stage takes the identity of substance with its accidents in full earnestness, and treats it as something else than a mere phase added to the others. Substance is inner necessity, the immanent power over the accidents; but if this inner necessity is to be intelligible it must come out, and the accidents must become in their external character what they are inherently. That is to say, we must surrender that aspect of the conception of substance according to which the accidents do not determine one another, and must grant to them as to substance manifest, power over one another. This gives us the category of causality. In pure substance the accidents merely pass into one another;¹ in causality they determine one another. In the relation of substantiality A follows B because of the

¹ 'The accidents, as such, . . . have no power over one another. . . . In so far as such an accident seems to exercise a power over another, it is the power of substance which grasps both in itself, as negativity [i.e. as negating power] posits an unequal value, and determines the one as the passing, gives the other another content and determines it as the subsisting, or, in other words, determines the former as lapsing into its possibility and the latter as coming into reality' (*Larger Logic*, WW. IV, p. 222).

necessity of substance in each ; in the relation of causality A, as the embodiment of substance, determines and produces B. Substance in this conception has dirempted itself into two shapes, each of which is itself substantial. Two points require emphasis here.

The ordinary conception of causality is dogmatic and rests on unexamined assumptions. It begins by assuming separate things, finds that they follow one another in a determinate order, but instead of thinking out what is involved in this determinate order gives it a name, causality, and passes to some easier problem. The main difficulties in causality arise from the assumption that cause and effect are purely separate facts, and that the relation between them, viz. invariable sequence, is external to their nature. Naturally, if we grant that in full truth A and B are merely self-identical, any essential relation between them is unintelligible. Hume made this assumption, and in consequence reduced causality to mere sequence together with the expectation engendered by the experience of that sequence in the past. Kant saw that if causality is to be intelligible as an objective relation, the assumption of the absolute independence and self-sufficiency of its factors must be given up ; and in his view the relation is constitutive of the terms.¹ Causality, the type of objective order, is an *a priori* principle for Kant, without which the unity of the subject and hence knowledge in general is impossible. In Kant's theory, however, there is a gap between this transcendental principle and the concrete matter of sense by which it is filled ; and so far as the empirical sequence of events is concerned, Kant stands very close to Hume's position, not discerning the imperative need for the revision of the hard and fast boundaries between perceived objects. Hegel brings out the identity of cause and effect in a way which Kant failed to do. Kant's view is confined in effect to the necessity of the objective coherence of events in time and space ; Hegel realizes that in order to think this coherence we must be prepared to take the identity of the factors seriously, and not be content with its mere

¹ For a brief account of Kant's view of causality v. Adamson, *On the Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 57-66 ; cf. Macmillan, *The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy*, pp. 127-34, where stress is laid on the ambiguous position of inner sense in Kant's view.

assertion as a transcendental principle in conjunction with an uncritical view of the phenomena of experience. The cause, Hegel insists, is cause only in the effect, and the effect is such only in relation to the cause ; the two aspects have an identical content. This may be clearer if we discuss an imaginary objection to it. It is admitted, it may be said, that the real meaning of the conception is the transformation of energy from one phase to another. The cause of the heat generated by the impact of a bullet on a target is the kinetic energy of the moving bullet, but the previous *shape* of the energy does not pass into the later one. The shapes alternate ; the constant content is merely a constant quantity of energy. Thus Hegel's statement seems to go too far, the truth being that cause and effect have only in part a common content, while in part each has also a private element, viz. the shape or form of the energy.¹ In reply to this statement it may be said that the conception embodied by it is not causality but substance. It was this omission of difference that set the problem which Hegel is here trying to solve, and it is hardly probable that he overlooked this. Hegel's illustrations are not always the truest index of his meaning,² but he does seem to meet this difficulty. In the *Encyclopaedia* he says, 'The rain (the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water. In point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect (wet) : but in that case the result can no longer be described as effect ; for without the cause it is nothing, and we should have only the unrelated wet left.'³ The cause involves its effect in its conception, and *vice versa*. 'Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content : and the distinction is primarily only that the one lays down, and the other is laid down.'⁴ But if this be so, there is only one substance present ; only in the effect does the cause become cause. That is to say, the cause determines itself, and in going into the effect it is really becoming itself. 'The cause, consequently, is in its full truth *causa sui*.'⁵ The difficulty which ordinary thought has in grasping this con-

¹ Cf. McTaggart, *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, §§ 173-4.

² Cf. Bosanquet in *Mind*, January 1911, p. 82.

³ § 153, Wallace's trans. p. 277.

⁴ *Ibid.* § 153 note, Wallace's trans. p. 278.

⁵ *Ibid.* § 153, Wallace's trans. p. 277.

ception may be due to its inveterate habit of taking time determinations as final.¹ When the effect is present, it says, the cause is past, and surely the past cannot be present. If we are to understand the conception of causality, however, we must rise above this naïve view; we must remember that we are looking for a connexion that is not broken by the passage of time, and that the externality of moments of time to one another cannot be the last word on the subject. If time enters at all its proper place is within the single content, not between two isolated facts with separate contents of their own. Further, one must rise above mere picture thinking. A material effect does not have a material reproduction of its cause inside it; we are dealing with conceptions, not with images. If a material thing is conceived as cause, it contains in its conception a reference to that which it produces; and if the two are separated in time it is only by thinking a unity which can transcend temporal distinctions that we can think of causality at all.²

Secondly, we must note the other aspect. Following Hegel's view of *causa sui*, we have seen that he regards cause and effect as one content. But this unity is not achieved at the expense of difference: such a course would imply

¹ 'There is at any rate a presumption against the truth of this doctrine. It is against the ordinary usage of language. In ordinary empirical propositions about finite things we never find ourselves asserting that A is the cause of A, but always that A is the cause of B. The Cause and Effect are always things which, irrespective of their being Cause and Effect, have different names. The presumption is that there must be some difference between things to which different names are generally given' (McTaggart, *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, p. 176). For Hegel one of the disadvantages of the ordinary usage of language is that it is quite unable to apprehend at once the mutual implications of unity and difference, that in its clumsy analysis of itself it is content to have things either the same or different, and that it is bewildered when its attention is drawn to the concrete categories of the notion towards which the dialectic is here tending and which it cannot avoid embodying in the concrete. He would probably be surprised, however, to find a philosopher setting forth the inadequacies of ordinary speech against the concreteness—the incipient unity of opposites—of the higher categories of essence. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, § 153 n.

² This does not mean that time is eliminated by causality, or that the unity in question is an abstract strand indifferent to change. *Causa sui* finds its full truth only in the notion, or ultimately the 'idea', which is a system containing all determinations within it as content.

entire failure to cope with the problem which substance left on Hegel's hands. Cause and effect must be two as well as one; for if their difference were neglected the whole conception of production would vanish, and, as Hegel says, 'we should have only the unrelated wet left.'¹ Substance divides itself into appearances which are themselves substantial: that is to say, substance has not only to appear in each factor but also *as* each, and in its conception it must include the operation of the accidents on and in each other.

The conception of causality, thus, involves two points of view. Cause and effect are two substantial terms, *and* they are one substance. Identity and difference are balanced against one another, but they do not properly cohere. Perhaps the general position is expressed most clearly when we say that the nature of the cause is to pass into an effect which is other than itself. In interpreting Hegel here we must not be misled by the emphasis he lays on the conception of *causa sui*: that is the point which is new to us, and we are apt to lose sight of the other aspect. The precise way in which causality unites unity and difference must be carefully noted, because a failure to take it sufficiently concretely will give us an abstract view of the higher category, the notion. Causality is the embodiment of necessity: in a causal series nothing can call itself its own; everything has been made what it is by forces which are other than it and which it regards as alien. That is to say, in causality itself the inherent unity is not yet in its own true form, it is not able to master and possess the element of difference. To put it another way, the aspects of the conception of causality, viz. identity and difference, pass *immediately* into one another, and the *rationale* of the movement is seen but imperfectly. This analysis may be difficult to apprehend at first sight, but it is involved in concrete shape in countless numbers of our ordinary judgments. We do mean something when we say that one thing becomes another, and we do not mean simply that one thing always follows another. Common sense does not know that Kant has shown that things are related in time only in virtue of a further relation of the things themselves, and that points of time are meaningless apart from a specific content within them. But it does feel that when the empiricists reduce

¹ V. *Larger Logic*, WW. IV. pp. 230-5; *Encyclopaedia*, § 154.

causality to unconditional sequence (whatever unconditional may mean), they have omitted an identity—connexion if you will—that common sense asserts.¹ When A becomes B, A does not merely pass away and B arise ; A becomes that which it is not : the cause becomes an effect, other than it, yet involving it in its conception as effect. This is a contradiction, but it is asserted by every judgement of causality ; and it is difficult to see how it can be expressed otherwise than by saying that in causality the identity of cause and effect is immediately one with their difference. The cause and the effect have nothing in them that is not in the other also ; their being is not their own. In the *Larger Logic* Hegel draws a careful line between the categories of substance and the categories of necessity, but the distinction is too minute to occupy us here.² Causality is the embodiment of necessity ; and the nature of both principles lies in the dissipation of a thing into externality. A thing is compelled and does not act freely when a process, which works in it, and as it, cancels it and sets it up as something else. If one looks carefully, one sees that an external force acts on a thing only because the thing answers to it and that it is not merely external ; but the relation is that of necessity when the very nature of the thing, in virtue of which it *might* claim to be self-determining, is not its own, but is constituted in it and as it from without. Hegel insists that any natural object which is subject to necessity is unable to sustain the contradiction within it. When the externality of its content or substance becomes apparent the thing is destroyed : only a higher principle than causality can attain unity and selfhood in and through externality.

At first, however, the conception which we have stated is not complete. The one factor is called cause or active, the other effect or passive ; and only part of the full meaning of substance is given in each element. The unity already found

¹ Dr. McTaggart is not wrong in appealing to ordinary speech in this connexion : his error, I think, is in making the appeal to one aspect in order to exclude another. His argument in effect opposes one moment of the conception to the other and attempts to exclude the aspect of identity because of the presence of difference. Hegel admits both and their inconsistency as they appear here : the dialectic would stop at this point if the conception were genuinely self-consistent.

² For Dr. McTaggart's view—a critical one—v. *Commentary*, chap. VII.

in causality demands more than this, and hence in order to realize itself the conception becomes that of reciprocity. A preliminary effort to remove the difficulty may be made by conceiving an endless chain of causes each of which is the effect of a preceding cause and the cause of a subsequent effect.¹ This, however, gives inadequate satisfaction to the identity of causality stated in the doctrine of *causa sui*; and we are forced to the conception of reciprocity. The nature of the effect depends not only on the cause, but also on the passive factor, i.e. that in which the effect is produced. The cause does not act in the void, but presupposes something else on which to operate. The so-called passive factor must therefore be conceived as cause with reference to this event, and not merely to a subsequent one; for without it the cause would not have its character as active. Further, the form of activity exercised by the cause depends on and varies with the other factor; hence the result is the common product of an interaction. Causality thus implies an action and reaction of elements in which each is both cause and effect of the other; each becomes itself in determining the other.

It is through the conception of reciprocity that we pass beyond the sphere of essence altogether; and we must be careful to note exactly where we stand. In tracing substance into the truer category of reciprocity it is important that the positive side of the former should not be lost. We have seen substance sunder itself into individual factors which were respectively cause and effect, and we insisted that it is still one substance which appears thus. Cause and effect are two and also one; and we have refused to lighten the difficulty by casting overboard the aspect of unity. For the position does not become any easier in that way, and the case becomes without remedy if we assume that we are dealing with inherently indifferent and unrelated factors. This remains true of reciprocity, and we are faced with the same problem still. When the world is thought under the conception of reciprocity it becomes a system of mutually determining parts,

¹ 'Thus the cause has an effect, and is itself effect; and the effect not only has a cause but is itself cause. But the effect which the cause has, and the effect which it is—like the cause which the effect has, and the cause which it is—are distinct' (*Larger Logic*, WW. IV. pp. 234-5).

each of which is substantial, and each of which is necessary to make the others what they are. They interact, and achieve their own being only in determining others and in being determined by these others. Each thing is part of a system, and has no character except in so far as it reacts on other things and is in turn reacted on by them—only by going out of itself and establishing other things has it a private or inward nature of its own. This is the highest principle of essence, and in it the difficulties come to a head. The contradiction which infects the whole realm is this: the factors of its categories have a private independent nature, and at the same time involve a reference to something other than themselves. Thus the 'thing' is the mere medium of its attributes, but it involves a reference to these attributes and to the concrete detail which lies outside the mere unity of 'togetherness'. Similarly, substance is the original, the underived, that which is in itself; but it involves a reference to the particular differences of the attributes which inhere in it. In reciprocity the contradiction is acute; for the only private being of each term is the reference beyond itself to other factors of the system; its nature is to establish them. Consequently, it is always easy to attack any content of knowledge which is erected on this plan and to dissipate its structure to the winds by setting the aspects against one another. There are no relations without terms, the criticism says, and the only terms offered are nothing but relations.¹

This point of view may be clearer if we consider a concrete instance of it; and we may take as an example Spencer's criticism of altruistic Hedonism. 'The sympathetic nature gets pleasure by giving pleasure; and the proposition is that if the general happiness is the object of pursuit, each will be made happy by witnessing others' happiness. But what in such case constitutes the happiness of others? These others are also by the hypothesis pursuers and receivers of altruistic pleasure. The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is to depend on the display of pleasures by others; which is again to depend on the display of pleasures by others; and so on perpetually. Where, then, is the pleasure to begin? Obviously

¹ The Realist critics of so-called internal relations seem to have some such reciprocal system as their target. In that case they can find good material for missiles in Hegel.

there must be egoistic pleasure somewhere before there can be the altruistic pleasure caused by sympathy with it. Obviously, therefore, each must be egoistic in due amount, even if only with the view of giving others the possibility of being altruistic. So far from the sum of happiness being made greater if all make general happiness the exclusive end, the sum disappears entirely.¹ Spencer sees clearly enough that in a reciprocal system the nature of each term forbids that the other terms with which it co-operates should be self-contained, and also that the other terms are not this one but are definitely other than it. His point is that in the system of altruistic pleasures each individual has no substantial satisfaction and depends for his pleasures on others who have none of their own to give.

Now, how is this difficulty to be surmounted? Any solution is to be rejected which simply drops out an element and falls back on some conception already shown in the dialectic to be imperfect. We must find some conception which will retain all that this one has in it, and yet avoid its defect. This is, in brief, what Hegel does. He brings us to see that in a reciprocal system we have something which is inherently more than a set of mutually determining parts. The paradox which troubles us rests on an assumption, viz. that we have to begin from the point of view of an isolated individual. It is quite true, for example, that if we have to understand the moral ideal by beginning with the pleasure of a private individual and working over from that to the others, the whole conception is self-contradictory. For in stating that the pleasure of the individual comes only from that of others we have robbed the individual of a substantiality which cannot be restored to him from others which are in a like case. The step we have to take is to recognize that there is more present than one term and others, there is the whole. We have assumed the substantial unity running through the terms, but we have not thought of taking it as the main feature and proper starting-point. We have tried to enter the system at the side, as it were, and we failed; we may now try to enter into the spirit of the system as a whole and recognize that it is the true individual.

Before proceeding, we may gather together the main points

¹ *The Data of Ethics*, 3rd. edit. pp. 227-8.

which have emerged. Substance, we saw, appeared in its accidents and exercised power over them ; but it was faulty because it could not give an adequate account of difference, and because it did not really determine itself in its accidents. It constituted or posited its accidents, but presupposed its own nature. The first of these defects was partly removed by causality and reciprocity, where substance divided itself into manifestations which were themselves substantial. Reciprocity, however, is an imperfect category, for it sets the negative element on equal terms with the positive and dissipates everything it touches. When thought leaves the seemingly solid standing-ground of the particular, it demands some support on which it may stand and find rest. Reciprocity has turned out to be a veritable flux, and endless movement into externality. The step which thought now takes brings it out of this infinite relativity. There is only one thing stable, and that is the whole ; and whenever thought lays hold of experience as a self-articulating principle, the negative element—relativity—becomes subordinated to the positive. This is the point of view of the notion. To revert to our former terminology, experience has ceased to be merely one *and* many, a one that is also many, and has become one *because of* its multiplicity and difference. The notion is a principle which owns its differences, and in developing an opposite brings into explicit being a unity strong enough to sustain and include the opposition within it.

By over-reaching the relativity of its content and including difference and externality within itself, thought has transcended the second flaw in the conception of substance, viz. the mere presupposition of the essence. The system is an organism. It appears in its members ; their acts are its acts, and in their mutual determination of one another it determines itself. If we regard the nature of the principle and of each of its manifestations as private and self-centred, as something which stays at home with itself and is purely self-contained, then the notion is unintelligible. In order to understand it we must see that the nature of each member is found in an outgoing activity, and that what it establishes is not merely alien but is also itself. The inward nature of the thing and its outward reference are not merely conjoined, as in essence ; they are identical. This is also true of the

system as a whole. The principle—the notion—establishes itself in its members, and the act whereby each posits itself in its other is a process whereby the whole establishes itself. Thus the one-sidedness of the relation of substance disappears in the notion, for the latter posits itself in and as its accidents. Substance is absolute merely because it is underived ; the notion is absolute because it is self-determined. The movement of the accidents has become a movement of substance itself, and the outward reference falls now within the whole, not merely as an additional factor, but as an integral element. It is that through which the notion realizes itself. Thus the notion is a category of activity ; its nature is to go out of itself and find itself in this movement.

There is nothing mysterious in the statement that the notion is absolute not because it is underived but because it is self-determining. There is a dangerous tendency in thought to revert to the principles of essence when dealing with the notion, and to raise old problems which have really been answered. In this mood it is urged that the self-determination of the notion does not free it from the difficulties of substance ; it, too, has a nature which it must presuppose. And this logical problem is the basis of the charge that Hegel's conception of freedom amounts merely to that of a so-called spiritual mechanism, determinism in a subtler medium. Now, in dealing with this difficulty it is important to see clearly what is at issue. Doubtless the notion has a nature, but that is not a defect—it is not the defect we urged against substance. The question is, Must the notion *presuppose* its nature in the same sense as that which was found to mar the conception of substance ? We may therefore ask for a clearer statement of the meaning of presupposition in this connexion. We have seen that substance is in truth indeterminate. Accidents, of course, appear on the surface, and substance dwells in them and has power over them. But there are within it no differences to account for the differences it produces in its appearance ; it is indwelling and hidden. When we force this point to the utmost it yields the conclusion that substance does nothing. Doubtless it posits its accidents and determines them ; but how can there be a power that acts and is unaffected by its action ? Substance is unmoved ; and the movement must therefore be in some

way illusion—if substance is the whole truth. But against this we have to set the reality of the movement ; for to deny the movement is to annihilate the accidents and substance along with them. Substance, therefore, is not indeterminate ; since it acts it must have within it principles of action, means for the production of differences. What are we to make of this antinomy ? The first side, the indeterminate aspect, is the outer show, the appearance which substance wears when it is not taken with the light of the notion upon it ; and it is the vacuity into which inadequate thought must retire. The second aspect, the inward determinateness of substance, is a statement of the nature of substance in the knowledge of that which it becomes in the upward trend of thought. Substance *must* be determinate, but at its own proper level this determinateness is hidden and not made open. Therein lies the underived character. The charge, then, is no gratuitous one ; it voices the demand that substance should show what shape it has, and insists that substance seems to be a featureless abyss merely because it is in shadow.

The point may be put in other words. In any ordered world of thought which has risen to the level of substance, change and process find a place. And such change has an explanation. But if the first principle, substance itself, contain no such explanation, then beyond it there lie forces and powers which it cannot control, and which are alien to it. But the first principle, substance, at the same time claims supremacy and completeness ; it itself is the sole truth : and hence it falls into contradiction with itself. Substance may reconcile the discrepancy only by genuinely accepting the determinateness of its accidents as its own proper content. It will then leave nothing standing beyond it to bind it, and it will have a right to claim as its own those powers which it asserts to be concealed within it.

It is this step that the notion has taken ; it has brought into harmony the implicit nature and the overt appearance. The first step appears to be one of renunciation ; the supreme has limited itself in each of its members. But that step, though essential, is only one side of a complete act ; for the principle thereby gains the whole as its content, and all that is falls within its scope. Growth, we have been told, is not mere aggregation, it is creation. And the nature of

spirit, we are assured, is to pass for ever into forms which are unique and new. Hegel might agree with this, but he would certainly add that at the same time spirit was only coming to its own full stature. The notion is a principle whose nature is to elaborate itself from within and to become a concrete system. The factors are embodiments of the whole, they are organs in which the whole is present as such, and each, when taken in its context and truth, has the power and value of the whole. Thus the notion—unlike substance—expresses itself in a form which is worthy of it, and in going into its opposite it is realizing what there is in it to be. Its inherent nature is brought out in its development; and it is—in Hegel's terminology—for itself what it is in itself, *an und für sich*, the absolute.

It may be useful to express this conception with reference to the terms universal and particular. Previous to Hegel no thinker succeeded in resolving the opposition between these two. Aristotle's conception of the individual is ambiguous, because at times he seems to regard it as the union of two disparate elements, matter and form, while at others he treats it as the *infima species* itself. It seems fair to suppose that, on the whole, Aristotle's thought was dualistic, and that he regarded the universal as incapable in itself of giving the concrete detail of life. Universal and particular do come together for him, as in Hegel's categories of essence, but the reason of their union is not present in their nature. Even Spinoza failed to meet the difficulty. Unlike Aristotle he refuses to give the particular any content that is beyond the universal; but in bringing the particular within the universal he restricts the nature of the former and does not do justice to its negative aspect. In Hegel's category of the notion the universal is not merely an abstract principle which is made concrete by being dipped in a foreign matter, such as the matter of sense intuition; it is a concrete whole having internal differences, the equipoise of opposed yet united aspects. On the other hand, the particular is not an exclusive unit—it is a way in which the system appears; its nature is in no part merely private but is drawn from the whole. The notion obliges us to affirm the identity of the universal and the particular; and in concrete thinking the two aspects are at one with each other, and each is the other.

This identity of opposites is, of course, the great stumbling-block in Hegel's logic to many minds, and it has been the butt of much mockery. But to reject this category is to deny the validity of every step of the path to it. Hegel has already shown the identity (not the sameness) of opposites. It is there for the thinker who traces the dialectic. Being turned in our hands into not-being or nothing ; that which merely is, equally is not. The identity is there and is patent in the dialectic, although it is not manifest to the mind limited to such principles. If imperfect thoughts do imply their opposites, there must be some more perfect principle of thought within which this implication falls as content. And such thought is an identity of opposites. In this category of the notion Hegel has brought within the content of thought the power which gave the dialectic life ; the dialectic has now become for itself what it is in itself. If we, in real earnest, reject this position, it is difficult to see what shift thought can make. There is no stable mean between the utter nominalism of Antisthenes and the concrete logic which treats the assertion of the identity of different things not as a sign of the impotence of thought, but as a statement of the nature of reason and of reality. When we think coherently, so that the identity of the universal and particular is manifest, the result is the concrete universal or true individual. The unity lives only in the differences, and the latter have their meaning and being only in the whole which they utter forth. The universal which does not thus articulate itself is abstract ; it is at most a common element—a glorified particular—and hence not really a universal at all. Similarly, the particular abstracted from its context loses all that makes it what it is, it lapses into the pure being which is nothing. The concrete universal, thus, or the notion, is the truth both of the universal and of the particular ; it is the category where they are identical.

This analysis, however, must not be understood abstractly ; the identity in question does not exclude difference. The fault of Spinoza's philosophy is that he achieves unity at the expense of difference ; he files down the two aspects until they have an indifferent shape and so can be mistaken for one another. But for Hegel the negative aspect, difference, tension, opposition, is a moment—though only a moment.

The universal must limit itself, must take on the forms of finitude, and preserve that finitude even while going beyond it. We shall see later how the self, which is the actual embodiment of the notion, denies itself and goes forth into its other, into a world which is the not-self. The outgoing moment is essential and in the spiritual life it involves strenuous effort and bitter sacrifice; indeed the concreteness of the identity of the whole depends on the stress of the outward process. There is not full joy in the harmony of thought if in its nature it has not gone into a far country. To minimize the reality of the alienation is to diminish the fullness of the union, and to translate an identity of opposites into a bare tautology.¹

We cannot trace in detail Hegel's analysis of the sphere of the notion; but it is necessary to note one distinction. The description we have given is that of the character of the whole of the third division of the logic, which is called in general the doctrine of the notion. But the sphere comprises a number of categories of differing grades. The name, 'notion', is given by Hegel to the first of these as well as to the whole; and the last one, the only adequate and complete principle of thought, is called the 'idea'. It is perhaps enough for our purposes to say that the notion, in the narrow sense, is the principle of such a system capable of complete articulation but as yet undeveloped. The 'idea' is the complete system actually seen to be the concretion of the simple immanent principle. The notion involves the 'idea', and is the bud of which the latter is the fruit. The former is inward, immanent, undeveloped: the latter is always an inward principle which expresses itself outwardly and has actually mastered the external. The 'idea' is the truth of the notion, the full self into which the notion develops itself. In the sequel, unless the context forbids, it is to be assumed that the term, notion, is used to indicate the narrow category rather than the whole sphere, for the distinction between the principle and the concrete achievement is of great importance. But we cannot dwell longer on the point in its bare logical form, and can characterize it further only in more concrete embodiments.

By way of transition to this more concrete realm we may discuss a possible misconception of the meaning of Hegel's

¹ Cf. *Phenomenology*, WW. II. pp. 15-16.

analysis. We have spoken of the identity of opposites, but we are not thereby committed to the absurd statement that all opposites are identical, and that it is a matter of indifference whether we say yea or nay. The categories are not themselves the world, they are at most the principles of it ; and, although from a scientific point of view they are the more weighty aspect, yet in their abstractness they are a poor substitute for a world constituted by them. That is to say, when we have analysed a category we have only stated a demand ; the task still remains of satisfying that demand, of finding or organizing an experience which manifests the form of unity that the category reveals. It is one thing, e.g., to determine in the abstract the nature of substance, and another to possess a content of knowledge which in all its concreteness is itself a substance. Similarly, in the notion the demand for a world or medium in which the unity of opposites is achieved is not lightly satisfied. Ignoring for the present the difficult problem of the ultimate relation of the various spheres to one another, we may represent the various categories as the principles of various grades or realms of experience. Form and matter are inter-dependent, and each matter has a limit to its capacity of yielding forms. Some matter of experience is, as it were, too coarse to take on the finer forms, and the higher categories cannot be realized in it ; on the other hand, some matter is inherently too fine to be held by the rougher and less adequate forms. Hegel does not seek to find the notion and the 'idea' in their proper shapes in the purely physical world of space and motion ; the lower categories in which externality predominates are the appropriate form of such stuff. Nor does he suppose that the categories of being, or even of essence, can give us the truth of the moral and intellectual life of mind. The proper field for the notion is self-conscious mind, and the ego is the realization of that principle.¹ If we are unable to *think* the nature of the notion in the abstract, and must have examples of it in the concrete in order that the 'identity of opposites' be more than

¹ 'When the notion has developed into such existence as is free, it is nothing else than the ego or pure self-consciousness. Of course, I have notions, i.e. determinate notions ; but the ego is the pure notion itself, which, as such, has become a definite fact' (WW. VI. pp. 13-14). Cf. Macran, *Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic*, p. 123.

a confused phrase, it is only in the life of self-conscious rational mind that illustrations can be found. The opposites of external nature are not identical for thought ; the sphere is, therefore, in itself, confined to and governed by lower categories, and is not fully rational. Mind alone over-reaches its other, denies itself in order to find itself, and brings the notion into being. In discussing the *Philosophy of Right* itself we may see more closely the way in which logical demands are met by the ethical life, and to what extent the answers are adequate.

CHAPTER III

THE REAL AND THE RATIONAL

IN the previous chapter we discussed the meaning of the principle of thought which Hegel calls the notion, and we shall find that this is the fundamental principle of which the ethical world in all its forms is the articulation. But before examining the notion in its shape as an ethical system we have to deal with it in another of its forms. We have already briefly indicated the attitude of Hegel's philosophy to things, but we have confined our attention almost exclusively to his logical standpoint. We must, therefore, determine more precisely the view he takes of the special nature of ethical philosophy. In so doing we shall be elaborating the analysis of the notion, for philosophy is a form of reflective thought, and its moments are articulations of the basal principle of all mental life. Hegel's adoption of a scientific attitude in ethics has provoked severe criticism; and in order to understand precisely what Hegel means by science here we shall examine his attitude in its general bearings. The main topic we have to discuss in this chapter is the identity of and distinction between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the ethical world. It seems advisable, therefore, to pursue our inquiry at first with special reference to Hegel's explicit statements regarding the philosophy of nature. The identity and difference which we seek will thereby become plainer when we analyse the specific nature of mind.

For Hegel philosophy is a concrete attitude of mind; it is not mere practice, nor yet is it what is usually called mere theory. Both in his early voyage of discovery, the *Phenomenology*, and in his more mature *Encyclopaedia* he places it highest in the ranks of the concrete attitudes of mind. Of course philosophy is not itself the whole of being; its content is not the absolute in *all* its fullness, breadth, and detail; nor is it all knowledge, for it treats much that is known, and which doubtless deserves to be known, as irrelevant, and

confines itself to main principles. But philosophy in Hegel's view is the notion of the whole, and its content is the principle of which nature and mind are the embodiment.¹ There are two attitudes to objects which Hegel definitely repudiates as inadequate to philosophy.² The first of these we may call intellectualism, the purely theoretical standpoint. From this point of view the task of knowledge is to conform to the real; we have to leave things unaltered, to refrain from imposing our subjective ends upon them: we must simply accept them as they are in themselves. This, of course, is the basis of all empiricism; and it is not without justice that empiricists, such as the English school, are charged with intellectualism.

Hegel points out, however, that we cannot rest in this attitude; the passivity which it enjoins is incompatible with the proper activity of thought. Thought is essentially universal; it cannot accept a mere datum, but must think it, and discover law and coherence in its object. We may seek earnestly to examine things disinterestedly and try to adopt a purely objective attitude to them, but thought will not permit us. Thought itself has a determinate structure and mode of functioning: we may intend to take each particular fact merely as it is and by itself, but thought insists on taking its objects not as mere particulars but as instances, and apprehends the minutest detail not merely as 'this' or 'that' but as 'such'.³ Whether we will or not, thought leads us to centre our attention on the universal, on the law, and to put the bare fact into the background as the mere vehicle of the law. Hegel does not need to be told that reality (or experience) is richer than thought. 'The more thinking enters into imagination', he says, 'the more the particularity and immediacy of things disappears from nature. By the invasion of thought the wealth of the infinite variety of nature is depleted, its vernal growth blighted, and its colours blanched. The sound of noisy life in nature is stilled in the silence of

¹ V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II. 'Das absolute Wissen', pp. 610-12, trans. pp. 820-3.

² Of course the division may be carried much farther—the entire *Phenomenology* is an analysis of attitudes of which only the last is adequate. But the division indicated in the text is also Hegel's own, and is sufficiently representative for present purposes.

³ V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II, 'Die Sinnliche Gewissheit oder das Dieses und das Meines', p. 73 ff., trans. p. 90 ff.

thought ; its warm profusion, which clothes itself in a thousand wonderful shapes, withers into barren forms and universals shapeless as murky northern clouds.' ¹ By thinking it we have altered the given, and thereby set up a dualism. Things as given to us are detailed, concrete, individual—indeed particular ; but the content of our thought is universal. Have we not converted real existences into contents of knowledge, into something which we have made ? In trying to grasp objects we have altered them, and we seem to have missed our hold. ' We make the thing universal and our own, and yet *qua* natural thing it ought to be free and independent.' ² Intellectualism thus has two sides. It puts forth ' realistic ' intentions, and assumes that reality is the given, that which is independent of the apprehending subject. But at the same time it is an attitude of thought, and all thought is a transforming and appropriating principle ; thus it chooses the relevant from the irrelevant, links up and interprets what is not given in that fashion, and in general bullies experience into supplying it with contents marked by its own characteristics. On this side it manifests an unconscious idealism, and presents another instance of inadequate thought turning into its opposite.

The assumption which intellectualism takes as its explicit principle, and which its performance flouts, is that the object of knowledge is a hard and impenetrable reality, inherently out of touch with the nature of apprehending knowledge. This assumption the opposite abstraction to pure theory, viz. the practical attitude, flatly denies. It assumes that things are utterly in relation to mind, and is a thorough-going idealism. The satisfaction of any desire or impulse naïvely crosses the gulf which intellectualism has declared to be impassable. ' The wit and need of man ', says Hegel, ' has found endless ways of changing and mastering nature. . . . Whatever powers nature evolves and looses against man, cold, wild beasts, water, fire, he knows means against them, and indeed he takes these means from nature and uses them against itself. The craft of his reason enables him to set one natural force against another, to destroy the one by the other, and so preserve and maintain himself.' ³ In the practical attitude the objective is subordinated to the subjective.

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VII a. pp. 12-13.

² *Ibid.* p. 14.

³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

The end lies in the satisfaction of the self ; and so the objective thing is regarded merely as a means whose end is the restoration or fulfilment of the harmony of self-feeling—the removal of discomforts and oppositions within the self. The task which intellectualism regards as impossible is performed, Hegel points out, by the animals, which, all unconscious of the unattainable character of things, reach out to them and devour them. This attitude gives us the point of view of finite teleology. But when it is exalted to be *the* method of dealing with things, and claims are made for it as for an ultimate standpoint, it manifests as grave deficiencies as the opposite abstraction, viz. intellectualism. It is true that things are determined by us as relative to our purposes ; but this is not the whole truth. The power of mind to bend things to its designs is narrowly limited. Man may overcome this, that, or the next thing, ‘ but he cannot master nature itself, the universal, in this way, and trim it to his end ’.¹ We shall see later² that a finite end is in the grasp of something greater than itself, and how great a failure mind is when it erects its private purpose—its subjectivity, as Hegel calls it—to the level of omnipotence. Further, teleology of this kind can afford but a spurious and external spirituality. Mind is interpreted as finite, i.e. as having an independent nature of its own to which things, indifferent in themselves, are arbitrarily subordinated. This is not the teleology of Aristotle, for whom the end is immanent in the thing as its own proper nature ; it is rather that external form which reads its arbitrary satisfactions into things as their inner meaning. It declares that ‘ the wool of the sheep is there only to provide me with clothes ’, and it wonders at ‘ the wisdom of God in providing cork trees for bottle stoppers, vegetables for weak stomachs, and cinnabar for cosmetics ’.³

Mere objectivity and mere subjectivity are equally one-sided ; if a genuine philosophic standpoint is to be reached the receptive attitude of theory must be united with the purposive character of practice. Philosophy is a practical attitude, and involves the right to transform the given, to think it, and to find law and order in it. But at the same time it must not be arbitrary and subjective ; it must not proceed from principles which are external to nature, private

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VII a. p. 10. ² Chap. IX. ³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

ends and the like, but must ascertain what the world itself is. In thus combining the theoretical and practical in a fuller and more adequate attitude we must alter each of them. Practice must forego its subjective limitations, and theory must renounce its intellectualism; we must be realistic and idealistic at once. We must, therefore, assume that in thinking things we are not departing from their true nature, but reaching forward to it; the truth comes to us not as datum but as result. By way of contrast we may indicate a false method of uniting theory and practice—a method which ignores the transformation required in each attitude. The defects of the purely theoretic consciousness—its entire subversion of the realism it professes—are in this theory accepted as final, and the equally one-sided practical attitude may simply be added to it as a supplement. The two imperfect aspects are not seen to be abstractions from a deeper attitude, but are set forth as interacting functions or faculties of mind. The result is, of course, a compromise. One shape this doctrine has taken in modern philosophy is the view that the universals of knowledge are mental constructs, they are classifications and arrangements made only for the convenience of thought and not because they are fundamental determinations of reality. The deficiency thus admitted may be filled up in more than one way. For example, the conception of a purely objective reality may be retained, and the task of reaching the unknowable may be handed over to the practical function of mind under the guise of faith or moral teleology. Another method, in which the practical side predominates, gives up the conception of the independence of the objective and makes finite purpose the motive and test of thought itself. Thought does not reach independent reality, it admits, but there is no independent reality to reach. We have been making a false demand on thought; its real function is to satisfy our purposes. It is a means to our satisfaction, and if it achieves that end no further claim should be made upon it. Satisfaction is thus put in place of reality, and thought becomes a moment in a finite will.

Hegel's attitude is thoroughly opposed to this compromise. He will not surrender any of the positive aspects of the inadequate powers of mind, and he believes that the realism of naïve theory has a certain truth. All his teaching is an

effort to bring together the moments of reality and rationality, and he denies that the idealism of true thought inhibits its adoption of a realistic standpoint. He therefore questions the assumption that the universals of thought are merely mental. If universals were mere convenient marks of things and aids to distinguishing them 'we might, e.g., take the lobe of the ear as the sign of man, for no beast has it. But we feel at once that such a determination does not succeed in knowing the essence of man'.¹ The first step in the solution of this dualism of mere thought and mere purpose is the denial of the adequacy of the datum. 'The truth of things is that *qua* immediate and particular they are only appearance and show.' That is to say, the negative or destroying aspect found in the attitude of desire and purpose to objects in their immediate appearance is the first moment of philosophic thought. 'Intelligence familiarizes itself with things not in their sensible existence, but by thinking them and by setting them as content in itself.'² But the universal which thought finds is not arbitrary; it is the law of the thing. From Hegel's standpoint it is an unjustifiable assumption to hold that the world is an aggregate of particulars; in the last resort it is a coherent system—and perhaps even system is an inadequate expression. Law, universality, context, and mediacy are constitutive of the barest fact; and when we must choose between the aspects, universality is the truer and deeper side. We express more, and are nearer the heart of things, when we know the law of an object, than when we can merely look at it and point. 'The universal of the thing is not something subjective, depending as it were on us. Rather in opposition to the transitory phenomenon it is the noumenon, the objective, the reality of the thing itself; and it is the Platonic "Idea", existing not afar off, but in the individual thing as its substantial genus. The inscription on the veil of Isis, "I am that which was, is, and shall be; and no mortal hath lifted my veil", dissolves before thought. "Nature", says Hamann with justice, "is a Hebrew word written only with consonants, and the understanding must point it".'³ Hegel does not suppose that the categories

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VII. p. 17.

² *Ibid.* p. 16.

³ *Ibid.* p. 17.

are the whole of the known world ; they are the ' diamond net into which everything is brought and thereby made intelligible '. The universal is abstract apart from that full realization of it which is reality in its entirety, the concrete existing worlds of nature and mind ; but, for knowledge, it is the fundamental aspect, the outline and essential nature of the whole, the notion of which the absolute itself is the ' idea '.

Philosophy is thus both receptive and active. It transforms the given, but at the behest of the deeper truth in the given. The task of science is to make things intelligible and discover rationality in them. It is active but not arbitrary. Discovery is a process, and involves digging beneath the surface till the gold is laid bare ; but the gold must be found *in* the rock and not be put there from without.

In order to determine Hegel's view further we may look at the distinction between philosophy and positive or inductive science. The philosophy of nature—and the same thing is true of the philosophy of mind—is not a substitute for the sciences of nature ; it does not itself discover laws from the actual facts and sift the phenomena of sense. It presupposes inductive science. ' The philosophy of nature takes the material which physics has prepared from experience, at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstructs it in such a way that experience is not its final warrant and base. Physics must work into the hands of philosophy, and the latter translates the universal, which the understanding has yielded, into the notion, and shows how as an intrinsically necessary whole it proceeds from the notion.'¹ In the last chapter we saw the nature of the notion, and indicated that the dialectic itself is an illustration of it. The notion is a principle which develops itself into a system ; and thus the barest principle of pure thought, being, was forced by the pressure of the whole within it to pass step by step into the articulated body of logic. The same thing is to be discovered in the philosophy of nature or of mind. The universal aspects of the special subject-matters can no more be left in a confused aggregate than can the categories of pure reason. They have to be reduced to order and congruence, their juxta-position must be resolved into mutual

¹ *Ibid.* p. 18.

implication, and the unity which the notion demands bestowed upon them. But this unity must not be capricious. The notion, we have seen, develops itself into the 'idea'; the variety which it achieves is not attained simply by applying a static principle in many directions, but is a genuine self-evolution, a deepening and maturing of the principle itself. To this end the philosophic science of nature must be dialectic. Its goal is the entirety of the explanatory principles of its object, and it must show them as interlocked and as mutually supporting. Naturally, then, since the system is the goal or result, we must begin at the other end from it, for we have to meet and bring with us every aspect of the whole. The simplest conception of the object, therefore, is the starting-point. When the inadequacy and incompleteness of that appears, we move to the next category, one stage more concrete, and so on, until the notion becomes the 'idea'. Only when we have brought the notion out into the 'idea' is the complete explanation, the *rationale*, of the object in our hands. So long as we do not know the various aspects this philosophic dialectic transcends our powers, and in this sense experience and induction are the necessary preliminary—foundation, if you will—of philosophy. But, on the other hand, so long as we are acquiring information of, and seeking acquaintance with new aspects, and passing haphazard, as chance and imperfect knowledge lead us, from one point to another, we cannot fully explain our objects. The middle terms of all our arguments are still merely *rationes cognoscendi* and are not yet *rationes essendi*. We note the appearances, and can say why we are certain of their existence; but what it is in truth that is before us we cannot tell. Like Plato's cave dwellers we see the shadows on the walls but not the veritable things themselves. Now, since philosophic explanation is a genuine system or organism, its parts are not to be conceived as independent, self-subsisting factors. Each law or universal aspect which falls within the compass of the completed science has its meaning and verification from the entirety of its context. Each is an abstraction which breaks into contradiction when thought in isolation. It is plain, therefore, that the metaphor of a ground or basis is misleading. The full truth, the explication of the significance of each element, comes to us only at the end. And philosophy

is not an edifice resting on those categories which come first in the order of statement. It is rather a self-balancing system no part of which will stay in place unless each of the others is present. If we lay any stress on the order of the exposition in time, the 'warrant and base' of the whole is in the last stage; and although ordinary speech may resent the inversion of its metaphors, yet it is reasonable to believe that thinking is a movement towards knowledge and certainty and not away from it. Now, although this is the fundamental nature of thought, inductive science does not grasp it. It is busy building up, or acquiring, and emphasis is laid on the relations of points of importance in the *acquisition* of knowledge. The metaphors of foundations and grounds are appropriate to it. Thus, a change of method marks the transition from inductive science to philosophy, and this is the meaning of Hegel's statement that the philosophy of nature reconstructs the material of physics 'in such a way that experience is not its final warrant and base'. Experience is not to be despised—far from it. Until mind has wandered over the whole of its field it cannot map the whole. The philosophy of nature cannot make physical facts, nor dare it really ignore them. But a fact by itself is nothing for thought; the true interpretation is the essential, and that, as such, is not a datum of experience but the product of universalizing and comprehending thought. Philosophic knowledge, then, is knowledge in the notion. That is not to say, of course, that a ready-made form is fitted to the material; as we have seen, the bare logical notion is a mere *demand*. The actual notion of a science is a proper product of the subject-matter, the principle of the things concerned, and each step of the development is the natural and inevitable consequence of the unfolding of the special nature of the fundamental conception. The notion of nature is not the notion of mind, and each develops into its 'idea' by a path determined by its own character and needs. But this they have in common, that they are principles which develop from within, and which pass into a concrete system in which they are not lost but realized. Hegel's conception of philosophy thus is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*: it stands above both. He admits the growth of knowledge, and the dependence on experience and on *a posteriori* methods which

that implies : but at the same time he insists that knowledge in itself is otherwise constructed, and is its own guarantee. The *a priori* and the *a posteriori* are both confused abstractions from the full method. Both regard the approach to knowledge as if it were itself all knowledge ; the *a posteriori* taking the faulty steps of the learner as the type of the march of maturity, the *a priori* imagining that there is no need for the learner to stumble and that he may march at once.

Such in brief outline is Hegel's conception of philosophy. We may now proceed to determine more closely his attitude with regard to the ethical world. In the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* there occurs the following statement : ' What is rational is real, and what is real is rational. Upon this conviction stands not only philosophy, but also every unsophisticated consciousness ; and from it proceeds the view of the spiritual universe as the natural.' ¹ The objections which present themselves to this proposition are manifold. Some spring from the claims of the subjective consciousness. Freedom and spontaneity seem to be infringed by this objective doctrine, and it is complained that Hegel's view leaves no room for sin and error. Hegel's own account of the claims of subjectivity will be presented in due course, as will also his view of evil from an ethical standpoint. We may confine ourselves in this chapter to the way in which Hegel's ethical theory attempts to unite the objectivity of science with the freedom of the subject-matter. We must discover what difference is made to the articulation of the underlying conception of philosophy by the all-important consideration that ethics deals not merely with facts but with the will and with ideals. There is undoubtedly a grave difficulty to be overcome by him, for he seeks to bring together the aspects of reality and validity or worth, and it is commonly alleged that from no standpoint can these be seen in ultimate harmony. We may, therefore, look at his criticisms of two rival methods of ethics, each of which Hegel regards as holding fast to one side and omitting the other of the necessary whole.

The first of these is ethical empiricism.² Empiricism objects

¹ WW. VIII. p. 17.

² Hegel's attitude to empiricism, as well as to the view which follows in the text, viz. formalism, is defined in his earliest ethical treatise,

to the 'high *a priori* road', and rests its view on experience. It is a form, as we have seen, of intellectualism. Experience presents to us an endless series of determinations, each filling out its own moment of time, and passing away again. In a pure empiricism none of these has pre-eminence over the others; for all are facts, and it is only as facts that they are interesting. This very infinity of material, however, is embarrassing; for empiricism calls itself science and wishes to think; it would be a theory and not a meaningless record of details. Therefore this pure realism in ethics must follow the appointed path of its downfall; it becomes idealist and transforms the given. Some one feature of experience, or group of such features, is plucked forth from among the undistinguished crowd, and regarded as the essence of the matter. Other phases are subordinated to it and treated as means. For example, in the theory of punishment, the aspect of the reformation of the offender may be made the end, and everything judged from that point of view. Or in the relation of marriage and the family, the education of the children may be set forth as the purpose of the whole, and the rest determined as relative to that end. But this procedure does violence to the other determinations. There are many other aspects of punishment than reformation; why should these be slurred over? There is the protection of society, the deterring of others, and so forth: are not these as valid ends as the one chosen? The privileged feature has no special right to predominance; for in the long run each is a fact, and every fact is as good as its neighbour so long as it lasts.

Having chosen a feature for chief place, empiricism makes it absolute, putting it forth as a binding law of life. The so-called law of self-preservation, or the hedonistic proof of the happiness principle, may serve as examples of Hegel's meaning. Some concealed criterion is adopted—physical necessity, common practice, &c.—and the aspect of things which fits this is called a duty. But this is a mere tautology. When we examine this so-called duty we find that it has its place not because it is binding, but merely because it is. If all men ought to seek happiness simply because in point 'Über die Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts', *WW. I. Lasson VII.*

of fact they do, then 'ought' adds nothing to the fact. 'I ought' is a disguised way of saying 'I do'.

Hegel continues the analysis. Ethical empiricism apes science further. Science is a unity, a system; and so empiricism must seek to reduce the complex field of appearances to a *single* principle. The unity to which it reduces the variety of its data, says Hegel, 'can signify only as simple and poverty-stricken a group of qualities as possible, from which it thinks it can extend to knowledge of the rest'.¹ Hegel is thinking of Hobbes. In the absence of a rational method empiricism tends to throw its doctrine into a pictorial form, and imagine (whether with historical accuracy or not, does not much matter) a 'state of nature', a chaos from which the ethical life springs. But a descriptive study of the transition from a state of nature to civilized society would be a mere chronicle, and not an ethical or political philosophy. Empiricism must pretend to make chaos *account* for society, and to that end it imports into the state of nature the 'capacity' or 'possibility' of all that comes out of it.

Empiricism thus drifts into arbitrariness and formalism in its effort to become science, and Hegel reminds it of its realistic basis. Pure empiricism is incoherent and unscientific, but it has a relative truth against the one-sidedness of this pseudo-philosophy. Life presents an infinite variety of cases, and philosophy must be wide enough to cover them all. It is a legitimate demand upon a formal view that it should develop itself in experience. Naïve empiricism 'rightly insists on its resistance to such an artificial erection of principles, and prefers its own empirical inconsistencies to the consistencies of such philosophizing, and its own confusion . . . to the absolute exclusion by one another of these different aspects of one and the same intuition, and to the determination of the whole itself through a single one of these qualities. . . . Finally, empiricism justly charges such philosophizing with ingratitude, since it has given the latter the content which its notions have, and has to see them become spoiled and distorted'.²

In this criticism we find reiterated in the sphere of ethical science two points which we have already discerned in

¹ WW. I. p. 333, Lasson VII. p. 338.

² WW. I. pp. 341-2, Lasson VII. p. 345.

general ; the necessity for experience and the necessity for its transformation. Ethical philosophy is not the whole of the ethical world, but it is the principle of the whole ; and if it is to be as comprehensive as experience it must be the notion of which the empirical is the embodiment. Hegel considers the failure of an ethical theory to cover social life as a totality to be a radical defect, and he believes that the true notion is the immanent principle of all ethical experience. Secondly, the details of social experience cannot be worked into a totality as they stand ; they must be recast and reconstituted. No one feature is to be picked out as the essence ; for the essence is not one aspect but a principle—right in general and not this or that right. His point of agreement with empiricism is that the notion comes out of experience and must be found in it ; the notion is not a fiction of the mind but the nature of the facts. The point of disagreement is that for Hegel the apprehension of this objective right is not attained by simple inspection but by conceptual thinking, by apprehending the rationality of the ethical world.

We may now consider the method most opposed to empiricism, viz. the moral idealism of which Kant's theory is one of the highest forms. Empiricism has treated the ethical as the existent, Kant insists that the ethical is the rational. We have seen that the existent as apprehended by empiricism falls short of rationality, and Kant accepts the tacit dualism. The characteristic of Kant's ethics is the opposition of reason to experience and the emphasis laid on the primacy of practical reason. Empiricism in its purer form lays hold of the real in its immediacy, in its definite temporary moments as facts. The critical philosophy, on the other hand, recognizes that there is another aspect, universality or wholeness, and that the latter is the more fundamental for science and reason. Empiricism claims, as we have seen, to be science ; but it fails to discern that scientific totality cannot be reached either by the mere aggregation of particulars or by capricious selection among them. The particular must be radically transformed before it can become a member of an organic whole. The compilation of separate parts can give only a mechanical and superficial unity ; it cannot reach the entirety and congruence which rationality or intelligibility demands. The critical philosophy begins with the perception of this failure.

When thought has made this step, two paths open before it. One is to maintain the dualism of matter and form, of experience and reason, and to preserve an apparently scientific attitude by rejecting experience and the particular and by holding fast to reason and the universal. The other course is to revise the assumption which leads to the dualism, viz. the impenetrability and atomic character of facts. At first sight experience is not a rational system, it is a patch-work of particular details: so much is common to empiricism, to Kant, and to Hegel. Against empiricism Kant and Hegel insist that the mere particular is not intelligible. Kant, however, agrees with empiricism that the facts are in truth as they appear, and assert that the incompleteness which he sees in them is their final character. Therefore, he thinks, in order to attain rationality in the moral world we must forgo the facts and turn to the intelligible content of reason. Hegel questions this. He allows to empiricism the truth of its assumption that the rational is the real, but breaks both with Kant and empiricism by denying that the immediate object, the relatively uninterpreted datum, is what is truly there. Kant, however, does not take this step. Recognizing the universality and completeness which empiricism fails to provide, he exalts it to the place of the whole, and isolates it from the particular. The form, he thinks, must be coherent and self-complete, or as Hegel phrases it, infinite and absolute; and since the matter of experience yields nothing final, we must obtain the form not from the matter but from another source, viz. reason. Kant's ethical system is, therefore, a mode of the *a priori* and formal type of thought.

Pure practical reason, for Kant, is the essence of the moral order, and the moral law is the result of its legislation. But having made a cleavage between matter and form, and given to reason control merely over the latter, Kant is unable consistently to find any real content for the legislation of pure practical reason. Its commands have no point of contact with the world of actual practice, and Hegel insists that, if thought clearly, it shows itself to be utterly empty. The understanding which apprehends experience is, for Kant, a faculty of parts which constitute no whole; while practical reason is a faculty of wholes which have no parts. Kant, of course, could not afford to recognize the full force of this

dilemma, and he gradually fills the legislation of practical reason with a foreign content to which it has no right. His task is difficult, and he adopts the expedient of applying the formal unity to various matters of experience and allowing it to articulate itself in conjunction with but not by means of them. When a practical course of action is in question, we may bring it to the bar of reason. Reason, however, will not itself provide a deliverance, for such action would bring it down from its lofty *a priori* status and stain it with the mire of contingency and fact. The moral law is not determined by its instances, but is an authoritative standard to which they refer. Pure practical reason, thus, falls into the category of substance in contrast with the notion. And Hegel's mode of attack is to point out that so long as Kant holds the universal to be independent of the particular, so long is the latter in its turn independent of the former. If the form is not the form of the matter, the matter is untouched by it.

Kant tells us that the morality of a maxim of the will is its pure universality, its self-consistency; and he obtains an apparent content for the moral law by laying hold of the implications of universality. The moral maxim is the universal; hence that which can be universalized is moral, and that which cannot is immoral. To this Hegel rejoins that an illicit step has been taken. The essence of the ethical ideal, on Kant's fundamental assumption, is not universality in its concreteness as the principle of a system, but *mere* universality, form without matter, self-consistency in the narrow sense. 'When Kant recognized that a universal criterion of truth would be that which was valid of all cases of knowledge without distinction of their objects, and that, since we thereby abstract from all content of knowledge—and truth is concerned precisely with this content—it is quite impossible and absurd to ask for a sign of the truth of this content of cases of knowledge when the sign is not to penetrate to the content, he pronounced judgement on the principle of duty and right which is set up through practical reason. . . . It is thus inherently self-contradictory to look within this absolute practical reason for an ethical legislation which must have a content; for the essence of the former consists in having no content.'¹ The moral law is an abstract principle

¹ WW. I. p. 351, *Lasson* VII. p. 353; cf. *Larger Logic*, WW. V. p. 28.

of reason out of all relation to experience, and cannot pass criticism on any particular mode of action or life. Kant escapes the tautology which is his sole right by the illicit introduction of experimental detail.

We may follow this in an example. 'The commonest understanding', he says, 'can distinguish without instruction what form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not. Suppose, for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my fortune by every safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it. This is just the case for my maxim. I desire then to know whether that maxim can also hold good as a universal practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case, and ask whether it could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same time give such a law as this, that every one may deny a deposit of which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that such a principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the result would be that there would be no deposits.'¹ But this application involves more than Kant has any right to say in accordance with his dualistic assumption. The annihilation of deposits is quite a consistent action, if consistency means not coherence with a system but abstract self-identity. Kant has tacitly introduced a reference to a systematic self-coherent life; but that is more than mere universality, it is the concrete whole. Taken in isolation the premise that there should be no property is as self-consistent as its opposite, and the law of formal practical reason cannot decide between them. The assumption of property as the positive content of the judgement is arbitrary, and prejudices the point at issue. 'If the determination of property in general is posited', says Hegel, 'the tautology can be deduced from it, property is property, but beyond that nothing else. And the legislation of practical reason is this tautological production: property if property is, must be property. But if the opposite determination, the negation of property, is posited, then from the legislation of the very same practical reason comes forth the tautology: non-property is non-property; if there be no property, that which would be

¹ *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. § 4 Anm., Hartenstein, V. pp. 28-9, Abbott's trans. p. 115.

property is cancelled. But the very point we have to prove is that property must be ; we are concerned only with that which lies outside the capacity of this practical legislation of pure reason, viz. with the decision which of the opposed determinations must be posited. But pure reason demands that this is already performed, and that one of the opposed determinations be previously posited ; then alone can it bring forth its legislation as no longer redundant.'¹ At this point Hegel strikes a note which resounds throughout his thought. The formalism and subjectivity which Kant affirms to be the principle of ethics is in truth the essence of the unethical. According to Kant reason has no specific content, its bare generality stands aloof from the passions and impulses, the needs and satisfactions, of the sensuous life of man. But the obverse side of this statement is that the particular contents of will and desire are not conceived as transformed and assimilated by the good will. They remain particular and unregenerate, indifferent, if not actively hostile, to the supersensible principle of reason. Thus when man acts, even though it be in accordance with duty, his motive is touched with self-interest : only a sensuous animal can act in the sensible world ; pure reason lives, if at all, in another and distant sphere. Therefore the moral agent, he who acts as if he were a moral being, is really moved by natural and non-moral fact. At most he has thrown the cloak of the goodwill over unregenerate inclination. Thus to depose the goodwill, to put passion on the throne of life with the sceptre of sanctity in its hand, is treason to the ethical ideal. But the only escape from this attitude is by the consistent denial to the pure but empty moral standard of any lot or part in action, and by the pessimistic conclusion that morality in every shape and form is an unattainable ideal.

This subjectivity to which Kant's teaching, taking it on its lower side, inevitably leads, was regarded by Hegel as a special danger of his time. Desiring to find a basis for the ethical life in reason, even fearing lest the objectivity of reason might crush out the moral life altogether, thinkers of various schools tended to despise scientific thought and to fall back on the inwardness and spontaneity of intuition and the convictions of the heart. Hegel himself in his earlier years dallied with

¹ *WW*. I. p. 353, *Lasson* VII. p. 355.

the conception of intuition; and in his earliest ethical writings, in which the foregoing criticism of empiricism and formalism is found, the term plays a not insignificant part. But the word has even there a different meaning from that given to it by the Romantic school—even by Schelling, with whom Hegel was at the time associated. For Hegel intuition was a prevision of the rational, an insight into the nature of things, which could justify itself afterwards by criticism. For others, however, intuition was a peculiar form of knowledge, a certainty which was immediate and self-contained, standing in no need of mediation. The result was in some cases a flouting of the rational altogether, and the absurd assumption that the deepest things of the spirit are those which require least toil of thought. 'The way of intuition', says Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, 'requires you to don the vestments of the high-priest. Along that road stalks the ennobling sentiment of the Eternal, the True, the Infinite. But it is wrong to call this a road. These grand sentiments find themselves, naturally and without taking a single step, centred in the very sanctuary of truth. So mighty is genius, with its deep original ideas and its high flashes of wit. But a depth like this is not enough to lay bare the sources of true being, and these rockets are not the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific insights are only to be gained by the labour which comprehends and grasps its objects.'¹ When intuition is put in place of thought, the moral consciousness lacks objectivity and reality. Intuition has no other standard—if thought is shut out—than immediate certainty: individual man becomes the measure, and philosophy lapses into the confusion of the Sophists from which Socrates and Plato rescued it.'² 'The words "God giveth it to His own in sleep" have been applied to science; and hence every sleeper has numbered himself among the elect. The thoughts he has obtained in sleep are indeed products suited to it.'³ The ethical life of man has developed slowly in his history. It has gradually moulded itself in habits, customs, and social institutions: it is slow of growth and difficult of attainment, and it will not yield itself to the first call of a fanciful mind. 'The notion of the thing does not come to us by nature. Every man has fingers, and

¹ *WW*. II. p. 56, translated by Wallace in *Prolegomena*, p. 53.

² Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, *WW*. VIII. p. 14.

³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

may have brush and colours ; but he is not thereby a painter. Even so it is with thought. The notion of right is not whatever each has first at hand ; to think rightly is rather to know and to understand the thing, and our knowledge of it must therefore be scientific.'¹

It is time to gather together the points which have emerged. Empiricism does not attain scientific rank ; it may describe the outer appearance of many phases of life, but it cannot tell us what is fundamental and universal ; it cannot depict life as a whole. It holds to facts without their rationality. Formalism, on the other hand, typified at its strongest by Kant, rightly places the essence of the ethical life in reason ; but it takes reason abstractly and as isolated from experience and reality. The ethical, for Hegel, must be conceived both as rational and as objective—objective not only in the sense of possessing formal validity for thinking beings but in the deeper sense of being the expression of the reality of human life. What we have now to determine is the meaning of the phrase 'the reality of human life'. How does Hegel escape from a bondage to facts, from bowing the knee to the gods that are—in short, from empiricism ? The criticism which he has passed upon empiricism is that it lacks the notion and reason. But in what way, it may be asked, will rationality bring a system of right which is grounded in, and ultimately one with, the objective world, above the level of the merely *de facto* ?² Referring in the introduction of his *Smaller Logic* to the criticism which has been aroused by his identification of the real and the rational in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says somewhat sharply, 'We must presuppose intelligence enough to know . . . that existence is in part mere appearance, and only in part reality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any error, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way the name of reality. But even our ordinary

¹ *Ibid.* note to preface, p. 9.

² 'So far as I can see, all that Hobbes or Filmer, Haller or Stahl have taught, is relatively open minded in comparison with the famous phrase regarding the rationality of the real in the sense of Hegel's preface. The theory of divine free grace and the theory of absolute obedience are blameless and innocuous in comparison with the frightful doctrine which canonizes the subsisting as such' (Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 367).

feelings are enough to forbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the name of a real; for by fortuitous we mean an existence which has no greater value than that of something possible, which may as well not be as be. As for the term reality, these critics would have done well to consider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed logic I had treated amongst other things of reality, and accurately distinguished it not only from the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence, but even from the cognate categories of existence and other modifications of being'.¹ That is to say, Hegel repudiates the interpretation which sees in his statement the doctrine that existence as such is right: he says not that the existent but that the *real* is rational. We must, therefore, go back to the logical distinction of categories, to which appeal is thus made, and see what the difference amounts to.²

Hegel means by existence something akin to what we call fact; it is this, here, and now. It is the transitory appearance of the sensible world taken at a superficial valuation: its history and its future are left out of account; the laws which it exemplifies, and which in truth constitute it, are quietly passed over; and it is regarded as an immediate conjunction of qualities interpenetrating one another in a limited unity of time and space—in short, a thing. Such a fact is a common object of knowledge, and it has its necessary part to play in the true apprehension of the scheme of things; but it is

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VI. p. 10; cf. Wallace, pp. 10–11.

² The following difficult passage may provide a key. 'The essence, gone forth into immediacy, is primarily existence, indeed an existent or thing, the undifferentiated unity of essence with its immediacy. The thing, it is true, contains reflection, but its negativity is directly obliterated in its immediacy. But since its ground is essentially reflection, its immediacy sublates itself, and the thing turns itself into a positivity.'

Hence, secondly, it is appearance. The appearance is that which the inherent thing is, its truth. This existence which is merely posited and reflected in other-being is, however, equally a self-transcendence into its infinity; the world of appearance sets itself over against the world which is reflected into self and inherent.

'But that which appears and that which is essential stand absolutely in relation to one another. Hence, thirdly, existence is essential co-relation; the appearing manifests the essential, and the latter is in its appearance. The co-relation is the still imperfect reconciliation of reflection into other-being and reflexion into self; their complete inter-penetration is reality' (*Larger Logic*, WW. IV. p. 120).

neither self-complete nor free from self-contradiction. By itself it is an abstraction, the result of an imperfect and one-sided principle of thought. When we think more deeply and attain more concrete categories, the simple abstraction is modified, and the 'thing' is seen to belong to a deeper system from which alone it has its being. When the neglected universals take their rightful position, the *prima facie* unities of space and time do not indeed vanish, but they surrender their false prominence and take a subordinate place in the universe. In contrast with existence, reality is the highest level to which the categories of essence can reach without definitely passing into the notion; its highest content is the system of reciprocal substances which forms the point of transition from substance to the notion. It is thus a much deeper truth than mere existence, and the latter is indeed an element within it. Substance exists, i.e. it appears in definite shapes, and without these it would not be itself. But it is far more than a mere congeries of facts; and to throw its existential aspect into relief is to do injustice to its complex nature. The real is not another object than the existent, it is the same object more deeply understood. It is not an essence afar off, it is the essence *in* the appearances—an essence which is the appearances. Thus when Hegel says that the real is rational, he does not speak of the world merely as it unrolls itself to a recording chronicler, he presupposes a mind with insight which can see what is hidden and beneath—even see it coming to the surface. On one side of it, therefore, Hegel's position is an attack on the insight of his critics. There is more in the world of fact than they have seen. In the nature and structure of man, in his reality, there is something other than the natural; his character has a moral texture, it is a movement of ideal forces, of principles, and is infused with rights and duties. These are in man, they are that of which he is and by which his life is nourished.

At this point the distinction between nature and mind appears. In the next two chapters will be found a fuller discussion of the will and of the nature of rational life in general, but it is necessary to anticipate here sufficient of that analysis to make the contrast of nature and mind intelligible. Mind and nature are sometimes said by common

sense to be respectively the intelligent and the unintelligent ; but we must modify this statement a little. Reason is not altogether absent from nature—else there were an end to natural science and to the philosophy of nature ; nature is intelligible and is apprehended by thinking mind. Hegel is not a subjective idealist, and he does not suppose that the finite mind makes nature ; but he insists that the essence of nature lies in the laws and principles which appear in their fullness only to mind. As a whole, nature is characterized by him as the external. That is to say, everything in nature is an individual, one fact among others, interacting with other individuals and on the same plane with them. Of course, the universal is not absent, and Hegel detects in nature the presence of the notion and even of the 'idea'. But these principles appear there in crude forms, and wear the shape of individual facts. The living organism is an embodiment—though an imperfect one—of the notion, and cannot be understood by means of lower categories. The organism is not an aggregate of parts but one living whole, in which the factors are organs and modes of the single life. Nevertheless nature contains only one side of the full being of reason. Reason lies buried in it in the shape of intelligibility and does not appear as active. Nature is capable of explanation, but of itself it explains nothing. Mind, on the other hand, is the proper shape of the notion. Reason is in it not merely as the knowable, but as veritable knowledge ; as active, thinking, willing consciousness. Hegel believes that mind in its full truth is not merely another non-natural fact, formally distinguished, indeed, from the natural by its specialized construction, but to all intents and purposes on a level with the natural. The significant consideration for him is that in mind the externality of nature is overcome.

In order to see mind as it is in principle we must not merely look at it from the outside, and regard it, as psychology usually does, as a subjective object. We must take its own standpoint and see it in its relation to its content. From this point of view, mind is the unity of opposites. Over against it lies an external world, an apparently independent and self-contained world. But mind grasps that world ; and in feeling, in thought, and in will it transcends the gulf that lies between nature and itself. It takes the natural world as *its own* world,

and can find itself at home there. Later on we shall emphasize the way in which this is performed by the will, and at present we may consider it merely with reference to thought. To know an object is to break down the barriers between mind and things. All knowledge alters the first appearances of things. The bare datum is interpreted, it is seen to be shot through with universality and law, and it suffers mind to place it within the context of an intelligible system. Thus mind discovers that the reason which is in itself as thought, is also in nature as law. Intelligibility and thought are not two reasons but one; the objective and the subjective, or the passive and the active, aspects of the single whole. 'The study of nature', says Hegel, 'sets mind free in nature; for mind develops in so far as it relates itself not to another but to itself. Similarly, it is the emancipation of nature. Nature is intrinsically reason, but it first obtains existence as reason through mind. Mind has the certainty which Adam had when he looked on Eve: "This is flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone". Thus nature is the bride which mind weds.'¹ In this quotation the two-sided movement of the notion is indicated. The externality of nature is robbed of its finality, it is taken within mind and made a content of the latter. And in the same act mind develops its own abstract principle of thought into a world of outward parts, a concreted and compacted system. In nature, then, rationality remains implicit; it is the essential feature, but it is not 'for itself'. The inherent character of mind, on the other hand, is to drag forth this rationality of its world, to make the implicit explicit, and as active reason to find reason in the object.²

If we are to understand this significant distinction between mind and nature, we must take the conception of the implicit seriously. In discussing ethical empiricism we saw that in its effort to explain the ethical world it had recourse to this conception—it had to import into the chaos from which it set out capacities and possibilities of the developed whole. Now, the flaw in its procedure is not the adoption of this thought of implicit being, but the use of it as an expedient in defiance of its own fundamental principle, its abstract realism. If existence is the whole truth, then the implicit is an illusory makeshift, a device to hide ignorance and failure. But

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VII. p. 22.

Ibid. § 376 note.

existence is not all : the mind cannot be explained without reference to the implicit.¹ Mind is not an aggregate of its parts ; and the mere juxtaposition in time of the events of a man's life is not an adequate rendering of what he is in truth. We speak without understanding if we say that a child *happens* to become a man, or is forced to manhood by outward compulsion. We have seen that the unity of causality—much more then, that of the notion—compels us to think principles which transcend time-differences ; and the implicit manhood of the boy is the phrase by which we express the presence of the organic whole in one of its members. What Hegel calls the 'idea', the completed system, is that in which the implicit and the explicit are at one. In the idea the principle is realized, and each member of the whole attains substantiality and completeness by taking the principle of the whole as its own. The conception of the implicit is fundamental here ; it is constitutive not only of the 'idea' in its full truth, perfect thought and action, but even of the perversions of the true form. In regarding the true shape of rational life it is easy for thought to imagine that because implicit and explicit are in harmony, the former is an otiose repetition of the latter. But to think thus is to fail to see that in a rational whole the particulars draw their character from the system and are not parts but organs. To withdraw the immanence of the one self in its phases is to reduce it to an external conjunction of accidents, and to take it not as a satisfaction of the logical demand for a unity of opposites but as the embodiment of some less adequate category of thought. Nor may the conception of the immanence of the whole be withdrawn from the faulty shapes of rational life. The bad life, for Hegel, is inherently a contradiction by virtue of its failure to render that which it ought to give : if we forget or ignore the inherence of the higher, the principle of the whole, in the lower, we see no contradiction, for we have lost one of the

¹ Can nature ? In a sense it can. For although the reason implicit in it is its true character, yet—apart from the contrast with mind—the latency of reason need not be stated. It is enough to show what forms of reason are hidden there for thought to find. Mind, on the other hand, is the development of the implicit into explicit being ; and the term, implicit, no longer concerns the relation of the content of the science to the scientific thought, but falls within the scientific content itself.

terms, and we are led to take evil action out of the category of the ethical altogether.¹

Doubtless the philosophy of mind, and we shall have to recur to the point, is abstract ; it is a statement of principles, of essences, of implicit character.² It does not tell us the special history of any particular man ; its mission is to proclaim what manhood is, and what it is to be a man. It therefore confines itself to the analysis of his rational nature as such, and deals with his failures only in so far as they involve his rational nature within them. The errors and gropings of man, the by-paths into which his feet stray, the incoherencies of his early speech, the distortions of his growing figure, these are not the fundamental side of him, they are not that which he takes as his own when he is most completely realized. 'Whatever lies between reason as self-conscious mind and reason as present reality, what divides that reason from this and hinders its satisfaction in it, is the fetter of some abstraction which is not liberated into the notion.'³ The discordance between the truth of man, the wholeness of the rational nature that is in him, and the present achievement is doubtless a fact, and Hegel has no intention of denying it. But fact is not reality, and Hegel's contention is that in such a state man is not himself ; he is a contradiction, both a rational being and an irrational, both truth and falsity.

Thus we must take into account the contention made above, that the categories of logic are not fixed forms of identical nature in every instance. We have seen that they are demands for the organization of a subject-matter, and that the precise answer to the demand depends on the character of the content. The reality of mind is other than the reality of nature ; and although history and necessity may exhaust the latter, the former has to include the aspect of subjectivity. We may anticipate a subsequent portion of the exposition in illustration. In his theory of punishment Hegel insists on the presence of the higher, that which ought to be, in the

¹ For Hegel's view of evil, v. chaps. VII and VIII.

² It is difficult to see what those who deny all validity to the conception of the intrinsic or implicit take their own philosophies to be. If philosophy is more than an arbitrary means to some alien end, if it is an outline or account of the world, what is this itself but an essence, an implicit being ?

³ *WW.* VIII. p. 19, *Lasson* VII. p. 15.

lower which defies and flouts it. Crime is not merely unprofitable action, it is action against right ; yet right is the true nature of rational action, and crime in violating right violates itself. It is an act which by its self-contradiction contains in it the demand for its own removal. Crime is not a dispute as to what is right ; it admits right, and infringes it. Thus the actual presence of the ideal in the fact alters the character of the latter. It would be a different act, not perhaps as regards mere relations of time and place, but in its deeper truth as a function of a moral self, if the right it denies were not in it. It is possible to look at the act as a purely natural event, a movement of physical parts ; but such inspection does not see all that there is there, it does not comprehend the reality of the object.

But it may be asked, why does Hegel identify rationality with reality and not merely with the notion or the 'idea', if reality, a category of essence, is inadequate to mind ? The reason is fairly obvious. He is protesting against the dualism of formalism. 'The reality of the rational', he says, 'stands opposed by the popular fancy that ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and philosophy is a mere system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very different fancy that ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have reality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves.'¹ What Hegel calls the real is the highest category which Kant discovered in the sensible world of experience ; and Hegel had to combat the assumption that the deeper laws of thought have no outward embodiment and application in the world of things. The notion and the 'idea' are, for Kant, regulative ideas, subjective principles of procedure in knowing, but not constitutive laws of the known world. Hegel answers this view in its own terms. The rational (i.e. notion and 'idea') is the real ; it is the final truth, the rose in the cross of the present. He has a right to his principle. When a higher category of knowledge supersedes a lower one the latter is sublated ; it is no longer *the* truth and is recognized to be an imperfect and one-sided aspect of experience. But it does not vanish. The lower is supplemented and modified, it is given a new significance and function ; but nevertheless it has its own specialized part to play within the higher

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, WW. VI. p. 10-11 ; cf. Wallace's trans. p. 11.

principle. Being, for example, is preserved in substance. When an object is taken in its essence as a substance, the immediacy of the accidents is transcended, and they are seen to be the vehicle of something deeper. But the immediate aspect also remains. The surface qualities, the colours, weight, shape, and so forth, of the outward embodiment of substance still appear to the senses, although the mind penetrates behind them ; and it was the failure of the category to bring these diverse aspects into harmony that marked it as imperfect. Similarly, in the notion reality is transcended but not lost. ' In my view ', says Hegel in the preface to the *Phenomenology*, ' everything depends upon grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but as subject as well.'¹ The truth is not subject only, but that which is subject as well as substance ; and Hegel commonly uses the word substance, even in connexion with the ethical order. When an object such as a living thing or a finite mind requires us to employ deeper categories than those of essence for its comprehension, we do not leave the direct palpable world of experience behind us and lose contact with fact. Thought must carry that world with it. To change the categories of knowledge is not a process of reducing the known to an amorphous mass and reshaping it so that no feature of the old material is recognizable. The old aspects persist although in due subordination. In Hegel's terminology they have passed from actuality²—i.e. isolated existence—to ideality—i.e. position in a system ; but if the lower elements were not thus carried up and preserved as well as held in subjection we should not have transformed the old, but have destroyed it and created something entirely new. The higher contains and is the truth of the lower, but the latter is an aspect of it. Now, mind can be understood only from the point of view of the notion, and the ethical world demands deeper categories than those of things. But the danger—to which Kant succumbed—is that in the effort to think the ethical order in the notion we lose touch with the real. The ever-present temptation of idealism is towards a premature unity, a synthesis which makes its world one by the simple expedient of denying that the awkward

¹ ' nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subjekt '.

² *Realität*—a technical term, not to be identified with the English word ' reality '.

differences are relevant. And Hegel's identification of the rational and the real is to be read as a warning against this fallacious tendency. The rational is at least real; it is the truth of the facts, and it is not less present than is a bare uninterpreted content of the perceptive consciousness.

We have already indicated that the facts of ethical life are constituted by the ethical principles in them, and this truth is part of a complex relation. The ethical is, for Hegel, the notion of this sphere; it must therefore not only determine facts but also be determined by them. Or, in other words, it establishes itself in things by bringing to light their intrinsic substance. It is this negative side that Hegel thought his time stood in danger of forgetting. And yet it should be obvious that true ideals are not fictitious constructs, but are born of facts. 'Every individual is the son of his time', and the flight of the strongest mind cannot carry it beyond its atmosphere into the void. The ideal state of Plato is the Greek city state at its highest and best, with the potentialities which Plato saw in it developed to their fullness. The political ideals of Hegel himself are circumscribed by the insight he had into the possibilities of the life of the states he knew. When a man's ideals are false, it is because he has misinterpreted what is in his world; he sees the potencies of things amiss. In every case what we would see in the world is inextricably bound up with what we do see there. It is not pretended, of course, that the existent accounts for the ideal; that would be an interpretation of the notion in the terms of thinghood. The point is that the ideal comes to us *out of* the present and objective.

Moreover, while it is true that the ideal is the standard of fact, there is another standpoint from which the ideal is to be judged by fact. A merely fanciful wish is no true ideal. When a man frames to himself an image of a life in which all his private satisfactions are added to one another, he is not depicting a true ideal but deluding himself. The ideal must have a structure and obey law; it must fit the facts and take cognisance of their characteristics and needs. If one's day-dreams were—*per impossibile*—brought into existence, they would exclude the deep and structural principles which make life and the world worth having; and such 'ideals' are the false subjective, not that which *ought* to be.

By thus setting aside the capricious and subjective and by liberating and taking as its own the deeper and more significant aspects of the real, the ideal receives the supremacy which it claims. When duty is conceived as a mere 'ought', the unattained and the unattainable, it has no force behind it. It is a categorical imperative, Kant tells us, which gives no reasons and assumes no ends ; but, one may ask, does its cloak of authority cover the rod of punishment ? There are no terrors in mere demands which are quite unrelated to facts ; no penalty follows their infringement, and if their authority be demanded they have no warrant to show. It is a commonplace in ethical theory that no answer can be given to the question, why should I be moral ? But this commonplace is not the whole truth. Unreasonable questions can at least insist on having their self-contradictory character made manifest ; and it is by no means clear that actual failure to give a reply is a proof of the absurdity of a query. The question, Why should I be moral ? is self-contradictory only because it is asked by one whose standpoint is necessarily within the moral sphere ; he is questioning that whereby he is. But if a theory, like the formalism of Kant or any other view which separates fact and ideal, leaves the larger portion—the real portion—of life outside the ethical world, it is possible for one to take one's stand on this large residuum, and from thence hurl defiance at whatever may be beyond. It is not open to formalism to say that one will thereby stultify one's true nature, for by the hypothesis one's true nature is one's existence, fact and not ideal. But when the ideal opens itself to the actual, and waits upon the world to deliver it of its meaning, the self-abnegation is the source of all strength. The ideal is now the representative of the nature of things, and the entire might of reality will avenge an insult offered to it. The ideal, thus, for Hegel, is itself the notion, and in surrendering all privacy of content it has gained the whole as its own.

Hegel's view then is to be understood as a defence of the reality and potency of moral principle. He has committed himself to the task of showing that whatever form of rational life is not ethical is not fully real ; it may exist, but it is an abstraction infected with contradiction. The critic who takes up the standpoint of ethical empiricism—however else he

may eke out his doctrine—and insists that the real is nothing else than the existent, will be forced, if he faces Hegel's thought, either to let rationality slip from the world, or to show that the contradictions Hegel finds in evil forms of moral life can be reconciled. What has to be attempted in this latter case will appear in the sequel.¹

I have endeavoured to explain in what sense Hegel's philosophy of right is a philosophic science. It is a science of ideals—a normative science, if you like—and it does not profess to offer historical explanation or even description of fact. It is not the part of philosophy to give that full, detailed, concrete knowledge which alone could be regarded as a sufficient answer to the question, Why are things as they are? in the sense in which the question has significance. Philosophy is not all knowledge, i.e. the 'idea' of knowledge; it is at most the notion of it: and it is the task not of the philosopher in his seclusion, but of all mind in all its forms, to carry out the process of embodying the abstract principles of pure thought. The utmost demand which may reasonably be made on philosophy is that it should provide principles whereby things *may* be understood. Thus, ethics has to tell us what evil inherently is, what kind of thing an evil act or character is: but the common question, Why does evil arise? is no problem to be solved by it. For, on the one hand, evil in general is a timeless abstraction which does not arise, and, on the other, the particular situations and events in which evil things do occur imply for their full explanation principles far other than those of ethics: they are acts in time, in space, in the world of motion and subject to the laws of motion. The general nature of evil, its general place in life, and its relation to the ethical world—this is all that may be asked of any ethical philosophy; and the success which Hegel has in solving these problems can be judged only by his actual performance. But while the philosophy of right is a normative and not primarily a historical science, it should throw light on history and may seek inspiration from it. For the distinction of positive and normative, as we have seen, is no absolute one. The ethical standards are in facts, and an ethical philosopher is justified in seeking examples of and clues to

¹ With this discussion cf. A. Phalén, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in Hegels Philosophie*, pp. 389–99.

ethical relationships in the historical record. Much of the richness of Hegel's own discussion of right comes from the wealth of the historical knowledge of man and of states that lies behind it.

Only one point in conclusion. Hegel well knew the limitations of his science. Philosophy presupposes the world ; it is the effort to understand what is already there. Doubtless the political and social reformer must have insight into the nature of man and society, and there is no reason why he should not be abreast of the stage to which philosophy has reached ; but as far as principles of right are taken merely as that which ought to be and not as themselves actual, so far is he excluded from philosophic ground. Hegel's view should not be regarded as an impediment to reform, but rather as a warning that the life which is busy with attaining is not yet complete. The ethical insight of a time is limited to the stage of rationality which has manifested itself in it ; and fresh forms of life must be established and proved before they can carry philosophy a step further. Just as logic is not an organon of discovery or a teacher of science, but the interpreter of what science has already seen and the analyst of its principles, so ethical philosophy is not a means to alter the state, but an insight into the coherence which it has attained. This is what Hegel says in the often-quoted passage at the end of the preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. 'One word more concerning the information of what the world ought to be ; for that end philosophy always comes too late. As the thought of the world, it first appears when reality has concluded its constructive process and brought itself to completion. What is thus taught by the notion, history also shows to be necessary ; only in the ripeness of reality does the ideal appear over against the actual, and build up for itself that same world, apprehended in its substance, into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, some shape of life has become old, and by grey in grey it cannot be made young again, but only known. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at the approach of twilight.'

CHAPTER IV

MIND

IN the previous chapter we glanced very briefly at Hegel's conception of mind and its relation to nature ; we have now to determine his view more in detail ; for he regards the ethical life as a special way of articulating the general structure revealed in all forms and phases of mind. We may begin by stating the contrast between mind and nature as sharply as possible. Nature, Hegel tells us, is in the realm of externality ; it is called external nature not merely because it is outside us, but because its characteristic feature is externality itself. Everything in nature lies in time and space, and in these media every part is outside every other part. Look as we will we can find nothing which is not an individual fact, one among others, subsisting alongside these, and standing in relations of action and reaction with them. Everything in nature is finite ; it is bounded by other things contiguous to it in time and space, and by the forces which operate upon it and make it what it is. Now, this finitude is constitutive of facts of nature, and if it be taken away their identity is destroyed. This is obvious with regard to spatial relationships. A geometric figure is clearly determined by the adjoining parts of space, and if the bounds which they set to it are removed its essential character is lost. Most natural things can survive a certain amount of such alteration, but there is a very narrow limit to their power. And even when one special limit is partly irrelevant, some other equally external boundary is what constitutes the fact. Gold, e. g., may remain gold in spite of certain alterations of figure, but it is constituted by another limit. Its specific gravity is a term which we use to indicate the comparison between the particular effects which the attraction of the earth exercises on gold and on water. If the action of this outside force were altered so that it produced a different effect on gold, the specific gravity would change and the essence of the metal would be lost. Clearly, then, nature is a realm of finitude, a system of acting and reacting

elements, and an embodiment of reciprocity. Everything refers beyond itself endlessly for its explanation : it is the joint product of all the forces of the universe and must be resolved into these if it is to be explained in detail. It is in a system of this sort that Hegel finds the meaning of necessity. Necessity means, in the long run, external determination, the dependence of a thing on things other than itself. We have already traced in the second chapter the progressive forms in which necessity is realized. In the category of substance it first appears as the inward power of substance over its accidents. In causality it begins to be explicit, its essence lying in the division which has taken place within substance. Cause and effect are one, it is true, but they are also immediately different, and the two aspects are not reconciled. In reciprocity the conception is completed, and we found that each term has its being from and in a system of other terms outside it. The true unity of the notion is lacking here : the identity of the terms is still implicit and the obvious or explicit factor is the resolution of each into that which is other than it. When we say that the being of the thing is its relation to others, we have dissipated it into these others and destroyed its self-identity. In this endless outward resolution is necessity. 'Necessity', says Hegel, 'is often called hard, and rightly so, if we keep only to necessity as such, i. e. to its immediate shape. Here we have, first of all, some state, or generally speaking, fact, possessing an independent subsistence : and necessity primarily implies that there falls upon such a fact something else by which it is brought low. This is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract. The identity of the two things, which necessity presents as bound to each other and thus bereft of their independence, is at first only inward, and therefore has no existence for those under the yoke of necessity.'¹ Such, then, is the character of the natural as such : it is a finite individual, bounded and determined by other individuals, an embodiment of the category of reciprocity, and under the sway of necessity.

The ultimate nature of mind is in contrast with all this. To apprehend the character of mind we must look at it in its strength, as it is when it realizes what it has in it to be, and satisfies all its essential purposes. There is no external limit

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 158 note ; Wallace's trans. p. 282.

to the range of the mind's capacity ; there is nothing which it cannot know, no rational satisfaction which it cannot enjoy ; and no fact is so stubborn that it cannot be reduced by mind and made a means to the fulfilment of life. In contrast with the natural, mind cannot be moved from without ; and if the powers of environment are to influence mind, they must transmute themselves into ideas and motives, into spiritual forces which are the substance of mind itself.

We are apt to speak of the environment of mind in a loose sense, saying that mind conforms to its environment and is moulded by the latter. But such a statement is an imperfect expression, and utters only the less adequate aspect of one thought. The truth regarding mind is rather that it determines itself through its environment. If we take the term environment to mean that system or world which is related to one self and forms the substance of its life—as, for example, a man's nationality, his social surroundings, the influence of his employment on him, the traditions of his circle, the books he reads, his hopes and fears, and all else that has an outward reference and origin—then the primary aspect is that mind makes its environment. Of the countless forces that play around the self only those touch it that are accepted by it, and they alone are its environment. The social and physical environment alike are my environment only if I apprehend them and take them into my life. The books I cannot know are no more than nothing to me, the beauties I cannot see do not gain entrance into my world, and the music of the spheres cannot charm me if I have no harmony in my own soul. Mind must remake for itself every element of its world, and is utterly impervious to purely external forces. We will discuss later the objective aspect of the relation, but the first aspect—and it is one which cannot be revoked—is the self-possession of mind, the activity whereby all that it has and is results from its own action. In contrast with nature, therefore, mind is self-contained.

When this aspect of mind is regarded from another angle it appears as the universality of the *ego*. The natural thing is merely a particular ; it passes over into other things and its unity with these remains latent. But however great be the range of the mind's activities, it remains one with itself. It is tied down to no single content, and there is nothing from which

it cannot turn in abstraction. It is aware of itself as this identical self present to all its experience, the universal of which every mode of its life is a particular.

These characteristics of mind, its universality and self-dependence, may be regarded in a one-sided fashion. Descartes, for example, makes a sheer antithesis between thought and things, and in consequence his view of mind is abstract. By his method of doubt he removes from the self every content of thought until he comes at last upon the bare empty form of the ego as such. This immaterial, unextending, imponderable, active, thinking substance is the contradictory opposite of the material, extended, ponderable, passive world of things, and Descartes takes the contrast as final. Doubtless the self, thus described, is universal and self-contained, but these predicates have a different meaning here from that borne by them in reference to the true nature of mind. The ego as inferred from the proposition, *cogito, ergo sum*, is universal in the sense that it lacks all particularity and definition, and it is self-contained in the sense that there is nothing in it for anything else to contain. Hegel does not deny this power of the ego to empty itself, to turn back into its self-identity and expel all its content as not-self; but he is careful to point out that there is another side to the act in which is contained the elements which this primary aspect excludes. In shutting out the world the self adopts an attitude of opposition to it, and this attitude can be maintained only by constant effort. Thus, in holding the world from it as the not-self, the ego stands in a fundamental relation to it, for it is only by conscious abstraction from the particular that this kind of self-consciousness is possible. If the contrast slips for a moment the self lapses into nothingness and thought disappears.¹

The dualism of which Cartesianism is an outstanding example has extended far into the history of thought, and many who would perhaps explicitly reject Descartes' dualism still retain the thought of the self as an inner core or impalpable simple entity. In their view the self does not proceed from nature, and the natural world is only the occasion and not the substance of its life. Knowledge, on this view, is like the light of a lamp shed on something set before it, and the self is that which carries the lamp. If this view be taken as the whole

¹ Cf. below, pp. 109.

truth about the self, even in its poorest phase, it is subject to grave criticism. Indeed it comes under Hume's strictures ; for the self, by being set over against its world, becomes one fact among others, a finite existent. If the view be taken seriously the only difference between the self and the other particulars that make up its world is that the former cannot be found. If we abstract from the objective content of the mind, from that which we have already called its world or environment, we leave standing nothing but a void form. If it is said that activity is left, one must point out that activity by itself is simply an empty abstraction, a movement where there is nothing moving. In an earlier chapter ¹ we distinguished two senses of the term, thought or experience, and the distinction drawn there may be indicated by the contrast of the process and the content of mind. The process is the external aspect apprehended by an observer, the subjective object which psychology studies ; the content is, as it were, the view from within, what the mind in question feels, thinks, and wills. But this distinction, although of importance, is not final ; and if it is turned into a separation, mind becomes unintelligible. When we think, feel, or will, it is the content of mind that is in process, and beyond that content there is nothing present to move. It is sheer superstition to suppose that mind is filled with spiritual phantasms that gibber and cry round a portion of the solid world, isolated by mind as its object. It is our world itself that moves in our experience, and our known, felt, and willed environment is shaped and developed in our activity. It would perhaps shock common sense too much if one were to say that objects of knowledge, tables, chairs, mountains, and past ages, actually perform in our minds the transformations which we are wont to assign to our ideas ; and, in truth, such objects, *qua* natural things, do not act thus. But at the same time we must insist that *qua* mental contents these things do move in our mental processes, and that our life consists of the processes of such stuff.²

But surely, it will be said, there is more in mind than comes

¹ Chap. I. p. 3.

² So far as I can understand, Hegel insists on the continuity and identity of 'natural things' and the moving mental content of mind without denying the stolidity and 'independence' of the former. This problem goes beyond the scope of this book, but in the last chapter I have suggested the demands which the solution must satisfy.

before it at any given moment, and that 'more' cannot be content. Hegel does not deny that there is more in mind than comes before it, and he insists that all finite mind is greater inherently than it is explicitly, but his admission will not bear the weight of the suggested inference. The suggestion is that the 'more' that is in mind is not explicit as content, but has another form of explicit being, some kind of subjective activity operating as another particular on the content in front of it. Now, what is more may be of two sorts: it may be some deeper form of unity, the implicit nature or capacity of mind, which has not yet been realized, or it may be some particular mode of feeling, thought, or will. But in the first case that which is as yet *merely* implicit is, so far as existence goes, nothing at all: it is in no wise the process aspect of mind. In the ordinary sense of the term it is an ideal which has not yet been attained. And if this implicit character is not merely implicit, but is active in mental life, then, no doubt, it is not a special content among others; but nevertheless the content of mind is the field of its being and the principle is immanent in that content as a universal, though not as a particular. For example, the good which a criminal act violates is inherent in and recognized by the criminal act, and the act contradicts not only the character of the self but its own selfhood. The immanent self is not an invisible entity over against the content, but is latent in the content itself. These considerations apply also if the element, which is said to be in the self and not for it, is particular—with the addition that at some time in the past the element was an explicit special content, and, to use Hegel's terminology, has slipped back again from actuality into possibility. Such things are but a poor filling for the self, for it is liable to lose all its substance merely by thinking of it. The distinction between self and not-self does arise, and we shall discuss it in the sequel,¹ but it is a distinction within the content of the self; and we shall see that, in Hegel's view, the self, even when it shuts out its world as the not-self and shrinks into the vacuity of its own abstract universality, is at the same time the whole within which the division has place.

By denying the Cartesian dualism, Hegel asserts the identity of the self and its world. But like every other

¹ V. p. 93 ff.

identity in the notion the unity is meditated ; it is a unity of opposites. A mind cannot be constituted by grouping any quantity of merely natural facts together ; nature by itself is always an unfinished system of individual though interacting facts, and, as we have seen, its externality is a constitutive feature of it. If we compare any portion of the system of merely natural things with the world of content which constitutes a mind, the differences are obvious at once. Every thing, the being of which is exhausted by its position in nature—or in the objective order, if we like to call it such—has a fixed being dominated by space and time. The fall of a stone, for example, as a natural fact, occurs at one specific place and time and in no others. Having occurred now and here, it cannot occur again or elsewhere except under new circumstances which make the second fall a separate event. What is here may act on what is over there, but it itself is here and not there. Everything is confined to its own proper space and time, and cannot transcend it without being dissipated. But *qua* contents of mind things are not so limited ; the same fall of the stone may appear in my thought again and again, being each time in fresh relations and context. It becomes connected to other contents by the laws of association, it is an element in conative unities, it is the example of laws and principles, and it is moulded into a thousand shapes and forms without loss of its identity. Thus, contents of mind are not externally limited by time and space as are natural events ; they have acquired a finer texture, have become moments of a more flexible system, and are wrought into a higher and more subtle unity. Hegel expresses this by saying that facts of nature lose their abstract particular existence or actuality when they become contents of mind and take on the form of ideality. By existence or 'actuality' in this sense is meant the externality they possess as particular things in the reciprocal system, and their 'ideality' signifies their liberation from these bounds, their transformation into moments of an organic whole, which gives them their function and place and withdraws from them the appearance of ultimate fixity. Thus when we say that, for Hegel, the objective world of the mind constitutes the mind, we must remember that in constituting mind the world develops features which, *qua* natural, it does not possess ; it organizes itself into purposes and cogni-

tions which are articulations of a single self-conscious subject ; and it rises to a unity which is not natural at all.

Before stating the contrast between nature and mind in its final aspect—viz. the antithesis of finite and infinite—we may indicate the limits to the contrast that have emerged in the preceding argument. We have found nature to be the realm of particulars whose being passes over into other particulars external to them, and we have found that mind is the universal and self-contained ; but we have also seen that the universality of mind bodies itself forth in the particulars it knows, and that it is self-contained because it grasps its world within it. That is to say, mind overreaches nature and takes the latter into itself, making it the content of mind and giving it a spiritual subsistence. The difference between mind and nature is not such that mind is merely other than nature, but rather such that mind attains its higher character by including and subordinating nature. Thus mind has a twofold character : by virtue of its contrast with nature it is one side of a relation, but by virtue of its comprehension of nature it is the whole within which the contrast occurs. This is the point at which Hegel's philosophy differs from that of Fichte and that of Schelling. For Fichte, as for Hegel, the ego is supreme, but in Fichte's philosophy there is no room for a genuinely natural world. Fichte—such is Hegel's reading of him at least—is afraid of genuine objectivity, and he does not let the self go free into nature and have as its content a world of external things. All that is in it is a mode and instrument of the fundamental subject which in the last resort is all in all. Hegel, on the other hand, in no wise denies the existence of nature—nature which is temporally prior to the self, and in which the self originates. The world, for him, as for Fichte, is spiritual, but it is not subjective in the sense of being something produced by mind from its inward parts to satisfy a need—even that of self-realization—existing in the self apart from or prior to nature. And in Hegel's view the self has to draw its purposes from nature and emancipate the potencies that are in objective things. For Schelling, on the other hand, nature is a partner in the whole on equal terms with the subject. Its being is inherent and objective, and the unity which it forms with mind is a unity in which neither mind nor nature predominates. His favourite expression is

that of polarity, or the neutralization of each aspect by the other. Hegel agrees with this in part, by insisting that nature has a character of its own which mind must find in it and by believing that mind comes to itself not in an abstract unity where all is subjective and nothing objective. But at the same time he holds that the difference between nature and mind falls within mind itself. The potencies of thought and purpose which mind finds in its world are of a spiritual character ; they can satisfy mind and in them mind can be at rest with itself. In the last resort, if this view is to be upheld, the very externality of nature must be a moment in the being of mind ; mind must come to itself in its world not merely in spite of the definition, the particularity, and the order which pertain there, but rather because of it—and the category in which we think mind must be nothing less than the 'idea' itself.¹

We may sum the character of mind in Hegel's view, so far as we have stated it, under two heads. (1) Mind obtains its substance from the outer world ; the details of its content have been found by it and can all be traced to 'natural' sources ; even its activities come from nature, for mind arises in nature, and its impulses and desires, the staple of its practical life, are set in it by the circumstances of its origin. Its very form is a unity to which that which was natural has risen. But at the same time the natural is transformed and idealized when it becomes spiritual ; it achieves a unity and constitutes a system which is mind and not nature. On one side, therefore, mind is the internalizing of the external, the deliverance into explicitness of the mind buried or latent in nature. (2) By apprehending the objective and taking it as content, mind articulates and determines itself. In its truth it is not an empty or abstract universal but a concrete whole developing itself into differences. Every objective fact or law which mind understands and can henceforth use, is a fresh organ which it has put forth, a determination whereby greater concreteness is gained. Mind for Hegel is never the merely inward, the notion as a bare principle, but always an articulated universal, a world, the 'idea'. Its moments, however, are always ideal, members of itself, and live in its medium and with its character ; and hence the 'reality'

¹ V. below, pp. 265 ff.

of mind is of a higher order than the 'existence' found in nature.

This brings us to the final form of the contrast between nature and mind. The natural is finite and under necessity ; mind is infinite and free. We may take the former term first. We have seen that the natural thing is finite because it is externally determined and because if its limits are transcended its proper quality *qua* natural thing is lost. But mind in its truth is not thus limited. Hegel does not deny that mind may be finite, and two sections out of three—one of these two being the science of the ethical life—of the philosophy of mind are occupied with finite mind. But the finitude of mind is other in character than the finitude of nature ; for even in its finitude mind remains infinite. When mind is in its proper form the place of finitude is within the whole : mind articulates itself into moments each of which is individual and definite—other than the whole, and hence finite. The word infinite is used in common speech in a variety of ways. Sometimes the term denotes the contradictory opposite of the finite, that which is not-finite—and it is in this sense that Spencer's Unknowable is infinite. But to oppose the infinite thus to the finite is to limit the former by the latter, and hence to render it finite. An allied use is that which identifies the infinite with the endless or indefinitely extended ; in this sense we speak of infinite space and time, or an infinite series of numbers. But if this conception is taken seriously it means simply the indefinite, that which transcends all bounds because it has in it no principle of definition. It is all-comprehensive in the sense that nothing shuts it out, but it lacks comprehension in the sense that differences do not belong to it ; it is endless because abstract. If this thought is generalized the infinite becomes utterly empty—pure being which is nothing. But there is a third sense which stands scrutiny. The infinite is that which includes and sustains the finite ; all bounds belong to it and are modes of its being, but it is confined by none of them. It is a whole system, leaving nothing outside it, but including everything as its own and as itself. In this sense the self is infinite. There is no range to the limit of its power, and nothing is inherently beyond the scope of its thought and ultimate purpose. External nature itself is the mind's own world and an embodiment of it—bone

of its bone and the substance of its life. But if this be the radical aspect of mind, what does its finitude mean? 'Mind', says Hegel, in the *Encyclopaedia*, 'is the infinite "idea", and finitude means here the incongruity of notion and actuality.'¹ Mind is finite when it is in contradiction with itself, when it embodies itself in shapes which cannot truly realize it. Its content is alien to it and withstands it. Hegel points out that the nature of mind lies not in the limit but in the infinite that is distorted by the limitation. Unlike the natural thing, the mind can transcend the limit without loss of identity; it may, by taking deeper thought, circumvent the obstacle and even use it. Mind, unlike the thing, is not constituted by being shut out by its neighbours. Moreover, even when mind is limited it is also beyond the limit and its infinity appears in its finitude modifying the latter. 'The very fact that we are aware of a limit, is proof that we are beyond it and of our unlimited being. . . . Only the unconscious is limited, for it is not aware of its limit. On the other hand, he who is aware of the limit is aware of it not as a limit to his will but as something known, something belonging to his knowledge. Only the unknown would be a limit to the will, and the known limit is no limit to it. Thus, to know one's limits is to know one's unlimitedness.'² That is to say, Hegel sees no ultimate difference between the determination which is felt to confine the self and that in which the self is more thoroughly aware of its freedom. In knowing the determination we have appropriated it, and made it *ours*; and even in this extreme opposite the self maintains its universality and self-contained being. Moreover, in being aware of its confinement it is aware of the greater self whose nature the limit cramps. And the process of transmuting the limit into a means is of the same nature as the internalizing of the objective in general. A somewhat commonplace illustration may make this clearer. Suppose a man becomes aware of a defect in his eyesight. In order to do so, he must contrast what he sees with what he should see, and must realize that a fuller vision properly belongs to him. In order to know his limit he must apprehend his essential nature of being beyond that limit. When he has become aware of his defect it begins to lose its limiting character. He can now take into account the weakness of his sight

¹ § 386.

² *Encyclopaedia*, § 386 note; WW. VII b. p. 38.

and judge external things accordingly. Then, by accurate knowledge of his defect he may take steps to correct it, and by such means as the use of glasses he may restore normal vision and overcome his defect. Now, it is important to note that when this limitation is thoroughly mastered it is not annihilated. The defect is sublated or merged, as Hegel puts it, but its special character is still operative. To have restored eyesight is not to see without defective eyes but to have one's eyes corrected and supplemented; and the nature of the supplementation depends on the special weakness of the eyes. So, in general, the idealization of the objective is not its destruction, but a transformation which also preserves it; and if this were not so mind would lose that opposite in which alone it comes to itself. 'But when mind is explained to be unlimited and truly infinite, we must not say for that reason that the limit is wholly and entirely excluded from mind. We have rather to recognize that mind must determine itself, and thus limit itself and make itself finite.'¹ Even the contradictions of its immature forms must have a significance for mind and be idealized into a mode of its self-realization. And so, after stating that the finitude of mind lies in the incongruity of its notion and its actuality, Hegel adds that this finitude is 'an appearance which the mind inherently posits in itself as a limit to itself, in order, by its sublation, explicitly to possess and know freedom as its essence, i.e. be completely manifested.'²

The infinity of mind is its freedom. Freedom is not the mere absence of constraint but is active self-determination. In truth nothing can be free from constraint except by mastering the world, for the world is one connected whole. To withdraw into the privacy of one's abstract self-identity is to exclude from the scope of one's freedom all the forces that move one's life; it is to pretend that one is a thing to which nature is external. The self is free, according to Hegel, because in all its actions it deals only with what is ideal and its own; its connexions with the world are those of feeling, thought, and will—mental powers in which the unity and self-identity of the self is realized. 'Freedom', says Hegel, 'does not come by flight from the other—it is rather an independence of the other gained in the other, and comes to reality by mastery

¹ *Ibid.*² *Ibid.* § 386.

over the other.' ¹ By idealizing nature mind preserves its own supremacy and self-possession. As the concrete unity of opposites, it finds its own self immanent in its world, the ultimate significance of that world ; and hence in its relation to its opposite it is in relation only to what is its own and the embodiment of itself. The abstract view of freedom minimizes the connexion between mind and reality, and at most regards freedom as something preserved by mind *in spite of* the forces of nature. Hegel, however, regards the natural as essential to freedom ; but for its relation to things mind would be isolated, empty, and impotent. It is by mastering the natural bond and making it a means to the final unity, the self, that mind develops its freedom. And the first step to mastery over nature is connexion with it. ' This relation to the other is not merely a possibility but a necessity in mind ; for it is by means of the other and by means of its sublation that mind preserves itself, and indeed is that which it has to be according to its notion, viz. the ideality of the external, the " idea " which returns into itself out of its other-being, or—abstractly put—the universal which differentiates itself, and in its differentiation remains self-identical and explicit.'² Only the infinite is free, for only the infinite is the absolute realized system beyond which there is nothing. .

Mind, we have seen, realizes itself in its world, but that world thereby gains a new character ; it is idealized and given a spiritual substance. The expressions of mind are thus not mere facts but vehicles of the whole, particulars which are suffused with the universal. ' The definite being of mind is therefore *manifestation*.'³ By idealizing its world mind reveals itself ; it comes to be what it is inherently. In the reciprocal system of nature each element is, in a sense, the appearance of the others ; for it is the definite expression of all the forces which have conspired together to produce it. But since natural facts are all particular, each is the appearance of what is explicitly other than itself. A sharp distinction is thus drawn between the appearance and that which appears, and the underlying or latent unity is unable to subordinate it. Thus, in spite of the identity of content which Hegel has insisted upon in causality, cause and effect are different things, and in appearing as the effect the cause renounces its individu-

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 382 note.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* § 383.

ality. But the character of mind is to realize itself in its world ; ' mind is not lost in this other, rather it preserves and realizes itself there, stamps its own inward nature on the other, giving the latter a mode of being agreeable to the nature of mind, and thus, by the sublation of the other, of definite actual difference, attains concrete explicit being and definite self-revelation. In this way what mind reveals in the other is only itself, its proper nature.'¹ Hegel thus reaches the position that self-revelation is what mind is ; its self-manifestation is not an accidental attribute which it happens to have but its essence and true being. This cannot be understood if we separate content and form : it has significance only if we see that in mind the form is not something imposed on the content from without, but the unity to which the content itself rises. In mind the modes of its life give themselves up, body and soul, to the whole, and the whole is filled only with that into which it has articulated itself ; every aspect is the revelation of the self-revealing.

The conception of mind which we have thus summarily indicated is Hegel's view of it in its truth. Mind is inherently universal, self-contained, all-inclusive, infinite, self-revealing, and free. But is this really a thinkable conception ? And do the forms of mind which we meet in experience bear it out ? Hegel's answer to this question is the whole philosophy of mind. In the *Philosophy of Right* one of the levels of finite mind is analysed, and the purpose of the subsequent chapters of this book is to show how Hegel verifies these features in so far as they are to be found in the ethical life. But although the consideration of the whole philosophy of mind is beyond our scope, we may indicate briefly in the next chapter the way in which Hegel traces his general conception of mind in those abstract forms which are dialectically prior to the ethical will.

¹ *Ibid.* note.

CHAPTER V

SUBJECTIVE MIND

THE philosophy of mind is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with subjective, objective, and absolute mind. Absolute mind is mind in its truth ; all discrepancy between implicit and explicit has been overcome, and every determination—even the externality of nature and the uttermost self-contradiction of which mind is capable—is thoroughly penetrated by mind and idealized. Objective mind is mind which realizes itself in the outward world, giving to things a spiritual essence and function, but Hegel judges it to be finite. Mind here has particularized itself, given itself outward existence, and built its ends into an objective world. But the world thus developed by mind does not thoroughly include nature ; its constructions—although realized—are artificial, and are not seen as the *full* truth of the object. This is the world of right and is the final standpoint of Fichte's philosophy. This consideration, however, will come before us more appropriately when we have discussed the *Philosophy of Right* itself.¹ Subjective mind is the first and most abstract aspect of mind, the side which in a developed consciousness is recognized to be one side of the relation of mind and its object. It is mind on the side of its abstract form, considered not as realizing itself in *natural* things but merely as a feeling, thinking, willing self whose embodiment is its feelings, thoughts, and purposes. Hegel points out that the term he has used to denote this mode or aspect of mind is somewhat misleading. Mind is always realized, for its notion is that of the self-realizing and revealing. Hegel has apprehended the point at which Cartesianism tried to overcome its dualism, by identifying the essence and the existence of the self. The self *is* its mental process, and its reality lies in those thoughts and volitions which dualism separates from reality by an impassable gulf. Mind stands behind the distinction of sub-

¹ V. chap. XIII. p. 262 ff.

jective and objective and is on both sides at once. Thus we may regard the early imperfect appearance of mind either as a subject which has yet to be objectified, or as an objective fact which has not yet developed into genuine ideality or subjectivity. On neither side has it completely overcome the externality of nature, and its contents require to be more fully sublated. Hegel puts the point thus. 'We have given the name, subjective mind, to that form of mind which we must consider first, because mind here is still in its undeveloped notion, and has not yet made its notion objective. But in this its subjectivity mind is also objective, and has an immediate existence, by the sublation of which it first becomes aware of itself, comes to itself, and attains the apprehension of its notion and subjectivity. Thus one might just as well say that mind is primarily objective and has to become subjective, as conversely that it is only subjective and has to make itself objective. Consequently, the distinction of subjective and of objective mind is not to be regarded as a fixed one.'¹ When the expression, subjective mind, is used, this qualification has to be kept in view. Another way of indicating the different stages is to distinguish them as universal, particular, individual. But the same reservation must be made in this case also; for what is here called universal mind is characterized by its abstract individuality, and through its contrast with nature is itself a particular. The truth is that the stages we are discussing are more concrete embodiments of the general stages of the Logic; the first stage of mind corresponds to, and is a concrete form of, the categories of being, the second stage corresponds to essence, and the third to the notion. Another way of distinguishing the stages of mind which has less need of these constant qualifications is to use the terms immediate or unmediated, mediate, and self-mediating. Subjective mind is the immediate mode of mind, its self-contained being, not yet articulated into a world other than itself.

Hegel begins his account of mind with its poorest and least adequate form of aspect, and to this he gives the name of the soul. We need not follow the stages of his argument closely and may depict its general course. The soul is mind still imprisoned in nature; it has as yet drawn no distinction

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 387 note.

between itself and the external world, and the hard and fast antitheses of later life do not exist for it. In a wide sense of the term it can be called instinctive mind, for it does not yet frame purposes to itself but is moved by forces welling up in it, which we, the observers, see to be the immediate transformation of natural influences into psychical form, but which the soul itself simply gives expression to without any consciousness of their origin or significance. Everything in the soul is merged in one vague mass of feeling, which glides from one phase to another, but it does not compare its phases, and is hardly conscious of their difference. This simplicity of the soul is not the same thing as the self-identity of reflective consciousness ; it is simple merely because it has not been broken up. Thought has not yet developed its antagonisms and given the content definition for the soul itself. At this level of mind there is a naïve unity with the natural ; the soul is receptive and passive, absorbing into its substance and giving spiritual embodiment to the influences of nature without any knowledge of its own transforming power. The natural conditions of its bodily life provide its content. Influences of climate and of race help to determine the bodily structure and function of the living organism, and such environmental features are immediately reflected in the character of the soul. So too the temperament, talents, and special character of families or individuals can be considered as the transformation into psychical form of the natural and material world in which they are found. In the same way Hegel regards the influence on the soul of the natural stages of life ; childhood, youth, manhood, and old age all reflect themselves in the temperament of the soul and in the features of its content and expression. The natural differences of the sexes, not yet raised to spiritual significance by thought, nor established by the ethical will in the family, assert themselves in the immediate being of the soul and give its features a structure. Of course, all the modes of the soul are more than natural, and have in them the marks of mind itself. Mood, temperament, innate character, and instincts do not belong to natural 'things', and the environment expresses itself thus only in and as the soul ; but by contrast with the later forms of mind, such abstract immediate life may well be called natural and passive ; for its own nature is not yet

apprehended by it. The feeling soul is 'the form of the dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing, of the mind through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality, where every definite feature is still "immediate"—neither specially developed in its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject, but treated as belonging to its special, its natural peculiarity.'¹

In order to transcend this bare immediacy mind has to idealize its content and escape from its direct immersion in nature. One step in this progress is the development of habit. Habit is a transformation of the immediate content into a psychical form; it is the supersession of nature by a second nature. One must not allow the mechanical character of habit to obscure the fact that it is a recasting of the natural, the reduction of immediate feeling to a moment—though but an inadequate one—of a single life, and the infusion of some measure of universality and self into it. 'Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless, casual, and particular. And it is true that the form of habit, like any other, is open to anything we chance to put in it; and it is habit of living which brings on death, or, if quite abstract, is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the *existence* of all intellectual life in the individual, enabling the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an 'ideality' of soul—enabling the matter of consciousness, religious, moral, &c., to be his as *this* self, *this* soul and no other, and be neither a mere latent possibility, nor a transient emotion and idea, nor an abstract inwardness, cut off from action and reality, but part and parcel of his being.'²

As the soul articulates itself and attains a unity in the shape of self-feeling, there gradually arises within it the distinction between the self and the not-self. Out of the shapeless mass of primitive feeling there gradually emerge landmarks of various sorts; comparisons begin to be made, distinctions acquire steadiness and permanence, and objects are recognized. In this way the observer sees the self building its content into a world of distinguished things in a concatenation of relationships, grouping contents together and finding laws in them. The Cartesian influence in philosophy has led some

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 400; v. Wallace's translation, p. 21.

² *Ibid.* § 410; Wallace, p. 44.

thinkers to say that the primary content, the datum, of mind is subjective—a complex of ideas, desires, and feelings from which a transition has to be made to the objective and outward. Thus Lotze speaks of the first step of thought as the objectification of the subjective. Hegel's view differs from this. The content with which mind begins is neither subjective nor objective, but lies beneath that distinction; or—to put it otherwise—in the soul subjective and objective are immediately identical with one another. Mind at this stage has not risen to consciousness of its identity and permanence, nor has it set the distinctions of mine and not-mine within the continuity of its experience. The flow of its life has not been checked so that it might be thrown back on itself and made aware of the difference between the order of its thoughts and the order of things. Nor has the conception of objectivity been developed; the soul does not yet know that it lies in a world of things, and it neither reads mind into nature nor denies it to the latter. Doubtless an external observer can draw sharp lines between the activities of the soul and the natural forces of which these activities are the utterance, but for the soul itself these differences are still latent and unobserved. To put this in another way, the activities of the soul, the movements of its content, have not yet become a content of which it is aware, and everything is submerged in immediate feeling. Moreover when the distinction does begin to develop, and the immediacy is broken, the construction which first becomes explicit is that of objectivity. The immediate possession of natural forces as one's psychical substance is gradually transcended by an organization of the content into a world—a world of things. That is to say, the lower unities implicit in the matrix of the feeling soul are the first to appear to it; the higher aspects are developed later. At this stage the *observer* sees the growing distinction within the compass of the one mind, and he notes the difference between that which the self does and the world which is about it and in it. But just as the comparison of the various contents of the soul was hidden from the soul itself, so this comparison of its activities and its world is also beyond the view of the subject. What the subject is *for us* and what it is *for itself* are as yet distinct.

The next step in mind's development is that whereby it

becomes aware of itself and learns to say 'I'. In Kant's phraseology, it becomes aware of its identity in its synthetic act; it ceases to be immersed in its object, and becomes conscious that the entirety of this object is present to one self. Thus self-consciousness is the reflection of the self from its world upon itself. All consciousness is implicitly self-conscious, for the external observer sees that it is only in and through the synthetic activity of the self, which realizes itself in each mode of its activity, that mind can build up a world against it. In self-consciousness there becomes explicit for the subject the self-identity in virtue of which alone consciousness of the objective world is possible. And hence Hegel says that self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness.

Self-consciousness is at first abstract: Kant's conception of the unity of apperception, which is abstractly self-identical and is expressed by the analytic proposition 'I am I', is an accurate rendering of what is explicit to this incipient shape of self-consciousness. The consideration that the identity rests on and implies difference, that self-identity is possible only for a self which maintains itself through a process, is still hidden from the subject and is patent only to the observer. Abstract self-consciousness is thus an embodied contradiction; for it is the whole taking itself to be only one side of the relation. Self-consciousness in its truth comprehends consciousness, and in its perfect form the unity of these opposites is explicit; but in abstract self-consciousness the unity is still implicit and, like all latent and undeveloped principles, shows itself by the *immediate* conversion of the one into the other. This immediate conversion is seen in the identification of itself by this abstract self-consciousness with one term of the opposition, i.e. with consciousness and not with its object. The specific mode in which this form of mind is called forth is appetite. In the natural soul there lie dull organic cravings, movements in which natural agencies take mental shape, but the soul does not know the character of these processes; it has not set up ends for itself, and it is not aware that it is idealizing the natural. But in appetite mind finds itself confronted with a natural world, other than itself, and even hostile to it. To maintain itself it has to dominate that world and deny its indifference. Hence it consumes the

natural object and restores and maintains its self-identity. At the level of appetite mind has not yet developed ends and purposes in a strict sense, and it does not prefigure its satisfactions and devise means ; it is immediately confronted by an object threatening its independence, and it reacts directly or instinctively. Appetite, however, stands higher than mere organic impulse, because, although the conative process is instinctive, it results in the awareness of self-satisfaction and continued identity. Its defect, as a realization of mind, is that it is individual and selfish. In appetite the object is consumed, the individual natural thing is not merely transformed but is destroyed ; and the transitory individual satisfaction is unable to sustain the permanent harmony of the self. The satisfaction of appetite is satiety, and there arise new appetites equally incapable of giving rest to the self as a whole.

This abstract mode of mind becomes more concrete in what Hegel calls recognitive self-consciousness. Mind is not satisfied with subordinating endless series of things to itself, and it must have embodiment in some more adequate and enduring way. This need is met normally only in a changed medium, and self-consciousness attains greater fullness by apprehending that it is in relation not only to external nature but also to other self-conscious beings. Hegel lays stress on this consideration, and he believes that in it lies the philosophic significance of slavery. The early and abstract efforts of self-consciousness to express itself in a medium adequate to it are fashioned somewhat on the model of its early dominance over nature as realized in the satisfaction of appetite. Another self is treated as a higher and more complex 'thing', and regarded as a mere extension of the selfhood of the master ; the revolution of the individual self, which comes about when it apprehends its concrete rationality in a society of free selves, has not yet taken place. Aristotle's conception of slavery is the naïve expression of the point to which Hegel here gives a context and a deeper meaning. The natural slave is an animate thing, a living extension of the master's person. The slave does not actively possess reason and is unable of himself to live a full and free life ; but he is capable of obeying the reason of his master, and his incompleteness is supplemented from without by the active reason of his lord.

Natural slavery thus is regarded as beneficial to both sides. On the one hand the sphere and being of the master is extended in the slave, and his rational freedom embodies itself in an enduring object—indeed in a quasi-thinking and willing self ; and on the other hand the slave is taught to renounce the imperfect thought and will of his limited and unsubstantial selfhood, and follows the dictates of a fuller self which he must take as his own.

In this relationship the moments of a higher rational life of mind appear, although in an isolated and abstract way. For one thing, there is the supremacy of self-consciousness, and the single self of the master has spread itself over two minds and embodied itself in another which is regarded as rational in a passive or receptive fashion. Again, in the relationship there is the renunciation of the abstract individuality of a self-centred being, and the conscious subordination of private ends to a whole at least nominally higher and more rational. But on the other hand, these moments of mind are not set in their proper relation, and they are formal or abstract. The two aspects we have indicated are inseparable in the life of mind, and, as we shall see, each self overcomes and merges its own self-will and finds itself in a wider and more rational whole ; but in slavery the aspects are sundered and allotted to different factors, and hence do not properly interpenetrate one another. In slavery the supreme will is still essentially private and unregenerate, it is the caprice of the master extended arbitrarily over other persons. The aspect of negation, the suppression of the narrow and individual self, is confined to the side of the slave and has no power over the lord. The relationship is thus not fully beyond the sphere of essence and may be taken as a concretion of the category of substance. The slave is an accident of the master's will—or would be so, if slavery could be made the whole truth of a human relationship at any stage of development, a point which is highly doubtful—and the negative element of the accident does not penetrate to the underlying principle, viz., the will of the master. This first attempt of self-consciousness to realize itself is thus abstract, and fails on both sides of the relation. By the total suppression of the active reason of the slave the master weakens and partly destroys the rationality of his own expression and utterance ;

and on the other hand the right of self-consciousness in the slave is bound to break through in time. The relation is thus inherently unstable, and when the possibility of a truer form of life makes itself clear, slavery cannot endure.¹

The fuller form of self-consciousness is found in the rational community where each self recognizes other selves as rational and free and is in turn so recognized by them. We have seen that self-consciousness arises when the subject is confronted by a hostile object, and, by consuming it, sustains himself, and is aware of his preserved identity. Another self is at first sight such a threatening object, and its independence is as grave a danger to myself as is an independent natural object; for the foreign self may bend things to his purposes and satisfactions and exclude mine. When particular minds collide, the first effort of each is directly negative with regard to the other; each seeks to destroy the other. When the possibility of extending the self through slavery is perceived, the 'other' is preserved and subordinated in the way we have just analysed. In the rational community, however, a deeper truth appears: man has found there that the self is not inherently private, and that it is not necessary to suppress another self in order to preserve one's own. Mind is intrinsically universal, and its universality is capable of concrete

¹ A slight digression may be permitted here. Those who dwell on the influence of economic factors in the abolition of slavery are apt to ignore the full import of the situation. Doubtless slavery did not give way until its economic disadvantages began to appear, and it may be true that on the whole the emancipation of the slave was advantageous to the lord or employer—if sufficient compensation for capital-value was forthcoming. But this consideration in no way precludes the rationality of the process, and one has to insist that the driving principle was really the rational nature of mind. In slavery mind is broken into two, and each part is defective. The weakness of the relationship lies in the suppressed reason of the slave and the uneducated and unmediated character of the reason of the master. And it is a mistake to suppose the change of the situation is rational only if it comes about by self-conscious and deliberative benevolence on the part of the master. One may well ask, Why is slave-labour unprofitable? and the final answer is that free labour is more profitable. But the latter is more profitable only because the slave, or potential free man, is inherently capable of active rationality. If the mind of the slave had no fuller truth in it than is implied in Aristotle's doctrine, then as a free labourer he would be less efficient than as a slave. However the change comes about, the effective force is the inherent nature of mind breaking through its false shapes.

realization. In the community of self-conscious beings each finds that the other self, which appeared at first sight to be hostile and exclusive, is really one in principle with him, and that his permanence and identity is not necessarily thwarted by the freedom of other selves. Indeed, it is discovered that only through the freedom of other selves is genuine selfhood possible to the individual. Mind demands recognition, it must have utterance in what is adequate to it, and this cannot be attained except in free mind itself. That is to say, Hegel's contention is that mind is not aware of its genuine principle until it is aware of itself as the notion. In relation to what is not mind—whether it be mere nature, or the suppressed mind of the slave—mind is bound to what is other than it, and cannot transcend the alienation. In its lordship over particular things of nature it is alone, and it does not find *itself* in its object. Doubtless objects yield to it and are unsubstantial against it, but mind demands more than this; it must not only dominate what is weaker than itself, it must also realize and utter itself in a world which *retains* the character of the self. It is easy to beat the mist aside, but the toil is unsatisfying and leaves no permanent results. In the fuller forms of spiritual life nature itself is gathered into the substance of mind, and, for example in the religious consciousness, mind finds mind in nature; but the simplest and most obvious sphere in which mind comes to itself is the rational community where the rationality and freedom of each is patent to the others.

At this level mind is aware of itself as reason, as a universal principle appearing without loss of its singleness in different selves. The principle is still formal, and is capable of articulation in many ways—it is not yet the common life realized in the ethical world, and may seek concreteness in such false modes as the barren craving for fame or notoriety; but nevertheless it is mind aware of its inherent notion, the soil from which all spiritual fruition springs.

This position may not commend itself at first sight. Association with dualistic philosophies and faculty psychologies—so often repudiated and yet adopted—has given the word 'reason' a narrow connotation alien to Hegel's meaning. Hegel never loses sight of the continuity of mind and of its wholeness in each of its phases; reason, in his sense, is not

a faculty, nor—properly speaking—an aspect of mind, but rather a characteristic structure and function which becomes explicit at a certain level. At first sight it may seem that reason can be made the principle of all mind only by doing violence to the facts, or by using the word in an entirely unusual and capricious sense. Reason, it might be said, is the principle of knowledge, and a deep gulf lies between knowledge and the other aspects of mind. Surely there are portions of the constitution of the living concrete mind of man that cannot be resolved into knowledge of any sort? And is it not therefore an inadequate rendering of mind that bids us look on the principle of cognition as if it were the principle of the whole feeling, thinking and willing self? This criticism springs from a sound instinct, and the truth it urges must be comprehended by any theory which makes pretensions in modern times to philosophic rank. But, when urged against the position that Hegel actually adopts, the argument has no force; it fails to apprehend the true difference between the various aspects of mind, and consequently it is unaware of the way in which Hegel develops the difference on which it insists. In order to gain a clearer view of the principle of mind we must consider the relation of the theoretical and practical aspects of mind with a more positive intention than we have done in the third chapter. The view which we have to expound is at first sight paradoxical, for it both treats the principle of knowledge as the characteristic feature of mind as such and recognizes contents and activities that are not purely theoretical. The paradox, however, rests on a special view of the composition of mind; and it disappears when that view is abandoned. We may, therefore, examine the distinction as ordinarily presented, and then restate it in accordance with Hegel's theory.

At first sight the distinction between knowing and willing is so sharp that there is a temptation for a philosophy that keeps close to 'common-sense' to separate the two aspects entirely. But a moment's consideration is sufficient to dispel the illusion that the two can be characterized by contradictory opposite predicates. Willing undoubtedly is active: but activity cannot be refused to thinking; for thinking is a process in which the subject expresses itself. Similarly, when it is pointed out that knowledge is an insight into the

world, the possession of it in an ideal form, and the reduction of it to mental terms, it is at once obvious that these same characteristics enter into the practical attitude also; for the realization of a purpose, at least on one side, modifies the objective in accordance with a subjective end and idealizes the real. Nor can a solution be found by taking the opposite course, predicating ideality of the will and reality of thought; for it was made clear in the previous chapter that the apparent realism of knowledge develops itself into a thorough-going idealism which interprets and thinks the given. Moreover, as will be seen later, the practical attitude, in spite of its apparent ideality, involves the moment of realism and objectivity. No pair of simple predicates suffices to distinguish will and thought; the relation is too complex. But we cannot stop here. Thought penetrates the will; and as the will develops it shows more and more plainly the presence of thought within it. It is also true that willing penetrates thinking, and we have seen that, for Hegel, the philosophic attitude—the highest attitude of self-conscious mind—contains both; but, since we are concerned primarily with the will as realized in an ethical world, we may refrain at present from discussing those higher forms of mind in which willing, as such, is merged, and look at the matter only from one side. Obviously willing involves thinking; ends and purposes are more than pure thought but they involve thought, for they must be known. So, too, the means must be known, and their adjustment to the end must be apprehended. A blind will, or an unthinking will, is a contradiction in terms, the paradox of an abstract theory. But there is more to be said in this connexion. In Hegel's view the purpose or end is not known simply in an external way, as the mere object of a contemplating subject; it is even constituted by principles of the same kind as those which are found in knowledge proper. When a mind rises above its early immediacy, and replaces appetite and impulse by a developed will, the content of the purpose organizes itself into a system, it develops and reveals laws and principles; and it assimilates its structure more definitely to that of thought as the will attains strength and character. In the ethical world the objectivity which is the mark of the content of developed knowledge is also the mark of the explicit will.

According to this line of thought, willing and thinking seem in danger of merging into one another without distinction, and in order to prevent an abstract identification of them we must regard the problem from a fresh angle. Mind is the embodiment of the 'idea', and the 'idea' is the concrete unity of opposites. Up to this point we have assumed a sheer difference of will and thought, and in our discussion we found that a fundamental unity submerged the distinctive features on which we relied; it seems clear, therefore, that a stable distinction—stable in the sense that the unity of mind will not exclude it—can be found only if we admit the unity of the aspects from the start, and, taking our stand upon the whole, look for an opposition the essence of which is to contribute to the concrete identity of mind. Mind is essentially two-sided, and may be regarded either as the internalization of the outward or as the objectification and articulation of the inward. Hegel indicates these two aspects, the objectivity and subjectivity of mind, by the words 'being' and 'own'. 'Thus if we consider the initial aspect of mind, that aspect is twofold—as *being* and as its *own*: by the one mind finds itself something which *is*, by the other it affirms it to be only *its own*.' ¹ In its first shapes mind is immediate; its elements have not yet divulged the system that is implied in them, and the unity of the whole has the abstract form of immediate feeling. The development of mind is therefore a process to mediacy, the revelation of the inter-relation of the moments; and at the same time a higher immediacy is attained in and through this mediation. This double significance of the term immediacy is another way of expressing the difference between the abstract unity of the feeling and the concrete unity of the systematic and explicit mind. In this two-sided process both aspects of mind, its objectivity and its subjectivity, are changed; and Hegel regards them as passing into one another. From one point of view the naïve facts of mind are seen to be laid hold of by the self and to be adopted by it as its own being: from the other its inherent nature works itself out in an objective content or world. The former of these is the theoretic aspect of mind, the latter the practical. As a theoretic activity, mind 'has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 443; Wallace, p. 62.

must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedness and therefore from its abstractness, and make the affection subjective.' ¹ The impressions of sense have to be divested of the given character, they have to be resolved into laws and principles which are the substance of mind itself. As a practical activity mind begins with a content which is recognized as subjective and its own, and proceeds to translate that content into objectivity by embodying it in the world and giving it shape as a power effective in things. In the last resort the two aspects are inseparable, and every whole activity of mind manifests both. In these days we have been abundantly assured that thinking is always purposive, it has a practical motive and makes a practical difference to life. Hegel goes even farther than this: he is not content to place the practical aspect at each end, as motive and result, but points out that the process of mind which we have called thinking is itself infected with the features of the practical. The distinction, he says, 'is no absolute one; for even theoretic mind has to do with its own features, with thoughts.' ² The very datum is one's own, and in internalizing the datum one develops a content of mind into objectivity. Similarly, will has the marks of knowledge; 'the ends of the rational will are not something belonging to the particular subject, but something absolute.' ³ That is to say, the content of the rational will is the law of the ethical world, it is of the substance of the world as truly as is any theoretic determination, and the process of embodying it is the transmutation of given objects into an ethical, and therefore spiritual, system.

We thus reach the position that the theoretical and the practical attitudes of mind are two aspects, whose nature is such that they involve one another, and in their mutual implication constitute a unity of opposites, an embodiment of the 'idea'.

But mind is not always itself; it takes imperfect shapes, and comes to maturity only through a series of one-sided expressions. Accordingly there are activities of mind which can be described as either theoretical or practical: the moments have a phenomenal independence and isolation. In distinguishing consciousness from self-consciousness, we

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Encyclopaedia*, § 443 note.

³ *Ibid.*

said that, in the former phase, an identical subject was present, but that it was not aware of itself ; in self-consciousness this subject became explicit or for itself. In the same way mind may grasp one of its aspects rather than another : it may regard itself either as idealizing its world, or as expressing itself in an outward system, and it may lose sight of the other side. In such a case it may be named in accordance with its own valuation, i.e. in accordance with its explicit character, and called theoretical or practical. The other aspect is seen to be present by the reflection of a contemplating mind, but for the subject himself it is latent. With this possibility of phenomenal abstractness in view, Hegel arranges the aspects as stages of the dialectic process. First comes theoretic mind, then practical mind, and thirdly, as the unity of both, explicitly free mind. Theory begins with the objective and renders it mental. 'When I think an object I rid it of its sensuous character and turn it into thought ; I make it something which is essentially mine. It is in thought that I first possess myself, for conceiving is the penetration of an object which no longer resists me. I have taken from it the private aspect which maintained its independence against me. . . . Every presentation is a universalizing and belongs to thought, and to make anything universal means to think it. The many coloured picture of the world lies before me : I stand over against it, and, sublating the opposition by thought, I make this content my own. The ego is at home in the world when it knows it, still more when it conceives it.' ¹

We cannot dwell any longer on Hegel's analysis of theoretic mind, and must omit all the details of the development from intuition, or bare perception, to conceptual thinking. Nor can we insist further on the problems which arise when the effort is made to fix and isolate the theoretic attitude and treat it as a self-dependent activity. But it is necessary to glance at the practical attitude, and to determine very briefly its growth and its capability. The practical attitude begins with a subjective content, and gives it outward being. Its starting point, therefore, is thought, for it presupposes the activity whereby consciousness recognizes a content as its own. 'The will is a special mode of thought—thought

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 4 note.

translating itself into definite being and striving to reach particularity.' ¹ The specific difference of will is the limitation and determination of the self. The subject singles out a definite content from the wide range of the known world which it can abstractly claim as its own, and manifests itself in a definite and limited outward shape. But, at the same time, the universality that is the proper mark of thought is not lost here; the determinate will is the self-limitation of the universal ego; and one can say that in volition the totality of his world, which is the man himself, has expressed itself in one of its shapes. The content of will, whether as purpose or as achievement, is not a mere particular but a differentiation of a universal, an embodied life or self. 'When I am active in a practical sense and act, I determine myself; and self-determination means the drawing of a distinction. But the distinctions thus instituted are still mine, the features are in conformity with me, and the ends to which I am impelled are my own. Although I slacken my hold of these features and distinctions and place them in the so-called outer world, even there they remain mine. They are that which I have done or made, and they bear the imprint of my mind.' ²

Let us see how this attitude develops. It begins with what Hegel calls practical feeling, an immediate and undeveloped form of the autonomy of mind. At this stage action is moved by appetite; the self is not conscious of *making* ends for itself but simply *finds* itself pleased or displeased. We have seen that self-consciousness awakes in appetite, and the ego is dimly aware of its own identity. Over against the self lies the objective world, sometimes related to the ego in such a way that its self-feeling is enhanced, sometimes thwarting and diminishing it. 'The feeling will is thus the comparison of its immediate and externally derived character with its character as posited by its proper nature. Since the latter has the significance of that which ought to be, the will demands that the affection should agree with it. This agreement is pleasantness, disagreement unpleasantness.' ³ The self has grasped its intrinsic supremacy over the world, and this inner nature has become explicit as a demand or 'ought'. The specific marks of practical feeling are that the agreement or

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Encyclopaedia*, § 472 note.

disagreement is simply found by the self, a mere matter of fact, and that the test has not been universalized. No conception of a concrete life has yet become explicit; each relation is judged separately, and the unity of the one self is not apprehended as running through all the relations of the environment to the subject; a fresh appeal is made in every case. Similarly on the objective side, things are taken separately, and the environment is not judged as a whole and seen to be a single world; the reactions constitute a series which the self does not gather into a system. Pleasantness and unpleasantness, however, are only the first forms of practical feeling, and in later shapes greater complexity is attained. Hegel instances gratification, joy, hope, fear, anxiety, pain, &c., as feelings in which the relation which is immediately found by the self to pertain between it and things is of various natures and holds of different kinds of objects. A third class of practical feelings are the momentary valuations of ethical and religious situations, and they are those which in common speech we refer to the heart. Feeling, however, is always immediate and contingent; it is something which we merely find in ourselves and is not the proper medium of self-revealing mind. Hegel displays a higher level of the practical attitude in impulse and passion. In impulse the satisfaction reached is the work of the mind itself; the self is no longer content to accept accidental pleasures, but seeks to mould things so that they may suit it. Conscious activity, therefore, and effort are characteristic features here. Further, the satisfaction is no longer purely particular; activity is a process containing different elements, it includes various stages of satisfaction within it, and is therefore a universal. It is extended in time, and unites various objects within one conative unity. Passion is a special form of impulse, and is found when 'the totality of the practical spirit throws itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse, each of which is always in conflict with another'.¹ In itself passion is neither good nor bad, 'the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul—his interests of intellect, talent, character, enjoyment—on one aim and object.'² But it is the basis of all higher life, and the ethical and religious consciousness must manifest this

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 473.

² *Ibid.* § 474; Wallace, p. 96.

moment of self-limitation and whole-hearted enthusiasm for an end. 'Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too often, indeed, a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against the form of passion as such.'¹

Impulse and passion, however, taken as independent and not as moments of an ethical will, are abstract; although universal when compared with appetite, they are not yet fully universal, for they have not become the expression of the entirety of life. The intrinsic self, which is the standard and immanent end of the practical attitude, must make itself explicit as the ideal of life as a whole, and instead of being revealed spasmodically in separate actions must be sought in the complete range of one's activities. At this level Hegel uses the name, happiness. Happiness is a universal, and negates the particularity of separate impulses. These are sacrificed to one another and to the general ideal, and the good which is sought is no longer that of a moment but of a life. At this stage the will raises itself above its first immediacy, it does not let itself go into every possible satisfaction which presents itself, but chooses only those which will fit together into a whole. The will has now become conscious of its freedom. The natural has lost its power over mind, and every action is the expression of a principle which is of a spiritual character. In choice the will is explicitly free.

The meaning of this conception of the free will must be carefully noted. Freedom is not isolation from nature, nor is it lack of order; it is possible only to a mind that is in close touch with nature and that manifests law in its action. But the contact with nature ceases to be a bond because in the will natural forces have been transformed; appetite and impulse have divested themselves of the particularity and isolation which they had as natural, and have attained a universality which transcends nature as such. Freedom is not disproved when innumerable ties are shown to subsist between man and his environment, for in the long run the environment is that which becomes the self: the real question to be decided concerns the nature and organization of that environment as it appears in the self; and when we find that the whole takes the shape of a principle that transcends the

¹ *Ibid.*

natural, a principle of self-identity and self-determination, it is absurd to argue that it has to be judged from the standpoint of reciprocal action and treated as if the category of necessity were adequate to it. Freedom is not a matter of origin but of character, and the lowly beginnings of mind, its immediacy and natural content, are powerless against the might of the immanent selfhood which subordinates and idealizes them. The content of the free will is its own, that which it now is ; and in being determined by its motives the will is determined by itself. This view of freedom is meaningless to those who regard the self as an impervious atom related externally to all its phenomena, but freedom is not logically defensible in any guise from that standpoint. If the self is inherently indeterminate and empty, every determination of it must be external. But Hegel rejects the assumption, and by regarding the self in the light of the notion he is able to combine objectivity and subjectivity and recognize the freedom of self-determination.

Choice, then, is the practical attitude realized as explicit free will. But this is only the beginning of freedom—its bare notion—and the dialectic passes to more complete phases. I do not think that Hegel's treatment is fairly rendered by the expression, 'degrees of freedom'. The phrase has a quantitative connotation, and suggests that freedom is a substance capable of being cut into portions without alteration of quality. The modes of freedom that we are about to analyse differ in kind as clearly as in quantity, and although they may be written as a series their proper relations are not at all like the relations of their names on paper. This warning seems necessary on account of a prevalent tendency to suppose that the dialectic process is understood when it is considered to be a scale of degrees of thought or reality : such thinking forgets that degree, or quantity in general, is one of the subordinate categories, and that the dialectic process can be comprehended in its truth only from the point of view of the notion. Having made this protest against the phrase and the loose thinking that may be behind it, we may proceed. The will is the unity of two moments—properly it is the objectification of the subjective, the realization of the ideal, the particularization of the universal. But the harmony may be imperfect, and the will may take its essence to be

either moment to the exclusion of the other. In such a case each phase may be named in accordance with its explicit character, i.e. its character for the subject himself. We who analyse will see in what fashion the immanent identity asserts itself.

'The will contains the element of pure indeterminateness or of pure reflection of the ego into itself. Every limitation, and every given definite and natural content, such as are immediately present in need, appetite, and impulse is dissolved: this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thought of self.'¹ This is the negative side of freedom, the recognition of the inadequacy of the natural as such to the principle of mind; and, when it is fixed as a definite stage and phenomenon of the will, mind endeavours to exclude every content from itself and make itself an empty form. 'It is freedom of the void which has risen to be an actual shape and passion.' The theoretic consciousness manifests it in the ideal of an abstract contemplative life, and in the ethical world it comes to life as 'a fanaticism which destroys all subsisting civil order, removes all individuals who respect order, and annihilates every organization which seeks to come back to life.'² Like every other abstraction, this formal shape of freedom shows within it the opposed moment of the whole, and the implicit unity reveals itself to the observer. Two points may be noted. This abstract universal will is itself a particular; by excluding finite motives it places itself over against them and is itself finite. It is one way of acting among other possible ones, and its special feature is abstract universality. This point will be discussed more fully in connexion with what Hegel calls morality.³ Secondly, this negative freedom is in bondage to that which it denies. The negative always involves the positive, for where there is nothing to deny negation cannot exist. Negation is not the absence of relation, but is itself a specific relation; and it is dependent on that which it denies. We smile at Kant when he writes down that he must remember to forget his servant, Lampe, but Kant is expounding the nature of every significant negative. When the will appears as the principle of perversity and revolt, every portion of its content comes from that which it rejects and despises.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 5.

² *Ibid.*

³ V. chap. IX.

If the established and old-fashioned are utterly removed, if they are as if they had not been, the revolt against them is meaningless. Diogenes when he parades his poverty is an example of this. Take away the contrast with surrounding luxury, take away the spectators who are to admire his manliness and feel his scorn, then his pride and his virtue disappear also. Abstract and formal freedom is at the same time unfree, for it is bound to its opposite by ties which it does not include within itself. It must not be forgotten that, even in this extremity, the will is not a mere thing wholly under the domination of necessity. It is a self-contradictory phenomenon, both free and not free; a complex and special unity of the two. It is not a mixture of freedom and necessity in certain proportions, but a *false form* of freedom; and one is no more justified in measuring its degree of freedom than one would be in computing the amount of good that is in evil.

The second moment in the will is that of definition, distinction, and limitation. 'Here the ego comes out of distinctionless indeterminateness, passes into difference and posits a determination as a content and object. I do not merely will, I will something. A will that . . . wills only the abstract universal wills nothing, and is therefore no will. The particular, which the will wills, is a limitation, for the will must in general limit itself in order to be will.'¹ When this aspect is predominant the will is faulty. We must remember, of course, that we are dealing here with the will and not with mere impulse, and that it is an ego, aware of its universality and rational being, that pours itself into the narrow mould. This naively objective will accepts some natural desire and chooses that as its substance. In the simplest and most typical cases of the mode of activity some object is singled out, a place, a pursuit, a person, a finite end of some kind, and all the worth of life is tied to it. The will is always the activity of a universal self, and so the natural object is not taken as it stands but it is given an enhanced value by being made the sole vehicle of the entire man. Thus the predominant feature of this mode of life is a lack of perspective, and it is open to all the contingencies that affect the finite. No single thing is so secure that time and change will not reduce it. The multiplicity of the world is endless, and

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 6 note.

whatever be the object we adore, there are forces beyond it, greater than it is, and these operate on it from outside. The externality of nature is imperfectly sublated here ; instead of taking the world as a true organism, the self has tried to give it unity by grouping the parts around one significant object, and has identified the worth of the world with the permanence of this element within it.

The concrete will includes both moments explicitly ; it is an activity whereby the self gives itself true expression in a determinate world, each element of which is recognized to embody the universal. Every moral action has this character ; for by its means a world is built up, and in that world the self finds its true nature. Hegel's conception of the concrete rational will unites two senses of objectivity which are sometimes separated. Kant has already identified objectivity in one of its uses with the universality and necessity of ordered knowledge ; but he had contrasted the object of experience with the thing-in-itself, and had condemned the objectivity found in knowledge as itself phenomenal and subjective, relative to the constitution of our minds, and not true of unconditioned reality. But even when Kant seems most unable to escape the ill effects of his assumptions, his critical spirit appears and reminds us that his view is many-sided. We come into contact with unconditioned reality in practical reason, and in the good will we are conscious of ourselves as free. Kant, in his stricter moments, will not allow us to speak of an object of practical reason, because an object requires for its apprehension a detailed content which reason itself cannot supply and which in cognitive experience it receives from the intuition of sense. But although we cannot *know* unconditioned reality we can *think* it, and the universality of the maxims of the moral consciousness is, so far as it goes, congruent with the nature of the thing-in-itself. The flaw in our mental constitution is that it breaks into two ; content and form come from different sources and cannot attain complete harmony. Sense experience has within it no principle of self-determination ; it runs off into indefinite series, and is unable to reach wholeness and complete its content as a self-sufficient system. Pure reason on the other hand possesses the required form of unity, but cannot supply a content : it is an abstract universal unable to make itself

concrete. Kant sees quite clearly that the only satisfactory ideal of mind is a self-determining principle, a system in which form and content are at one; and he has no doubt that a principle cannot be wrought into a true system by being filled from without. Such an alien content is not marked by the characteristics of the whole and is not amenable to reason. Underlying his thought in each of the three Critiques is the ideal of an intuitive understanding, that is to say, a self-determining and self-particularizing universal; and his position is that if sense experience could attain final coherence and rationality, or if reason could give itself a specific and detailed content, knowledge of things-in-themselves would be possible. The condition of knowledge of reality is the unity of the objectivity of experience and the objectivity of reason.

Hegel accepts this ideal, and, by revising Kant's initial assumption, he finds the concrete universal to be, not merely a negative standard, but the implicit nature of every rational activity. The sharp lines which Kant draws between sense, understanding, and reason are arbitrary, and, if mind can attain such unity as Kant allows to it, it must be capable of a still higher form. Kant's view is unstable. It leaves unintelligible the way in which the ideas of reason act on the understanding, and its persistent separation of the activities of mind renders their inter-action impossible. If reason is isolated from experience and regarded as if it were a mere form of unity without intrinsic difference, it could not be a regulative ideal of knowledge. Reason, Kant urges, is a spur to knowledge; it holds up to it the standard of a rounded unity and impels it forward in the endless quest for a coherent and self-contained whole of experience. But the difference between distinctionless unity and a totality of systematic knowledge is immeasurable. Hegel has shown us that bare unity—pure being—is separated by the whole range of thought from the ideal unity of knowledge, the 'idea'; and the former cannot function as the latter. If reason presents the ideal of coherence to knowledge, and if that coherence is to be attained through the extension of knowledge and not by a regress on the abstract universals that experience contains from the beginning, then reason must itself be more concrete than understanding: in its intrinsic nature it must be the intuitive understanding which Kant seeks.

Accordingly Hegel revises Kant's assumption that the apparent fixity and hardness of phenomena is the final truth of them. Kant found that experience is constituted by the category of reciprocity, and that things of experience interact without realizing any deeper unity than that passage into otherness which we have seen to be the essence of necessity.¹ To put the point in other words, the content of experience, for Kant, is purely natural and cannot sustain the proper unity of mind. Hence, in the ethical world, the natural content of appetite and impulse had to be discarded in order to attain a true universality and a connexion with the unconditioned. For Hegel, on the other hand, the fixity and incoherence of natural impulses is only a first appearance and not the final truth. The practical attitude, of which they are the crude manifestation, is capable of higher things ; and in rationalizing its content and building it into a consistent aim of life as a whole it is developing the intrinsic nature of impulse itself. Hegel denies that the crudity and irrationality of impulse is final : the natural springs of action are developed when they are made adequate to mind, their potential relations become explicit, and they show that there is an aspect in them which is not realized when they remain merely natural. Thus, impulse and will are respectively the abstract and the concrete ; and Hegel insists that the imperfect and one-sided appearance of the natural motive is a transitory phase, which is merged in the rational will. The truth of impulse is its ideality, i. e. its subordination to an ethical principle and its capacity for rationality, not its actuality, i. e. its apparent isolation and independent being.

It is in this way that the two meanings of objectivity come together for Hegel. The full being of the objective or natural world is not apparent until it reveals itself as the objective and rationalized content of a comprehensive mind. Rationality is the truth of the natural, and mind is the liberation of the true nature of its environment. It is not possible, in the end, to regard the systematic coherence of reason as arbitrary, and as an external addition to the natural ; for, to refer to nothing else, Kant's theory is a standing proof that an extraneous reason cannot subdue a merely natural world, and only those purposes are possible which things

¹ V. above, p. 32 ff.

permit. Impulse can be transformed into will only if the former is imperfect and capable of completion ; a true whole cannot be constructed of genuinely independent wholes. In order to fit together at all, the elements must be individually abstract, and must find their completion only in their synthesis.

From this point of view the concrete will is not exclusive but all-comprehensive. Unlike its imperfect phenomena it does not limit itself explicitly to the bare form of universality, or to a single pre-eminent content, but wraps within it the entire objective environment. It has admitted the world to co-operation of its plans, and its scope is unbounded. It does not vainly seek to frame arbitrary purposes—that is to say, purposes drawn from some confined range of things and inclusive only of certain aspects of the whole to the exclusion of others—and impose those on objects. Its effort is rather to read the meaning that is in the world, to take that meaning as its own, and to make itself the vehicle of the forces that move things. In so doing it rationalizes its environment and gives the capacities of things an explicit shape that they would not have apart from it. In contrast with the imperfect forms of will it is completely free, for it does not shut out the world, nor take the part for the whole. It is master over every lesser thing, and there is none greater to master it. The hands of the universe are its hands, and it is entirely self-determined. This conception must not be mistaken for that of mere resignation—the attitude proper to an accident of substance. Resignation is the mere surrender of a self that does not find itself again. The concrete will does not abandon itself to an independently existing plan, for the plan exists only in it. It is active, not passive ; it conceives and carries out the greatest purposes, for they are those of the whole world.

In the concrete free will the practical attitude has become explicitly rational ; will, starting from thought, has returned to thought again. Its truth and adequacy lies in its coherence and comprehensiveness, and the further exposition of its nature is the analysis of the structural principles by which rationality is introduced into the chaos of immediate appetite and impulse, and the self realized in an abiding world. These principles are the content of the science of right, and to them we must now turn,

CHAPTER VI .

ABSTRACT RIGHT

WE have now reached the stage of objective mind. In discussing subjective mind we adopted an external point of view : we indicated different stages and aspects of the general principle, and glanced at the derivation of some complex activities from simpler forms. But although we stated the general requirement that practical mind must organize its content and give it objective significance, we did not show how that content is to be systematized or what development mind itself undergoes when it articulates its immanent principle into an orderly and spiritual world. In dealing with objective mind we take up this other side, and consider the constitutive principles through which mind, as will or practical reason, embodies itself in an outer element, and is recognized by others as a free and objective self. Hegel's point of view is unusual, and at first sight appears incompatible with the requirements of an ethical theory. The difficulty, however, has already been discussed in its general bearings in the third chapter, and may be dismissed here with a brief reference. Words like right, obligation, and justice are often said to indicate criteria or norms which are sharply divided from the world of facts ; they stand for categorical and unconditional imperatives, independent of the actual. Consequently, from this point of view, there is a gap between the fact and the ideal ; and the normative sciences, i.e. the sciences whose object is the ideal or norm itself, must have some other starting-point and method than those proper to the so-called positive sciences. Hegel, however, treats the philosophy of right as continuous with the philosophic analysis of the subjective forms of mind ; and his standpoint seems as objective as, e.g., that of psychology. English thought sympathizes the less readily with Hegel because it has no word corresponding to the full significance of the German word *Recht*. *Recht* means not only what we

ordinarily call a right but also law. A somewhat similar difficulty arises in rendering the Latin word *Jus*, and a beginner in jurisprudence sometimes has trouble in accommodating himself to the required atmosphere. It may be useful to indicate from this side the elements which Hegel includes in the significance of his term. Borrowing from the Stoics through Ulpian, Justinian said that '*Jurisprudentia* is the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of the just and the unjust'. There is a factor in this definition which is incompatible with the purely positive treatment of law. Austin, for example, urges not only that Justinian's statement is too comprehensive, but also that it reverses the true order: 'it affirms that law is the creature of justice, which is as much as to say that it is the child of its own offspring. . . . But, in truth, law is itself the standard of justice.'¹ The view underlying this criticism has much to recommend it as a working hypothesis for legal purposes, and is not without an element of philosophic truth, for law and right are inseparable; but it is not wholly satisfactory, for right is not merely derivative and dependent on law. Those who take up the positive position are apt to identify right in general with what the courts will uphold, and to derive the authority of the law from the authority of those who do in fact declare it. If the authority of the judge or legislator is questioned, the theory tends to argue in a circle, and defend the authority of the legislator by details of the law. The aspect which is neglected by this attitude is found in a somewhat crude shape in Roman law. Roman law falls into three main fields: *Jus Civile*, *Jus Gentium*, and *Jus Naturale*.² The *Jus Civile* was positive in character, consisting solely of enactments by some constituted authority. The *Jus Gentium* was a system of law governing the relations of Romans with Latins and foreigners. Its terms were stated by the *praetor peregrinus*, but it was supposed to be based on accepted habits and customs. The idea developed, however, and later jurists held that it was based on natural reason common to all men. The *Jus Naturale* was even farther removed from dependence on merely positive sources, and Justinian describes it thus. 'The *Jus Naturale* is what nature has taught all living things. That law is not peculiar to the race of men,

¹ *Jurisprudence*, Lecture V.

² *V. Digest*, I. i. 1-4.

but applies to all living things that are born in the sky, on the earth, or in the sea. Hence comes to us the union of the male and the female which we call matrimony, hence the begetting of children and their upbringing. We see indeed that all other things as well are held to know that law.’¹ Nature is not a worthy sponsor of any section of right, but the conception of natural law has a relative truth against the view which lays all emphasis on the positive side. Natural right asserted itself with vehemence against mere legality in the century before Hegel; and there would have been little excuse for him if he had failed to incorporate in his theory the aspects of truth that had stirred men so deeply in the revolutionary times. Indeed Hegel, in spite of the emphasis he lays on the identity of the actual and the rational, stands nearer in some respects to those who appeal to nature or reason than to those who look upon justice as the mere creature of positive enactment. ‘The consideration of the appearance and development of the features of right in time is a purely historical concern, which, together with the knowledge of their intelligible consequences obtained by comparison with other relations of right, constitutes a separate and worthy sphere. This sphere is separate from that of philosophy in so far as the development as an historical process does not coincide with the development of the notion; and the historical explanation and justification is not absolutely valid. This distinction, which is very important and should be firmly grasped, is at the same time very obvious. A feature of right may be shown to be grounded on and to follow from the existing conditions and institutions of right, and yet be absolutely wrong and irrational, as, e.g., many points in Roman Law that flowed from the established power of the father or husband in Roman society.’² He adds ‘We are accustomed to speak of Roman or German notions of right, or of notions of right as they are determined in this or that code, where in truth the notions are not forthcoming at all, but only general features of right, propositions of the understanding, principles and laws, &c. By neglect of that distinction the standpoint is confused; the question of the true justification is turned into a justification by circumstances

¹ *Institutes*, I. 2, pr.; also *Digest*, I. c.

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 3 note.

and consequences and presuppositions which are themselves valueless ; and in general the relative is set in the place of the nature of the thing.'

But although right is not of empirical derivation, it is rooted in the nature of mind. In the last three chapters we have seen that mind is an inherent reality working itself out in the phenomenal shapes of human history. When mind first becomes self-conscious it apprehends the incongruence of its own principle with its external surroundings through the medium of disagreeable feeling ; and this apprehension involves the superiority of the principle of mind to external nature. Mind soon learns to elevate its own being above the presented relation and set up its own satisfaction as a demand. As self-consciousness develops, the demand ceases to be a mere 'ought', the arbitrary claim of one individual being on another. Mind includes nature, and the essence of the external object is its function as an element within mind. This is the standpoint from which Hegel regards right. Right is more than a claim, or an obligation, or the decree of an authority : it is the realization of self-conscious mind ; and this realization is the intrinsic character of mind, it is what mind does as it comes to itself. Nor is it a mere fact, for its essence is the infusion of rationality into the fact, and the fulfilment of the claim made by mind that the satisfaction and realization of mind itself is the inherent truth of the situation.

Thus, for Hegel, it is an error to suppose that the essence of right lies in a collision of what is and what ought to be, and to imagine that the conception has no bearing in a realm where each does as he ought. Right is itself fulfilment, the realization and the objectivity of mind, with reference both to things and to other minds ; and the possibility of failure in the effort to reach fulfilment, though of profound importance from many points of view, is a subordinate element in the conception itself. Right may not be the category of a final standpoint—that is a further question—but it is too easily discredited when it is regarded as a suicidal effort to remove a discordance between ideal and factual, and when its essence is laid in the discrepancy of these moments. Such a discrepancy is rather the mark of the failure of right to reach its true form, a sign that it is not fully explicit : and any

activity whose outcome is satiety, or in which mind cannot find some rest, is inadequate to the principle of the ethical world.

Right, then, is the general principle of the objective realization of mind, and its special categories are the various moments involved in this realization. Of course one must not expect too much from philosophic analysis. The abstract conceptions with which it deals do not themselves indicate all the detail through which they operate or the many ways in which phenomenal mind embodies them. Just as in the analysis of a category such as thinghood logic did not undertake a description of any particular thing, or state its particular attributes, but confined itself to an analysis of its typical structure, and told us what it is to be a thing; so here no reference is to be expected to the particular terms of rights—except by way of illustration—and the principles evolved are simply the ‘diamond net’ in which particular rights are held. Hegel’s philosophy of ethics presupposes experience in the ethical sphere, and is concerned only with the fundamental categories by which its ethical character is determined. He sets aside ‘the possible imagination or even demand which supposes that the systematic development of the notion of right should produce a positive book of statutes, such as is needed in an actual state’.¹

We may now consider the general division of the subject, and indicate the main stages into which it falls. The dominant principle, of course, is the dialectic; the starting point, therefore, is the barest and simplest aspect, and each step brings to light the immanent complexity and mediateness of the whole. Hegel distinguishes three main sections, the first two being isolated moments of the full conception, the third the conception taken concretely. Firstly, the free will gives itself an immediate embodiment in objects; it subordinates something to itself, gives it a place within the context of an abiding purpose, and regards it as the vehicle of mind. The will thus gives itself an outward shape or existence in the thing, and is recognized there by other selves; this is the sphere of abstract or formal right. But, secondly, the ethical life is the embodiment of purposes or ends which arise only within individual subjects. Right has an inward aspect;

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 3.

for it is the satisfaction of a self, and, on one side, is constituted by the insight and intention of the agent. This is only a moment in the full being of right, but it may be made explicit as if it were the whole. When the revelation of duty to the individual conscience, the right of private interpretation, the claim to be judged only by the standards one recognizes as binding and in accordance with the results one intended to produce are treated as the fundamental and sufficient features of the situation, right has taken the shape of the moral consciousness and embodied itself in a medium of claims and counter-claims that Hegel calls morality. In abstract right, the first division of the field, the free will takes form and definite being in an individual thing: in the sphere of morality, the second division, it reveals itself as an individual subject. Thirdly, the ethical ideal in its completeness contains both aspects: it is free will realizing itself both in the conscience of individual subjects and in the outer world of things. It is both subjective and objective. It is the good in which all moral agents can find the satisfaction of their central purposes, and at the same time it is the enduring and objective realization of mind in a common world. Ethical mind constructs for itself a world of institutions in which individual selves lead a common life, and in which they find their highest and fullest freedom to be possible only by whole-hearted acceptance of the ends of the rational community as their own. Further characterization of morality and the ethical order will be more appropriate at a later stage of our argument when we shall have analysed the simpler categories which precede them, but brief notice may be made here of two points in Hegel's terminology.

The two words which Hegel uses to denote the second and third divisions of the whole field of right might both be translated into English by either of the two terms 'moral' and 'ethical'. The distinction between his terms is precise and clear for Hegel, but it is much more blurred in ordinary German, and in English it can hardly be said to exist at all. There is seldom an occasion when one might not write moral for ethical, or ethical for moral. So, if we wish to follow the articulation of Hegel's thought, we must resign ourselves to giving these terms a restricted and somewhat arbitrary significance. It would be possible, of course, to refer to the

second division of the field of right by a periphrasis, such as individual or private and subjective morality; and to the third by another, such as the social world of objective observance and realized ends. But this course is not satisfactory. On the one hand, the terms used make a *prima facie* claim to accuracy, and they are not really sufficient; they need further qualification which is found only in the whole exposition itself. And on the other hand, they are too clumsy for ordinary use—in an adjectival form they are impossible. I judge it better therefore to take the terms 'moral' and 'ethical' as technicalities, which must gather meaning as the argument proceeds. In accordance with the practice of most of the translators I use 'morality' and 'moral' in reference to the second sphere of right, and 'the ethical order' and 'ethical' in reference to the third.

Secondly, the word right indicates both the whole field of objective mind and the first division of it. 'By the word right we signify not only civil right, which is its usual meaning, but also morality, the ethical order, and world-history.'¹ There is a single principle running through the whole sphere, and each department or special mode is an articulation of it. The first section of the whole is the principle as a bare notion and develops through morality into the ethical order, the 'idea' of the sphere. Hegel distinguishes the first section of right from the more concrete shapes by using special names for the latter and by characterizing the former as abstract, formal, or intrinsic right; but the term is used in the twofold manner in order to remind us of the continuity of the entire process and as an indication that the principle of ethical science is a notion which develops into an 'idea' that is the product and true nature of the notion itself.

Objective mind begins with abstract right. Self-conscious rational mind gives itself an immediate existence in an object and is recognized there by other like selves. This immediate existence is abstract. Every individual has his being within a community, and has a status of however ill-defined a sort. Moreover, he is characterized by all the natural features of race, age, capacity and so forth that are born in him. But from the point of view of abstract right these are irrelevant. The sole point, at this stage, is that the mind is universal,

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 33 note.

and sets its universality before itself as its pre-eminent characteristic. This is the natural step in the dialectic. Hegel has analysed subjective mind, and goes on to consider its objective realization. The first phase, therefore, is the emptiest and least adequate aspect, the bare principle in virtue of which the field of objective mind is entered at all. When mind is thus regarded it has the form of personality, and to be a person is to be the subject or bearer of rights in general. Thus Hegel regards personality as a special aspect or mode of mind in which the moments of universality and particularity are united in a definite and characteristic way. The person, as such, is an immediate form of mind: but at the same time what is immediately explicit is a universal.

To understand the nature of personality, according to Hegel's interpretation of it, is to apprehend the implications of this statement. Let us, therefore, compare this immediate mode of objective mind with the immediate mode of subjective mind which we glanced at in the last chapter. Both are immediate because a mediation, which intrinsically belongs to them and without which they could not be, is not made explicit to mind itself. Immediate natural mind is of course mediated as regarded by an observer. We see the natural forces that enter into it and inform it, we see how one experience works upon and modifies others, and we know that it is one life and one mind simply in virtue of the interpenetration of all its factors. But on its inward side the natural mind has its contents immediately present, without comparison between them. It does not trace its contents to their origin or estimate their effect upon one another: each is simply there for it, and no further consideration arises. Now the same characteristic appears in personality. A self-conscious mind can be recognized as a person only within a society in which some detailed organization exists; to say that there are many selves is to speak abstractly, for these many selves are bound together in many detailed ways, and without these particular relations could not bring their inherent universal being to light at all. But the person who takes the standpoint of abstract right ignores these conditions. He does not ask how his personality is possible; he overrides all particular features, and insists wholly on the sanctity of his self-conscious universal will.

The nature of the principle may be made clearer by a criticism of a misuse of it. Property, as we shall see, is the field of abstract right, and some theorists have maintained that the principle requires an equal distribution of property. Of course we are not concerned here with the view that the higher good of society as a concrete organism demands a different distribution, and possibly a more equal distribution, of wealth than that prevalent at any given time and place: we have to consider only the contention that right as such involves equality of property. Now the ways in which a person's property comes into his possession are many. They fall under a general heading, no doubt, but nevertheless they correspond in detail to the infinitely various processes of nature whereby man moulds objects to his purposes. As an individual each man has capacities and opportunities which belong to him alone: his strength, his birth-place, his sensory acuity, &c., all help to determine the quantity of material in which he can place his will. Now, these conditions are excluded by the man who stands on his abstract universality and declares only that he is self-conscious will, a sacred person: and yet it is by them that property is actually gained. That is to say, the individual in question considers only the point in which he is like other persons and excludes particular differences. But on that account the principle he apprehends does not apply to the area which he has neglected; and the similarity in question refers only to his form as a person and not to the details of the things in which he places his personality. 'Like, in this case, would be only likeness of abstract persons as such, and all that concerns property, with its wealth of unlikeness, falls outside it.'¹ The amount of property a man should have requires for its determination some more concrete category than that of abstract right; for it must include considerations which relate persons to persons in specific ways in accordance with the needs of the state as a whole. Abstract right thus is formal, or immediate, in that it does not make explicit the further principles of the rational community within which alone it can exist.

But there is also a fundamental difference between the immediate modes of subjective and of objective mind. Natural

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 49.

mind is below the level of self-consciousness, but in personality self-consciousness is explicit. Natural mind makes no deliberate comparisons, and does not contrast itself with other minds or with nature. The person is aware of the difference of selves and recognizes other persons : his attitude is immediate and abstract because these differences are accepted without specification and without the totality of the conditions that make them possible. The person is in a more concrete sphere than subjective mind ; the principle with which personality begins is the outcome and highest point of subjective mind, and its immediacy is determined by reference to the mediation of a concrete system of ethical relationships which do not appear in the realm of subjective mind at all. That is to say, the immediacy of abstract right is the immediacy in virtue of which subjective mind as a whole is characterized as one-sided.

In personality the universal nature of mind attains explicit expression in an individual subject, and is manifested in his activities. Mind implants itself in an object and is recognized there. But at the first the process is abstract : right, as distinct from morality and the ethical order, does not explicitly contain a positive system whereby the world can be given entire coherence. It is still an abstract universal and bears little fruit. Every step of the dialectic has a negative aspect, and nowhere can it move forward in a perfectly straight line. That is to say, dialectical categories differ from their predecessors by more than compass : they transform the content which they contain. This is true of the first step as of the last. Pure being, as an empty universal, is a complete negation of the apparent wealth of the experienced world : and although its primary feature is positive, yet with reference to all pre-philosophic knowledge it is negative. So, too, the first category of objective mind, abstract right, is negative with regard to the rich content of individual minds ; it asserts the irrelevancy of desires and impulses and sets forth a bare form within which all concrete characteristics have yet to be brought. If it were possible for some mind in the phenomenal stages of its development to follow the progress of the dialectic through subjective mind into objective mind, the transition from the one stage to the other would be felt as a check. Instead of a number of principles whereby a positive system

of content might be organized, there would appear a negating and limiting universal whose sole practical application consisted in inhibiting certain activities. Its positive content is the infinite value of personality as such, and its decree is, 'Do not injure personality. 'It has only prohibitions, and the positive form of its commands rests at bottom on prohibition.'¹

Abstract right is thus a demand that one should be a person and respect others as persons; and its categories are not formulae for action but analyses of the principles involved in actions which satisfy right. Mind is confronted by the world of nature; it is setting out in its task of subduing nature to itself; and the phases of right are the various modes in which mind reaches some measure of success in its endeavour. Within this abstract sphere Hegel indicates three aspects or categories. The first is the simplest; in it the will stands in direct relation to a natural object and makes the object a means and vehicle of itself. This is property. The second phase, viz. contract, explicitly includes the difference of selves each of which possesses property, and contains the germ of a common will. In the third phase, the will of an individual is divided against itself, and manifests a collision of aspects within a single personality. This gives us wrong or crime. These three categories constitute a progressive movement from abstract to concrete, and in Hegel's view they comprise the whole field of abstract right. We must now look at them more closely.

Property is the realization of a self-conscious will in an external thing. Since mind is essentially a self-revealing system, it must give itself an outward existence and maintain its freedom in a world of things. The body is the obvious object in which this is first accomplished; for matter that has come alive is the organ of the life, and the life is transfused through it. But although a living being can always be said to possess its body, possession is not necessarily the same thing as property, and the category of right is not always present. The characteristic of property is that it holds a will within it, and a living being does not own its body unless life has developed into will. Thus Hegel says, 'Animals do indeed possess themselves, and their soul is in possession of their body; but they have no right to their life, because they

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 38.

do not will it.'¹ In taking possession of property the will comes forth from its inwardness, and enters into the outward world and is exposed there to the forces of nature and to other selves. It is by means of this step that a common world is possible. A mind that is shut up within itself cannot be recognized by others, it is cut off from any communication with them, and the rationality within remains undeveloped. The mind which places itself in a thing is from one point of view limiting itself; for it becomes liable to the lot and chances that external things suffer. But Hegel insists that this limitation is an essential moment in mind itself, and without it the will remains an unrealized possibility and of no effect. Property thus is the basis of the ethical life, the first outline of which the state is the completion. It is not an arbitrary device of selfish men, but an indispensable constituent in the rounded life of reason itself.

Since this first moment of objective mind is a limitation of the abstract universality of the will, property involves a certain externality. Property consists of things, and must be capable of distinction from the will; whatever cannot be regarded as a thing cannot be property in the strict sense. Hegel points out, however, that mind can place many of its own contents in the outer world, and, in spite of their inward and spiritual side, these can also be taken as external things. 'Spiritual gifts, sciences, masses, prayers, the blessing of sacred things, become objects of contract—recognized merchandise.'² At first sight the relation of man to these mental capacities and activities seems to be too intimate to allow them to be treated as property; they seem rather to be the man himself. But we have seen that mind is a universal, and can abstract from every particular content. Moreover, these mental powers are activities, they produce effects in space and time, and one can distinguish one's inner self from these results. Wherever this distinction is drawn property exists, and a legal view can be taken of the objects.

Property thus involves two aspects, a universal and a particular; and it can be regarded either as the limitation of the will in a thing or as the subsumption of the thing under the will. The will defines itself, and the thing becomes a moment of a universal. Hegel insists that the manifest

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 47 note.

² *Ibid.* § 43.

destiny of things is to become property. The natural thing is by itself imperfect and self-contradictory ; and at whatever stage we like to take it, whether as a thing in the strict sense ¹ or as a factor in reciprocal system, it is an organization of attributes reflecting an essence which fails to account for them. Thinghood is the mere togetherness of the properties, and yet it distinguishes its own properties and shuts out others. Substance, too, when pressed back turns into a darkness akin to emptiness.² Natural things lack an inner principle to bind them together, and the universals which connect them into wholes are not final. Hegel believes that mind itself is the ultimate principle in which alone rationality is found ; and the will, as it appears here in abstract right, is one mode in which the defect of nature is made good. In a human purpose the thing has a soul given to it ; in itself it has no soul, no right, no positive inward content, and it is unable to exclude mind. Finite purpose itself is not a final principle and has defects of its own ; but it is more adequate than any purely natural category, and can subordinate and idealize the latter. In accordance with this position Hegel argues that the right of the person in property is complete, the person takes possession of the whole of the thing. He maintains that Fichte's view of property involves an unreal distinction. Fichte holds that the soil is not a possible object of property. 'Hence', he says, 'the right of the agriculturist to a fixed piece of ground is solely the right exclusively to raise products upon it and to exclude all others from doing the same, or from using it for any other purpose which would conflict with that use. The agriculturist, therefore, has no right to prevent another use of his property, provided it does not conflict with his own. He has not the right, for instance, to prevent others from using his lands after harvest for pasturage, unless he has obtained also the right of cattle raising, nor to prevent the state from mining on his lands, unless, indeed, his lands should thereby receive damages, in which case the state must reimburse him.'³ Fichte is arguing from the point of view of abstract right, and not from that of the good of the community ; and his theory draws a

¹ V. pp. 19-21.

² V. p. 38 f.

³ Fichte, *Grundlage d. Naturrechts*, § 19 A, trans. by Kroeger, pp. 298-9.

distinction between the matter and the form of the object possessed. Now it may well be that an individual cannot bend a thing entirely to his end ; his knowledge may be inadequate, and his purpose imperfectly rational. Most things are imperfectly penetrated by the will ; they have other aspects than the ideality given to them by one owner, they may outlast his activities and function in other schemes of mind. But this does not justify the assumption of an impermeable core in things possessed ; it is rather a mark of the imperfection of the finite will. Hegel's comment is as follows. According to Fichte, ' if I have made a golden cup, it is open to another to take the gold so long as he does not injure my work. Plausible as this distinction is to the imagination, in fact it is mere hair-splitting. If I take possession of a field and plough it, it is not only the furrows that are my property but the furrowed earth. I will to take the whole into possession ; the matter does not remain its own and without a master. Even if the matter of the object be outside the form which I have given it, the form is a sign that the thing is mine. The thing is not external to my will ; it is within the content of my purpose, and there is nothing left for another to take into possession.' ¹

The person is an individual conscious of his universality, or, in other words, a universal will in the form of an individual. Consequently, property, the objective existence of a private person, is also private. Hegel lays some stress on this point. The will in order to come to itself must develop the moment of exclusiveness and externality ; and lacking this element the higher concrete unities of mind are weakened, if not destroyed. Just as the higher logical principle must include the element of difference contained in the lower, so the ethical order must attain harmony in and through the expression of different persons in their particular spheres. On this ground Hegel condemns the community of goods advocated by Socrates in the *Republic*.

It is necessary to keep in mind here the abstract nature of the principles with which Hegel is dealing. Up to this point he has been concerned with personality as such, an elementary principle of practical life and not adequate to the poorest actual existing being. Personality as such does not exist

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 52 note.

in its purity, or rather in its nakedness. What exists as a person is always more than a person, and is constituted both by particular ends and by more concrete universals which are not explicit in personality itself. Hegel has now brought to the forefront the moment of individuality, or privacy, and he has thereby made the conception of personality more concrete. But he has not yet reached the further principles and conditions through which alone personality is rendered possible. These principles—which will appear later—make a profound difference to personality, and at this stage he ought not to prejudice the nature of the modifications they entail. But in his desire to keep in touch with facts Hegel tends to overlook this, and he gives hasty illustrations of his view. ‘Common property,’ he says, ‘which according to its nature can be individually possessed, has the character of an inherently dissoluble community, in which my participation is explicitly a matter of choice.’¹ He gives examples. ‘The agrarian laws in Rome aroused a conflict between common and private ownership of land; the latter, as the more rational element, had to gain the upper hand although at the expense of the other right.’ ‘Many states have rightly abolished monasteries, since in the last resort a community has no such right to property as the person has.’²

Hegel has gone too fast here. He has still to consider the relation of the individual to the common will, and he has no right to prejudice the issue by assuming the latter to be artificial. He would have been justified if he had pointed out that wherever there is personality there is also private property, and he might have enlarged his argument by showing that even in the grasp of higher categories the privacy of personality is always and necessarily correlated with a privacy of property. He does not hold that the privacy of individual wills is ultimately hostile to their community and interpenetration, and accordingly, in his examples, he should not have assumed that common ownership impedes private possession.

At a later stage of his argument, after he had considered the nature of the common will, Hegel would have been justified in returning to the privacy of property, and in

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 46.

² *Ibid.* note.

showing—if his view had then allowed it—that this privacy can be preserved only if the exclusive element of the will is made absolute, at least in some instances. But he could not really have done so. In the higher categories of the ethical order a person is not an exclusive atom. It is self-contained and self-determining, as the will always must be; but it is also identical in its nature and in its ends with the other individuals which it holds without it. And its objective phase, its property, is also qualified by the fundamental common will. Property does not cease to be private, but it becomes common also; indeed its privacy is in the last resort a characteristic through which it is enabled to function as an organ of the common will.

This contention belongs properly to a later stage of the argument than that to which we have reached. The reason for introducing it here is that Hegel has overlooked it in his illustrations, and that he does not bring it out clearly in its proper place. He traces, as we shall see, the development of the will from its first naïve independence and individuality to its higher independence and individuality in the rational community. But his analysis is incomplete. As the functions of personality become organized in society, property develops new phases which do not appear in its simpler forms where the exclusive moment of the will is uppermost. Hegel does not indicate these new characteristics sufficiently; possibly his acquaintance with economic facts and theory was not sufficient to enable him to do so.¹ From the point of view of modern thought the gap thus left is of importance, and it still requires to be filled. One form in which the defect shows itself in Hegel's exposition is the way in which he is led to speak of higher principles of 'social life *interfering* with private property in the interests of ends which go beyond personality in its first exclusive appearance. The expression is not wrong, but it is only the negative side of a truth which should also have been stated positively. These interferences are also a defence of property itself, and make new forms of it possible. They check special aspects in the interests of the institution as a whole. Everything which widens the

¹ The distinction he draws later in discussing contract between use for specific needs and use to produce wealth (v. below, p. 137) might be developed in this direction.

objective field in which man can realize himself, and which gives him means and opportunity to express his most rational purposes in the world, increases property. Its restrictive and negative aspect is a moment in its positive function.¹

Our criticism of Hegel's treatment of private property has already digressed too far, and we must now return to his exposition. Although he does not analyse clearly enough at any stage of his argument the way in which the character of property—or perhaps one should say the field of property—is modified by social principles, he does indicate here some spheres where the notion is not applicable. Only a specific thing, separable from the essence of the person and yet within human control, can be property. Thus, no one is able to appropriate the elemental forces of nature or show an indefeasible right to a fixed star. Again, persons, unlike things, are not devoid of an inner principle, and can be dominated only at the expense of crushing their own rationality. In such a case, reason does not extend its dominion over nature, but is divided against itself.

The notion of property develops itself through three moments, the first of which is taking possession. This process has three main modes. 'We may take possession of a thing by seizing it physically, by forming it, or simply by marking it out.'² The first of these is the most obvious, but it is also the most limited. It is confined to things of a manageable bulk, and, although the most complete form of possession while it lasts, it is transitory. When I give a thing a form I impress my will upon it in a more adequate fashion. It is mine and embodies me even when I am not physically present,

¹ A recent critic, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, exaggerates the defect in Hegel's exposition here ('The Philosophical Theory of Property', in *Property: Its Duties and Rights*, p. 53). He quotes a paragraph from Dr. Dyde's translation of the *Philosophy of Right*, § 44, and on the strength of it accuses Hegel of arguing from the abstract right of mind over things to a right of each man to appropriate to his own exclusive use everything he can get irrespective of other people's needs and wishes. Dr. Dyde's translation of the passage is doubtful, and Dr. Rashdall's exegesis is wrong. Dr. Rashdall has failed to notice that Hegel has not at that stage raised the question of *private* property at all—it does not appear till § 46. What Hegel declares in § 44 to be absolute is not the particularity and exclusiveness of one person against others, but the right of mind against nature—a sound position of which Dr. Rashdall himself approves.

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 54.

and my will penetrates more deeply into the structure of the object. 'Under this head comes the process of forming organic beings, where that which I effect upon the object does not remain external but is assimilated by it; for example, the working of the soil, the cultivation of plants, the taming, nourishing and tending of animals, and all contrivances for utilizing natural materials and forces, the use of one material to produce effects upon another, and so forth.'¹ Hegel applies this principle to a man's possession of his own being. 'Man in his immediate existence is a natural being external to his own notion. He becomes possessor of himself, his own and not another's, by developing his body and mind and especially by his self-conscious apprehension of himself as free.' Taking possession of a thing by marking it one's own is the most indefinite of these three modes; but it is in a sense the most adequate, for it reveals the principle underlying the others. 'When I seize a thing, or form it, the act is in the last resort symbolic. It excludes others from the possession of the thing, and intimates that I have put my will into it.'² The essence, thus, of taking possession is the overt recognizable impression of my will on the thing. Hegel points that a rule is sometimes stated, as if it were a positive principle of right, to the effect that 'a thing belongs to the first who takes possession of it'. The positive form of this rule, however, is deceptive. The temporal element is a mere accident; for the deliverance of right is in general, Do not injure personality. 'The first is the rightful owner, not because he is first, but because he is free will; he is not first until another comes after him.'³

The second moment of the conception of property is use. The original act of taking possession is continued and developed when I use the thing. By using it the ego proclaims its superiority over the thing, subordinates it to the fulfilment of the self, and idealizes it. Use is the articulation of the notion of property, and the effective externalization of the will. 'To have full use of the thing makes one owner of it, for beyond the complete circle of its use there is nothing further to be the property of another'.⁴ When the right of property does not include the full right of use, it is imperfect.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 56.

² *Ibid.* § 50 note.

³ *Ibid.* § 58 note.

⁴ *Ibid.* § 61.

'The relation of use to property is that of substance to accident, inner to outer, force to its expression. Just as force is only in so far as it expresses itself, and a field is a field only in bearing produce, so he who has the use of a field is the owner of the whole. It is an empty abstraction to recognize a further property in the object itself.'¹ When property is supposed to reside in a person who is entirely excluded from the use of the thing, his empty right is a contradiction—a notion incapable of articulation—and Hegel says that it might almost be called an insanity of personality.²

But although the complete range of use is property itself, a limited right of use does not constitute one an owner. Ownership is a universal, and cannot be possessed by laying hold of one or two of the particulars in which it appears. He who holds all the accidents holds the substance also, for the substance is only in the accidents: but substance is not confined in any limited range of its modes, and he who grasps only the latter cannot claim power over the universal. Thus one is not justified in appropriating the possessions of another on the ground that the owner was not at the moment using them: the will of the owner may not have been properly withdrawn from the thing,³ and consequently the thing may not have ceased to be his property. Use, the development of the notion, is equivalent to the universal only when taken in its totality.⁴ So, too, when I acquire a limited use of a thing it does not become my property. The will of the owner still resides in it, my use is determined by his will and terminates in accordance with it. The substance still resides with him. Hegel lays down no rules whereby ownership is to be determined in cases where the right of use is divided between different people—the negative character of abstract right does not permit such positive rules. He merely insists that property is a thorough penetration of the thing, and when the moments are sundered property is not in its true shape. If the rights of one person can be regarded as fundamental and universal when compared with those of another, and the right of use which the latter has, taken merely as a limitation of those of the former which preserves the essence, then

¹ *Ibid.* § 61 note.

² *Ibid.* § 62.

³ For the nature of this process, v. below, p. 135 ff.

⁴ V. *Philosophy of Right*, § 59.

probably the former should be held to be the owner, although his right is mutilated. Different legal codes have different ways of deciding the point, and the arbitrariness of the rule is a sign of the imperfect way in which they realize the nature of property. 'It is more than a millenium and a half since the freedom of the person began to flourish under Christianity and to be recognized as a general principle by at least a portion of the human race. But it is only, one might say, since yesterday that here and there the freedom of property has been recognized. The importance of sentiment is rebuked by this example from universal history of the length of time taken by mind in its advance to self-consciousness.'¹

Use has various modes and aspects. In its primary form it is individual, a simple extension of the act of taking possession; it is the satisfaction of a specific impulse or need. Sometimes, however, it involves greater complexity and universality. 'If the function of using is for the fulfilment of a standing need and employs a constantly renewed material, or perhaps merely preserves the source of the material, then the individual act of grasping becomes a sign, giving the act the significance of taking possession in its universal form; that is to say, it indicates the taking possession of the fundamental or organic sources and conditions of the material.'²

A further universality, however, is to be found in use as a mode of abstract right. Things are qualitatively distinct, and so are their uses; but both can be expressed in quantitative terms. Hegel does not indicate how the transformation is accomplished, or by what means the measurement is effected; he simply says that the specific utilities of things with reference to a single need can be quantitatively compared, and that one need may be similarly estimated against others. Perhaps there is a certain philosophic loss in Hegel's omission; he is prevented from tracing the balancing of satisfactions within the individual to the balance of them between individuals in contract, and, in consequence, his sequent account of the economic system lacks articulation. 'This universality, which arises from the particularity of the thing, and yet abstracts from its specific qualities, is the value of the thing, that which constitutes its true substance and makes it an object of consciousness. As true owner of the thing I own

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 62.

² *Ibid.* § 60.

its value as well as its use.'¹ The transformation of quality into quantity is an advance, for in value the specific quality of the object is transcended but is still operative: it has become a moment of a general principle. 'The qualitative determines the quantum of the quantity, and in being sublated it is preserved.'² When value is taken as the important aspect, the specific thing which has value is reduced to the status of a sign. It stands for the universal, and its peculiar characteristics are lost sight of except in so far as they are essential to its function as a bearer of value. Money is a device whereby the specific character of the object is thrust into the background and attention drawn to the value itself. 'Money represents things, but since it is not itself the thing needed, but only a sign of it, it is controlled by the specific aspect of value which it abstractly expresses.'

The third moment in the conception of property is its surrender. A thing becomes my property when I put my will into it: it ceases to be mine when I take my will out of it. This relinquishment may be either an explicit and definite act, or an indefinite and lengthy process. In the latter case it is indicated by a continued failure to maintain possession and use of the thing, and the loss is incurred through prescription. The amount of time which must elapse before prescription can be recognized by law is, of course, arbitrary: but it should be sufficient to show that the will of the previous owner has really abandoned the thing. The principle itself, however, is not arbitrary. Property is an external existence of the will; it is, therefore, subject to time: and the will must maintain itself in time. 'Prescription is not merely forced into the system of right in order to exclude the strife and confusion which old claims would bring into the security of property. On the contrary, it is based on the actual existence of property, on the necessity which forces the will to express itself if it is to possess.'³ Hegel applies the principle to the national monuments of former peoples, to the rights of the family of a writer to his works, and to vacant land set aside for purposes that have no meaning in present times. When the will of the original owner has lapsed from the thing, it is a *res nullius*, and may become the private property of others.

Hegel discusses at considerable length what things can

¹ *Ibid.* § 63.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* § 64.

be alienated by the will in accordance with right ; and the general principle is that anything which is not separable from the person, and which cannot be called property in the sense analysed above, cannot be rightfully given up. Personality, the freedom of the will, morality, and religion constitute the essence of the self-conscious individual, and cannot be alienated. Abstract right, therefore, is violated by 'slavery, bondage, incapacity to hold property, or imperfect control of it. The surrender of reason, morality, and religion is exemplified in superstition, in ceding to another the authority and power to determine matters of conscience and religious truth for me, or to prescribe what I shall do, as when I explicitly hire myself to rob or kill, or undertake something that may involve crime.' ¹ One's own consent is not binding in such cases, for the self cannot be reduced to a mere thing. 'It lies in the nature of things that the slave has an absolute right to make himself free, and anyone who has hired himself to commit crime may repudiate the contract, since it is inherently nugatory.' The same principle applies to suicide. A man has no right over his life, for his life is the totality of his activity, the man himself. It can be subordinated only to some wider ethical idea, such as the state ; and when this higher reality, of which he is a member and from which his substance comes, needs such a sacrifice the individual has no right to refuse it. No personal reason can justify suicide, for right is a universal principle overriding all private inclinations and emotions. 'When Hercules destroyed himself by fire and Brutus fell upon his sword, their outrage upon personality was heroic ; but as to a simple right of self-destruction, there is no such thing, even for heroes.' ²

Although constitutive principles of mind cannot be alienated, we have seen ³ that the individual productions of one's mental powers can be externalized. So, too, can their limited use. Carlyle overlooked this point in his famous statement regarding negro slavery in America. He put the issue as if it concerned merely the length of time by which the man was hired : in the Northern states he was hired by the year or month, in the Southern for life. The latter was the better method in the circumstances, Carlyle contended, because under it the negro was forced to be industrious and had to

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 66.

² *Ibid.* p. 70 note.

³ p. 126.

acquire the virtues that come from actual work. Similarly, other people have argued in favour of slavery that the slave was better treated and had a happier lot than many workmen. From Hegel's point of view these contentions ignore the essential point, and forget that right is the soil of all virtue and happiness. 'The distinction here set forth is that between a slave and a modern servant or day labourer. The Athenian slave had probably lighter and higher work than our workmen generally have, but he was still a slave, for the whole range of his activity was given over to a master.'¹

Hegel raises the question whether the right to use a thing involves the right to reproduce it. And he says that the first point to be settled in this connexion is 'whether such a distinction between property in the thing and the right to reproduce is compatible with the notion of property and does not destroy its completeness and freedom: for on the completeness and freedom of property rests the very power of the producer to reserve the right of production to himself, to part with it as a thing of value, or to attach no worth to it and give it away with each particular individual product.'² Hegel proceeds to distinguish two modes of use here: the use of the thing to satisfy an individual need and the use of it as a source of further wealth by reproducing it. Since these uses are themselves distinct processes in the external world, the notion of property does not imply that the surrender of the one carries the right to the other with it. The right of reproduction is a specific source of wealth, and is a definite and separate piece of property. Copyright and patent laws are thus on a level with ordinary laws against theft, and enforce the fundamental though negative demand of right that the realization of a person in property be respected. In this contention Hegel has suggested one point in the analysis of the modes of property, but, as was pointed out above, he does not go into its implications.

It is not easy to state the exact difference between reproduction and the creation of a new product. No *a priori* rules can be laid down to determine when a man has assimilated a thought and recast it in such a way that it is stamped with the impress of his own spirit.

It appears natural that Hegel should discuss the moments

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 67 note.

² *Ibid.* § 69.

of property in the order in which he has taken them : first, taking possession, then use, lastly relinquishment. But we must remember that the exposition is dialectical, and that, therefore, the stages become increasingly concrete. The relinquishment of property is the unity of the other aspects. Hegel does not mean by this statement that to give up property is the same thing as not to give it up, and that after abandoning a thing one goes on to use it in precisely the same fashion as before. His statement refers to the *notion* of relinquishment, and points out that this notion includes the notion of possession within it. The explicit alienation of property is a declaration of my will with regard to the thing, it is something I do to the thing, and, as it were, I am responsible for its future condition. In repelling the thing I am still in relation to it, although the relation is primarily negative. This view of negation is characteristic of Hegel, and must be clearly understood. The difficulty one is apt to feel in it at first arises from a confusion of the analysis of notions with the relation of actual processes. It is possible to have a process directly embodying a positive notion, such as health, and another process embodying a category which holds the positive notion as a moment within it, the former notion being merged or sublated, viz. disease. But although the notion of disease involves the notion of health, and apart from the latter is meaningless, yet the actual state of disease, as a fact of a living organism, does not contain a normal and healthy organism somewhere inside it. So, too, the conception of the surrender of property involves the notion of property, but the abandonment of property is a different process from its retention. Categories are not necessarily related to one another in the same way as are separate processes each of which is the manifestation of one category. It is not to be imagined, therefore, that the unity of opposites, on which Hegel's philosophy rests, will permit a man to confuse affirmation with negation. The abandonment of property is an act of will whose content is the loosening of the thing from the will.

The negative is in general dialectically higher, because more complex, than the simple affirmation prior to negation ; and it provides a transition to a higher positive within which the negative itself is only a moment. Thus it is through the

voluntary surrender of property that the dialectic rises from property to the next category of right, viz. contract. Property, taken by itself, is the most abstract phase ; it states explicitly only the relation of the individual will to a particular thing. But we have seen that this relationship is conditioned by a rational community, and involves the recognition of one will by others. In contract this context begins to appear : each individual recognizes the right of the other contracting individual, and a common will is established.

Contract involves the agreement of two individual wills regarding the disposal of property : it requires the express consent of each, and thus renders explicit the recognition of each will by the other, which abstract right involves, but which is merely latent in the notion of property itself. ' It is the process which expresses and mediates the contradiction that the ego is, and continues to be, an independent and exclusive owner of property only by identifying his will with that of another and ceasing to be an owner.'¹

In discussing the logical problem of the nature of concrete thought and the concrete shape which that problem takes in rational attitude of a philosophic science, we saw that a genuine system involves a subordination and negation of the abstract particular, and its reinstatement as the vehicle or moment of a principle. On this ground we distinguished slavery from the rational community, since in slavery the supreme will, which functioned as the universal, was not the true principle of a system, but merely a particular will arbitrarily extended over another person. In contract the negation of the particular is found on both sides of the relation ; for both wills recognize each other, and give supremacy to their free agreement. But the negative element goes deeper than this : property passes from one person to another, and in his abandonment of a thing as his property the previous owner affirms the continuance of the general principle or universal. In the complete form of contract, where exchange takes place, the relationship implies ' that each, in accordance with the common will of both, ceases to be an owner, and yet is and continues to be one. It is the mediation of the will to give up an individual possession and the will to take property which is another's : it operates within a whole where the

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 72.

purpose of the one can be carried out only in so far as that of the other is present.'¹

Hegel draws a distinction between formal and real contract ; the former being an imperfect phase where the elements of the complete relationship are divided between the contracting individuals and do not apply in the same way to both. Contract is formal when one person surrenders property and the other gains it, and no exchange takes place. In general it may be called gift. Real contract is an exchange where each surrenders a possession and obtains one of equal value. When we remember that value is the universal aspect of property we see that 'In real contract each retains the same property with which he begins and which he at the same time gives up ; and this which remains the same is the essential property in the contract in distinction from the individual things which change their owners.'² When a contract is intended to be real and not formal, right is infringed by any glaring discrepancy in the value of the things exchanged, and a code of law should provide some relief in such instances.

In simple cases the objects of contract are exchanged at one and the same time ; but in other cases they do not coincide and a distinction must be drawn, based on that between mere possession and property. The question which arises is, When does a contract become binding ? Is A bound by his agreement with B, or may he wait until B fulfils his part ? Hegel decides that the contract is constituted by the agreement. The essence of contract, as of property, lies in the will, and the right of property passes from A to B whenever the agreement is made. Although the object remain in A's possession for a time it is no longer his property, for he has taken his private will out of it, and recognized it as belonging to another individual. When contract and fulfilment fall apart in time, the agreement may be given some separate form, and this constitutes a stipulation. The stipulation is the substance of the contract, for it contains the aspect of will.

On these lines Hegel distinguishes a promise from a contract. Contract is an actual transaction, and in it the right of property changes hands. A promise is a statement of a future intention, a subjective determination of the will which may alter. It may be asked, then, Why is one not

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 74.

² *Ibid.* § 77.

entitled to change one's mind regarding a contract, particularly in the case where the fulfilment is a future event? We have seen that contract is the constitution of a common will by different individuals; one's private will becomes the member of a system—though but an abstract one—and is subordinated to it. The common will has thus a higher right than the private will it sublates and cannot be cancelled by the latter. It can be counteracted only by another agreement of like character with it, in which both wills partake. In a promise this common will governing both sides is lacking, and its fulfilment remains a matter of individual consistency and honour.

When a contract and its fulfilment fall apart in time, the future realization may be anticipated by a security. The security is a provision whereby the value agreed upon may be realized in one form if another breaks down; and by placing it in the hands of the other contracting individual I give him immediate possession of his property on its universal side, viz. value.

The philosophic classification of contracts should not be based on external features, relative, e. g., to the peculiarities of some system of administration, but should rest on distinctions in the nature of contract itself, viz., those between formal and real contract, between property and possession, and between value and the specific thing. It should begin with the least developed and pass to the most fully developed and articulated form. Moreover, it should include only what belongs properly to the realm of contract. Promises have no place in it, nor has bequest; for in bequest the property does not pass from the donor until his death—when he is no longer owner. The whole subject of inheritance is bound up with the nature of the family: and the validity of claims to succession depends on civil society and the enactments of positive law. Bequest, therefore, involves more concrete considerations than those of abstract right, and should not be included here. Hegel's classification may be stated without further comment.

A. Gift; comprising (1) gift proper, (2) loan without interest, (3) the free grant of service.

B. Exchange; comprising (1) exchange proper either as (a) barter or (b) sale, (2) rent either (a) of a specific thing or (b) of money—loan at interest, (3) wages for service.

C. Contracts involving a security or pledge.

Contract applies only to property in the strict sense, i. e., to things in which I may place my will and from which I can withdraw it. Thus it involves an element of caprice and contingency. On this ground ethical institutions like the family and the state are not constituted by contract. They are themselves more concrete relationships than contract, and are the framework within which contract is possible. The express consent of the individual is a superficial aspect of the state, and one is not free to withdraw from it by refusing to sign a covenant. In contract the identity of wills takes shape only as a contingent agreement; it is not a true universal, but only a common element: but in the state—as in any ethical institution—the identity goes deeper, the private element is more thoroughly dependent on the universal, which expressly constitutes the substance of the former.

Since contract is an abstract relation depending on the casual correspondence of two independent wills, it involves the possibility that the common will and the private will diverge from one another. Individuals may disagree as to the terms of a contract, and one may refuse to carry out his side of the bargain. The next step in the dialectic is that in which right includes this possibility within its content, and thus rises above its first immediacy and contingency. This is the highest stage of abstract right, and through it the dialectic passes into the sphere of morality. Although it is properly a stage of abstract right, it is too important to be treated at the end of a chapter, and must be discussed by itself.

CHAPTER VII

WRONG AND PUNISHMENT

THE abstract principle of property is an immediate expression of the will, and it does not contain in itself the manifold conditions which determine the nature and extent of property in special cases. In contract the universality of the will manifests itself as the agreement of two individuals ; and the superiority of the universal aspect, the identity of will, is explicitly recognized. But the elements of mind have not yet been brought into a true rational form. The agreement established in a contract is artificial ; for each person retains his full individuality, and the special content of the agreement is binding on him not because it springs inevitably from the inner nature of reason but simply because of his choice and assent. Moreover, when an identity of wills is constituted by a contract the universal is still partial ; for the fulfilment of the agreement remains in the hands of the individuals, it is only required and not performed by the agreement itself. Now, it may seem that the next category of the dialectic should be one in which the universal incorporates and idealizes the particular in a more genuine way ; and the supposition is not incorrect. But at the same time one must not forget that the concreteness of the higher stages depends on the thorough development of the negative aspect of the datum, and that one must take into account the full depth of opposition of which the will is capable before a true unity of opposites can be attained. Accordingly contract is succeeded in the dialectic of objective mind, not by some category of the common life in which society is recognized as the substance of every person, but by a principle in which the contingency of abstract right comes to its highest point and the immediacy of the realm is exhausted. The climax of this section of objective mind is a category in which the universal and the particular aspects of will fall apart and oppose one another ; this is the principle of wrong.

At first sight it seems paradoxical to include wrong under abstract right ; one may argue that wrong is the negation of abstract right as a whole, and ought to form a capital division by itself, the negative moment of the dialectic triad. But the paradox is apparent rather than real. We shall see later with what content Hegel fills the second main division of objective mind, and need not discuss it here ; it is enough to say that wrong, according to Hegel's treatment of it at this stage, is not an absolute negation of abstract right. Indeed, the positive and substantial character of right is more explicit in wrong than in the category of contract, for right appears no longer as an artificial or posited universal, but as the fundamental aspect of the will. At first sight this may seem only to apply to the first form of wrong, naïve or unintentional wrong, and to be a forced interpretation of fraud and crime. Doubtless, it may be said, the universal aspect, right as such, is involved in these latter forms, for without a reference to the positive their negative shape would be meaningless ; but surely it is of the essence of fraud that right is converted into a mere appearance, and does not crime overtly depose it and deny its substantiality ? This objection is plausible, for right is subordinated by wrongful action ; but there is more to be said. Both fraud and crime recognize right, and what they endeavour to cancel is explicitly the universal and substantial element of the rational will. They go deeper than mere contract does, for they admit a universal whose being is rooted in something more profound than the accidental agreement of particular wills. And hence, in spite of their defiance of it, they contain the principle of right in a more adequate shape than has appeared hitherto. Further, Hegel includes punishment as an element in their conception ; that is to say, he refuses to treat them as substantial and self-complete forms. The negation and subordination of right by the will is intrinsically a failure ; it is a self-contradiction which demands to be sublated. Crime and punishment constitute a single category, whose nature is primarily positive, and in which the fullest difference and disunion of which abstract right is capable is held in suspension and is overcome. This will be made clearer in the sequel.

Perhaps it is advisable to repeat a warning given above. The connexion we have traced between contract and wrong

is one of categories, not of processes. The elements of thought involved in the notion of contract pass inevitably into the notion of wrong and are remodelled there; but an actual contract does not necessarily become a wrongful act. Even when the dialectic order is repeated in the sequences of history, actual processes must not be confused with conceptual elements. Thus, for example, many contracts were probably made before any one began to cheat, and right must have been in some measure established before it was violated; but this logical necessity, although it controls facts in time, is in no sense a compulsion driving any one who has hitherto done justly forthwith to lead a wicked life. The reflection of the dialectic in history is misunderstood if it is interpreted in any such fashion. Space does not permit a discussion of the topic here, and a full exposition of Hegel's view would lead us beyond the confines of ethical philosophy. But it should be clear that any actual process of human life, although it may be explicitly or self-consciously identified with one philosophic category rather than another, nevertheless is implicitly, or in the last resort, greater than it appears to be. It is more complex, more concrete, than any of its explicit constitutive universals, and has features which do not apply to the logical interconnexion of categories themselves. Logic does apply to the practical life, just as number applies to things which we can count; but the relations of logical principles are as apt to differ from the relations of events to one another as are the relations of numbers to differ from the relations of the things counted. In this sense Hegel insists that in history logical relations are embodied in an external medium and are not found in their purity.

We may now consider the subdivisions of wrong. These are three in number: viz. naïve or non-malicious wrong, fraud, and crime. In the first of these three the agent has no intention of infringing right, he admits that whatever is right should be done, and he errs only in mistaking the actual positive content of right. Two men lay claim to ownership of the same thing, each adducing grounds for his claim and believing that right is on his side. Each seeks to exclude the private will of the other person from the thing, but recognizes and respects the validity and supremacy of the universal. The forms of wrong are comparable to logical

judgements. 'This first form of wrong negates only the particular will, and yields respect to the universal right; it is, therefore, the least form of wrong. If I say that a rose is not red, I still recognize that it has colour; I do not deny the kind, but only the particular, red. Similarly, right is recognized here; each person wills the right and seeks to do it alone; his wrong consists in holding that what he wills is right.'¹

Fraud is the second form of wrong. In naïve wrong intrinsic right is recognized as the basis and substance of the will, but there is a discrepancy between the principle and its realization. The universal thus appears as something which ought to be realized, but which may be thwarted and refused. Fraud carries this a step farther. It degrades right, the true substance of the will, to the level of a means, and uses the appearance of right to satisfy an unrightful individual end. Fraud, thus, is an apparently positive form of right, which at the same time violates right by treating right, not as the essence, but as non-essential. Its attitude contrasts with that of non-malicious wrong. The latter respects the universal and infringes the particular: the former respects the particular, 'since the person against whom the fraud is committed is led to believe that right is done to him', and infringes the universal, for 'the right which is demanded is posited as a mere subjective appearance'. Fraud is a parasite. It draws its substance from right and is achieved only by explicitly acknowledging right; but it also denies right and makes it of no effect. Hegel compares fraud to an infinite judgement, wearing a positive form, but expressing only a tautology. The predicate of a positive judgement ought to be a universal including and characterizing the subject; but the positive infinite judgement, A is A, simply repeats the subject in the predicate and qualifies it by itself. It overtly asserts a particular, but reduces the judgement to nonsense by covertly excluding all objective significance. Hence, one might argue that to stand by the letter of the law against its spirit is fraudulent; for in the last resort it is indistinguishable from the deceit of the coiner, who gives one an object with a few superficial and particular qualities of money, but lacking its true nature and value.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 86 note.

The third form of wrong is crime. Crime attacks both the universal and the particular sides of right, and it leaves its victim with neither the substance nor the shadow of what is his due. It is action done against right both in its objective and subjective being. Since fraud gains the assent of the person deceived, it has no need of violence; the sufferer co-operates unwittingly in his own undoing. Crime, however, attacks the will of another in all its aspects and exercises force. It is a negative infinite judgement, and invades not merely this or that possession but the right of the person in general.¹

At this point the question arises, How is it possible to offer violence to the free will? In one sense it is not possible, for mind is not a thing to be pushed about or held in the hands; it must enter into the field of externality and be bound there if it is to suffer compulsion from others. There are two ways in which freedom may assert itself. On the one hand it may retire into its own inward recesses, rejecting everything distinguishable from its inner principle as alien, and look upon the lot and chances of the world with the indifference of Stoic apathy. This is an abstract freedom unworthy of mind. But there is another method. The outward fact and power may be accepted, mind may put itself in the thing and be constrained there. But it may refuse to regard the limit as final, and may place itself beyond it. In one way or another it may take possession of its opposite, idealizing the latter and building it into the edifice of its own life. Every form of mind has a different way of attempting this; we shall see shortly how it is accomplished by abstract right.

Before stating the way in which freedom restores itself in and through any violence done to it, we may look at the nature of violence in so far as it comes within the view of right. 'Since the will is "idea" or really free only in so far as it has a definite mode, and since the definite mode in which it has laid itself is the being of freedom, force or violence directly destroys itself; for it is the externalization of a will that cancels the externalization or definite mode of a will.'² Crime is the act of a free man; it cannot be imputed to the unthinking object or animal; it implies a will and a rational

¹ *Ibid.* § 95; *Encyclopaedia*, § 173; and *WW. V.* p. 90.

² *Ibid.* § 92.

nature of one piece with the rational principle of all minds. We may leave this statement without further explanation at present, for the nature of responsibility will come before us in the next two chapters. Crime is the act of a self-conscious being whose essence is a universal will. But the act itself denies the basal principle of all objective will, viz. right ; and the rational agent conducts himself as if will were nowhere to be found but in his private being, as if there were nothing but dead things in the world. By thus attacking other wills he attacks his own. Men are distinct from one another as regards their special qualities and conditions in life, but this distinction does not penetrate to their fundamental character. Every man is free in essence, and only in virtue of his inherent freedom and his capacity of rights is he a man at all. Right is not a private possession, it is not divided into parts, but is whole in every member ; and to touch it anywhere is to touch it throughout.¹ Thus the notion of crime contradicts itself : it cancels that in virtue of which it is, and is therefore intrinsically unreal.

This does not mean that the criminal act does not exist, for existence is not the same thing as reality. The foulest blemish is somewhat, and may taint much air in this world : but it is not real in the truest sense of the word. It is a mere semblance, a fragment ; it reflects borrowed light, and it exists at all only because there is something beyond it. Right is the substance of wrong, and if wrong could destroy right it would destroy itself. This is not altogether a new doctrine. ' What shall we say then ? Is the law sin ? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law.' ' For I was alive without the law once : but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died.' Wrong would not be wrong if it were final : it is wrong because right is in it as its truth and as the universal of which it is an embodiment. In crime abstract right is strained to the uttermost, but it is not broken : if it were to break there would be no strain.

Crime is a form of right that violates the very principle of right : how does right—or what is the same thing, freedom—maintain or restore itself in face of wrong ? The answer in brief is, by punishment. The crime is an act, a positive existent in the external world, but it is self-contradictory,

¹ V. *WW*. XVIII. pp. 33-4.

suicidal if you will, and therefore intrinsically void. 'The demonstration of its nullity is also an actual process annulling the injury. Right, thus, has reality as a necessity which mediates itself with itself by sublating the injury to it.'¹ Punishment is a realization of right, a process whereby the inherent nature of mind, as 'idea', works itself out by cancelling and overcoming the false form. 'Abstract right is a right to coerce, since wrong is a violation of the outward mode of freedom in an external thing; the maintenance of this mode against the force is itself an external act and a force sublating that first one.'²

According to Hegel, wrong and its recompense constitute a single whole, they are not externally added to one another, but are members of one body, elements of a single notion. This distinguishes his view from many others. Many theories of punishment regard it as a means to some finite end distinct from right itself. Sometimes the deterrent effect of punishment is set up as its cardinal purpose, and sometimes the reformation of the offender. Men shrink in cold blood from the barbarism of inflicting injury on the guilty person, and denounce any appearance of retribution as a relic of primeval savagery when lust and passion were uncontrolled by reason. We should not give way to passion, they say, but should punish only because it is useful for some beneficent end. To such thinkers Hegel must seem the greatest of all reactionaries, even less excusable than his distant predecessor Plato. But before we condemn Hegel—and Plato—let us take another glance at his view. What is his objection to our more humane theories? Briefly this: they forget that man is a rational being. The first point to note is that these theories, which we may distinguish as the deterrent and the reformatory, look on punishment as an evil. It is an injury done to some one; in itself, therefore, it is bad, and it is to be dispensed with in so far as the end we seek will permit. We shall return to this point. The deterrent theory regards punishment as a threat, and it may lay emphasis either on the individual or on society. In the first case it holds that the justice of punishment depends on the previous knowledge which the agent had of the threat; in the second it justifies punishment, even when he was unaware of the penalty, on the ground

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 97.

² *Ibid.* § 94.

that it acts as a threat to others. But Hegel asks if the threat itself can be justified. 'It treats man as if he were not free, and seeks to compel him by the representation of an evil. But right and justice have their seat in freedom and the will, and not in the absence of freedom which is made use of by the menace. When such a ground is alleged for punishment, man is considered, not in his dignity and freedom, but like a dog over which a stick is raised.'¹ Punishment based solely on such a ground would itself be a wrong, for it would not respect personality as such.

The reformatory theory may seem to escape this criticism, for it holds the end of punishment to be the development of the full and rounded life that is thwarted and cramped in the criminal in his unregenerate state. But this theory is defective also, and in the same way. It admits the potential rationality and freedom of the criminal, but it treats its realization merely as a future event. The wrongdoer, it says, is at present only a beast: by our punishment we will make him a man. But this view overlooks the fundamental consideration: a beast cannot do wrong, and without the law there is no sin. Crime, then, is nothing but an obnoxious act, and the criminal is subjected to an elaborate punishment, and not destroyed out of hand, simply because it is possible to make him a pleasant and agreeable addition to society. Thus the connexion between crime and punishment is broken altogether. There is no clear reason why men who happen to do wrong should be the only ones to undergo compulsory reformation; any undeveloped person should be punished if he is capable of higher things. The actual commission of crime is only a clumsy mark to indicate some people who would be the better of reformatory treatment.

Hegel believes that punishment goes deeper into the nature of man than this, and is a stern expression of his inherent rationality. Prevention and reformation are excellent things, and are of the utmost importance when the question of punishment is in question, but they do not explain the meaning of punishment in its ultimate terms. Punishment is not fundamentally an evil, it is the cancelling of an evil, the negation of a negation, and hence the restoration of the positive principle of right. Punishment is just, not because

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 99 note.

it is useful for something else, though that may be a worthy quality, but because it is the assertion of justice itself, a second act by which right annuls wrong. Hegel agrees with Plato that punishment is the criminal's own right. It is desirable that the wrongdoer himself should assent to the justice of the punishment, but even when a definite agreement is lacking, the punishment expresses the ultimate nature of his will. By his offence he has manifested his participation in the identical constitutive principle of every will, and punishment is the return of his own inherent nature upon him.

The nature of punishment is sometimes developed in a slightly different way by writers who draw much of their inspiration from Hegel himself. They admit his criticism of the views that single out some specific aspect of punishment and set it up as an external end. The purpose and significance of punishment, they insist, is the concrete universal, of which these special ends are in truth moments; hence retribution, prevention, and reformation are inseparable aspects of the true notion. This view, so far as it goes, is consistent with Hegel and brings out much of his meaning; but it leaves aside a consideration which he emphasizes. It treats the three moments as if they were parallel and coequal aspects, each manifesting one side of the rounded whole. Hegel expresses himself otherwise. Retribution is not one aspect among others to be balanced against them; it is itself the notion of the whole, a principle within which the other aspects are contained. Hegel is treating punishment here from the standpoint of abstract right, and of course the principle becomes more concrete when it is articulated within the context of organized society. But the further aspects which appear in this more concrete realm are not new principles externally added from another source, and are not to be balanced against the original one. They are modifications and developments of the fundamental principle itself. Just as the state is not a complex of right plus other considerations, but is the development of right itself, the true mode of right; so the concrete view of punishment as it exists within the state is the realization of the abstract principle of requital. The reformation which punishment should bring about is not an addition to the first principle, but is rooted in the latter; it is the assertion of the criminal's own intrinsic

will regarded from a special angle. So, too, punishment deters because of the identity in substance of all individual wills, and its particular modes are developments which punishment undergoes when the right it asserts and restores is no longer abstract, but is articulated into the law of an organized state. There is no need to find a further principle to explain the system within which retribution, reformation, and prevention fall. The idea of retribution is itself the notion of which that system is the 'idea'.

This inherent rationality, however, does not always achieve perfect expression in outward processes. Revenge is the first mode of punishment, 'and it is just in its content in so far as it is retributive'. But it is an imperfect mode of right because in its form it is a particular act of a subjective will, a contingent mode of justice, which appears to the other person as a new injury. Genuine punishment is the development of the crime, the other half that is presupposed in it; but when its performance is a matter of individual concern it becomes bound up with many particular motives and conditions, which cover over the objective content and hide its justice. The act of revenge is thus not only a requital but also a fresh wrong. In its turn it begets revenge, and the attempt to fulfil right leads to an endless series, or one that ends only by accident. Right demands some more perfect mode than this, and it can be realized in its truth only by an established court where the will of the judge is merely the medium of the law and does not taint the latter by any subjective elements.

The discussion of the realization of punishment in society goes beyond the range of abstract right and involves considerations more concrete than this realm affords. We may note, however, that Hegel indicates a stage between private revenge and the judgement of society expressed in an authoritative tribunal. In primitive society there arise men who coerce their neighbours—heroes we call them—and force the rudiments of law and order on the people around them. These acts, Hegel says, are just in spite of their violence, for they are directed against inadequate and unrationalized forms of will. The natural will is itself an offence against freedom, and constraint offered to it is a second act of violence negating the first. 'Mere goodness is impotent against the power of

nature, and the violence of heroes is justified as embodying the higher right of the "idea" over the natural.'¹ But although the aim of the hero is right, necessary, and consistent with society, he carries it out as if it were his own affair: he belongs to uncivilized life, and is not so truly free as the good citizen of a rational and well-organized state.

Punishment is not required for naïve or non-malicious wrong. In this form the principle of right is not attacked in itself, and is infringed only in a particular shape explicitly distinguished from the universal. In the state this wrong is righted by a civil action that decides which particular is to be subsumed under right; and when this is done there is no further need to vindicate right, for as a universal it has not been in question. Both fraud and crime require punishment. The wrong is an outward act which leaves things in an altered state, and they cannot be restored to their former condition; right is not satisfied, for example, by the simple restitution of stolen goods. Over and above the particular side, the attack on the universal has to be taken into account, and so punishment is an act which invades and infringes the distorted will. Since the fundamental aspect is the universal, the principle of punishment does not require a point for point correspondence of the punishment and the crime. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is the maxim of a very imperfect thought which sees no other way of constituting a universal than that of summing particulars. The equivalence of the wrong and its undoing is one of value, not of detailed quality, and the law recognizes this principle when it grants compensation for injury and punishes by fine and imprisonment.

Philosophy, however, cannot lay down any code of rules whereby appropriate punishments are to be determined. Actions in space and time are endlessly concrete, and must be considered in all their special context. But there is one point on which the general principle can provide a decision. There is a distinction between crimes 'which attack the entire manifestation of the will in the infinity of its notion, as e. g. murder, slavery, religious compulsion, &c., and those whose injury is limited in quality and extent'.² The extreme penalty is not equitably exacted in cases which do not destroy personality in its full range, but cancel only some of its

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 93 note.

² *Ibid.* § 96.

alienable expressions. Murder, however, destroys the life, and 'since the life is the full compass of a man's existence, the punishment must take away not a value, for none is great enough, but the life itself'.¹ Although Hegel does not say so, there seems to be no reason why the extreme penalty must be regarded as the death sentence: penal servitude for life, outlawry, or any other form of the total loss of rights, is an equivalent of the death penalty; it is death so far as the rights of the person are concerned.

This analysis of wrong and punishment throws some light on Hegel's general philosophy by illustrating and exemplifying the position and function of the negative element in mind. Two points may be mentioned. Hegel's theory here supports his wider contention that the sublation of the negative does not produce a merely positive result. Wrong—and in general the imperfect and finite—is a false appearance, a contradiction, an unreality: but this does not mean that it is in truth nothing at all. Hegel has sometimes been interpreted as holding that evil is due merely to a defect in our vision; in itself the universe is wholly good and does not contain any evil. And naturally the view has been subjected to severe criticism. It does not explain how the illusion of evil is possible. Further, by excluding evil from the absolute it renders the latter finite; for although evil is not a final reality it is somewhat, and the world of so-called unreal appearances stands over against the absolute, limiting it and marring its comprehensiveness. Such a view is inadequate, and ends in dualism. It presents us on the one hand with a perfect world—probably conceived statically—containing all good and nothing but good; and on the other with a world of appearances, either wholly unreal, or participating in some mysterious way in the perfect world. Commerce between these worlds is by the hypothesis an impossibility, and yet human interest is divided between them and cannot afford to give up either. Life demands a goal, an aim of some sort, a criterion of action, and an assurance that its journey is not a vain chase of a will o' the wisp. On the other hand, life must have imperfection within it; for progress implies imperfection, and in our lives at least progress is of cardinal importance. If the ethical ideal is as broad as life itself, if

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 101 note.

it is in any sense a goal for human beings, it must comprise and explain all sides of conduct ; it must not be an abstraction consisting of satisfactions without their conditions, the agreeable elements of experience stolen from their context and externally combined by the imagination. The charge generally brought against the philosophies of Plato and Spinoza is that they separate the higher and the lower, and do not make the inclusion of the latter in the former an intelligible conception. Spinoza, in particular, is accused of cutting the knot, and contenting himself with the denial of the reality of the imperfect.

Now, whatever be the truth of this criticism with respect to Plato and Spinoza, it is clearly unfair with regard to Hegel. It is true that for Hegel evil is an untruth, and certain passages can be quoted from him in which he insists that it is an appearance and denies its finality. But these passages should not be isolated, and ought to be read in the light of his whole argument. No interpretation does justice to his view if it omits either the finality of the positive aspect of the whole or the existence of evil. We have seen that wrong is a necessary category through which the dialectic must pass in order to reach the concrete ethical sphere, and the result of the dialectic is not indifferent to its process. Moreover, the right that is restored by punishment is not sheerly identical with that previous to wrong ; it is a richer principle, more complex and concrete, and more adequate to itself. The second act of violence sublates the first, but it does not turn the hands of time back and restore naïve innocence. Vindicated right is greater than right that has not been tried and has not proved itself ; for it has met its opposite and overcome it, and made explicit what is merely inherent in the abstract notion. I do not see how this view can be charged with failing to include the lower in the higher. If mastery is not mere annihilation, and if the whole is positive only because it is the negation of a negation, surely it is only perversity to imagine that an abstraction, wrongfulness, remains outside the restored right. When wrong becomes a moment of good it does not itself become merely good any more than a brick in a wall becomes merely a wall, or a citizen in the state becomes himself a little state. There is a radical fallacy in attributing *simpliciter* the characteristics of a whole to

its terms, and this applies even to the 'idea'. The new soul that is infused into things evil uses their very wrongfulness as a moment in itself; for mind is a unity of opposites, and comes to its truth only because of the distinction between it and its opposite.

This leads us to the second point. By punishment right transcends wrong, but the whole which is thus created is not an indifferent third thing beyond right and wrong, a neutrum in which each cancels the other. We have seen that the notion of right develops of necessity into wrong, and also that wrong depends for its being and significance on right, but this mutual implication does not set the terms on a level. Hegel's position is that the one term, right, has supremacy, and over-reaches the other. Wrong is a contradiction, an imperfect and unstable appearance: right is the completion, the substantive whole. Thus it is true that wrong is cancelled by right; it is preserved by being negated and by having its private character used to maintain the very principle it resists. If one were to omit punishment from the conception, wrong would remain quasi-substantive, and right would be suspended in it as a negated element. But thought cannot rest here; for the element thus negated is the substance itself, and in being negated carries with it the negation of the particular evil will itself. Wrong is inherently a subordinate aspect, and is enclosed by right at either end; right is both the notion it presupposes and the 'idea' into which it develops. Hegel's logical theory does not permit one to assume that dependence is all of one kind. Wrong is broken by its dependence on right, and is negated when the implication is made clear; but right is intensified and made more complete by its development, for its true nature is explicitly to overwhelm and master wrong. Mastery and subordination are both forms of implication, but they are not equivalent for all that.

The limitation of the scope of this treatment of the 'problem of evil' should be carefully noted. (i) Evil is considered here only in the form of wrong; other modes of it belong to more concrete realms of life and must be explained there. (ii) The analysis of notions is not an historical explanation. Hegel does not say here that in every historical case wrong is punished as it ought to be: he analyses the stages whereby

life makes itself rational and coherent ; and the conclusion to be drawn is not that any historical event is in its limited compass a perfect mode of justice, but that if it distorts a category of right it is not just, and although it exists it is neither rational nor ultimately real. (iii) The question is not raised in the form, Why does evil exist? Hegel tells us what he understands evil to be, and what its relation is to its relevant context. But he refuses to consider the hypothesis that goodness is out of all relation to evil, and yet should explain the latter. He has tried to show that naïve right as primitive innocence is not adequate to itself ; it is not fully right, and any further request for a 'deduction' of wrong seems to him to be the meaningless question, Why is the ultimate nature of the world as it is?

These qualifications of the problem are not on one level. The third is a legitimate refusal to answer self-contradictory questions, but the first two indicate limitations in the capacity of abstract right to solve the problem as a whole. Evil will appear in a further shape in the moral consciousness, and we shall comment on it there, but it has still other forms that cannot be resolved by the categories of objective mind. And in particular the problems that arise concerning the positive relation of historical explanation and ethical justification carry us beyond objective mind altogether.

We have now reached the end of the sphere of abstract right. The principle has been developed as far as it will go in the realm of naïve objectivity, and we must consider the development of the other moment, the subjective aspect of the ethical whole. This we shall begin in the next chapter, where we pass to the realm of morality.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY

THE second main division of right is called morality, and it presents to us a distinct standpoint and set of categories. Hegel's view of the nature of the moral consciousness is of importance for his general philosophy, and we must consider it rather closely. There are three main sources from which we may gain information here: the *Phenomenology*, the *Encyclopædia*, and the *Philosophy of Right*. The two latter present to us the constitutive principles of the moral world, indicating what kind of realization mind has through them and in what way the dialectic is forced beyond them.¹ The *Phenomenology* deals with the actual organization of the moral world, and with the structure of the moral consciousness as a phenomenon. In this chapter I intend to state the constitutive principles themselves, basing almost entirely on the *Philosophy of Right*; in the next chapter the attempt to construe the world by their means will be considered, and Hegel's criticism stated of the reality and coherence of the moral self and its content. To that end the negative aspects of the dialectic in the *Philosophy of Right* (and the *Encyclopædia*) will be combined with the main contentions of the relevant portions of the *Phenomenology*.

In the first place we may consider the dialectical transition from abstract right to morality. In the former sphere we found a series of categories which play an important part in organizing the content of the rational will. They are the constitutive principles which are explicit to the naïve consciousness. But it is evident that they are not sufficient to determine the entire rational character of the world with which we have to do in action; they are formal and abstract,

¹ For a criticism of Hegel's account of morality v. Rosenkranz, *Erläuterungen zu Hegel's Encyclopädie*, pp. 95-102, and *Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph*, pp. 155 ff.; also Lasson's introduction to his edition of the *Philosophy of Right*, p. xxvii ff.

and expose to us only the barest outline of the features of practical life. They are conditions without which an organized rational life is not possible, but they are not the sole conditions. In morality we make a regress on another set of transcendental principles which are implied in those of abstract right. It may be useful, at the risk of some repetition, to compare Hegel's procedure here—and in general—with that of Kant in the earlier part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the Aesthetic and Analytic of that Critique we have exposed to us a succession of principles which make experience possible. Kant tells us at first that the manifold of sense must be received in the sensible forms of space and time, and at this stage he speaks as if the object of knowledge were given to the mind completely determined except in these two respects. But in the Analytic we are shown that there are other conditions presupposed in the reception of the sensible data in space and time; a mind which had only these forms could not have even these. The constant rain of impressions which pours on inner sense must be held together, if it is to constitute an intelligible object, by a single act of apprehension; the various elements must be 'run over and held together by the mind', and the activity which fulfils this condition is called the 'synthesis of apprehension in perception'. The next transcendental condition is entitled the 'synthesis of reproduction in imagination'. In effect Kant asks the question, How is it possible for the mind to hold the various determinations of sense together? And the answer he gives is that former impressions of sense must be reproduced by the mind along with present ones. 'If the earlier determinations . . . were to drop out of my consciousness, and could not be reproduced when I passed on to later ones, I should never be conscious of a whole; and hence not even the simplest and most elementary idea of space or time could arise in my consciousness.'¹ That is to say, reproduction in imagination is a condition of the possibility of the synthesis of apprehension, which in turn is a condition of the perception of the manifold in the forms of space and time. In the next place, Kant discovers that reproduction in imagination itself has conditions. The reproduction must be orderly,

¹ WW. III, Hartenstein's edition, p. 569; Watson's *Selections*, p. 59.

and it must proceed in accordance with rules. 'There can be no knowledge', he says, 'without a conception, however indefinite or obscure it may be, and a conception is in form always a universal which serves as a rule.'¹ Behind the transcendental conceptions lies the supreme unity of reference, the single self or 'transcendental unity of apperception'; and it is a necessary condition of the other transcendental forms. The point to be emphasized here is this. These transcendental principles of knowledge form a series, each member of which conditions that which goes before it. They are not merely separate rules, which when added together make objects possible; they are rather developments of one another, each stating a condition involved in the possibility of the previous one.

Hegel's dialectic shows this same feature.² The first principles of knowledge are statements of the barest and widest conditions which must be fulfilled by any object, and the higher categories are further conditions necessary to the satisfaction of the former ones. In some ways the progress of the dialectic obscures this fact. The earlier categories are said to be negated, merged, or sublated; and one is apt to say that the higher principles are substituted for the former ones. But this is only one side of the truth. The lower categories are set aside only because of their abstractness; and although they are inadequate they are true so far as they go. In the 'idea' these principles are preserved. They are modified, it is true—transformed and transmuted, if one likes, but we must not let the metaphor mislead us. They are not merely turned into something other than themselves; but remain ingredients in true knowledge of the whole, although they are supplemented and placed in due subordination. Being is the lowest of all categories, and the most inadequate to express the nature of any concrete reality: nevertheless it is true of everything. 'All knowledge, mediate or immediate, and in general everything else, at least is; and that it is, is the least and most abstract thing that we can say of anything.'³ I do not see how any view which sets transformation against preservation

¹ *WW*. III, Hartenstein's edition, p. 571; Watson, p. 61.

² For Fichte's view of his own procedure v. *WW*. I. p. 446. It is irrelevant to the argument of the text whether Kant was fully aware or not of the dialectic form of his exposition.

³ Hegel, *WW*. XII. p. 314.

as an exclusive opposite is to be reconciled with Hegel's doctrine of the notion and the 'idea', which is the proper standpoint of the interpretation of the dialectic. If we examine any content we see that it has being only because it has more ; in order to be it must be a definite being ; and so on. There is no reason why this should not apply even to error and evil. If evil is a subordinate principle, then the universe can be called bad only because it is finally good ; and its goodness works in and through the imperfection. But further discussion of this would take us too far afield at present.

Hegel's position, however, goes further than that of Kant. Kant's transcendental principles are separate from one another ; their co-operation in the constitution of an object of knowledge is a quasi-mechanical one. But in Hegel's dialectic the lower categories do not remain outside their successors in the series. The higher category carries up the lower, preserves it, and contains it as an element. In order to avoid confusion, we have to remember that we are discussing bare categories here, and not concrete objects constituted by them. It is not meant that, e. g., an existent called 'definite being' contains another particular existent called 'being' : the point is merely that the category 'definite being' contains the category 'being' as a moment. This conception of the relation of the categories is required by the doctrine of the notion. The notion is at first the bare principle of a sphere, it gives itself concreteness by developing a series of determinations from within, and finally articulates itself into a whole system. Each successive category is the principle itself taken at a certain level of concreteness ; it is a development of the notion by itself, and not a mere addition to it. The whole is active as the notion ; and while it transforms each category of the dialectic as it passes beyond it, it also carries forward and preserves all that is in the less adequate forms.

We may now consider the special transition from abstract right to morality in the light of these statements. Abstract right exhausts the development of the universal aspect of the ethical universe, when that aspect is considered by itself. In morality we fall back on further conditions which make abstract right itself possible. Mind in the field of abstract right appears as personality ; but we may ask, Is it possible

for a person to exist who is not something more than a person ? Rational activity is possible only for a thinking subject, an individual mind which acts from within, and is more than a mere bearer of rights. We have to recur here to a principle laid down in a previous chapter.¹ There is always more in finite mind than is explicit to that mind itself : consciousness, e. g., would not be possible if self-consciousness were not actually present ; for apart from the identity of the single subject no unified world of objects is possible for knowledge. But the subject who apprehends such a world may not reflect on his own identity ; he may be absorbed in the objective world and may abstract from its subjective aspect. It was in this sense that we used the terms implicit and explicit, calling that explicit which was for mind itself, and calling that implicit which was present and operative but which was detected only by us who analyse the mind in question. And we have named the phenomenal appearances of mind in accordance with what was explicit in them. These considerations apply here. The person, as distinct from the subject, is not a being which succeeds in maintaining itself in the world as a mere bearer of rights, without ends or activities ; as a mere person the subject is an abstraction for which purposes are irrelevant, and for which the essence of the situation lies entirely in the principles of abstract right. That is to say, although the person is a phenomenal phase of mind in the sense we have indicated, it is nevertheless an abstraction. Every rational being is a thinking and willing subject, with private ends and inclinations, and infused with the universal principle of all ethical life. Morality is a point of view at which principles constitutive of the person, but merely implicit in his consciousness, become explicit to the agent himself. Thus the dialectic takes a forward step in morality ; for the explicit or definite mode of mind becomes more adequate to its notion.

What exactly has occurred here ? One part of the answer is, that abstract right has become subjective. We saw in the fifth chapter ² that Hegel distinguishes three moments in the will : the will is universal, particular, and the concrete harmony of the universal and the particular. In abstract right the first of these aspects appears. No doubt it is the realm of

¹ V. e.g. above, p. 103 f.

² V. above, p. 108 ff.

immediacy; but on that very account the intrinsic will is abstractly universal. Mind embodies itself immediately in external things, or in relations springing directly out of these, and the intrinsic will is not recognized as a subjective principle. It remains a vague underlying law, not located anywhere, and constituting the rightful aspect of property, contract, and punishment in an indeterminate fashion. But in morality the supreme principle is the rational nature of the willing subject, and the intrinsic will is recognized by the agent to be ultimately his own will. Right takes shape here not as an aggregate of pieces of property and rights arising from these, but as a realm of active minds. Moreover, each individual mind claims complete autonomy: the only principles recognized are those which appear inwardly to each subject. Thus the particular aspects of will come to light—not, of course, as a group of mere particulars, but as a universal articulated into a variety of instances each of which has the authority of the universal within it. The principle of morality is the explicit self-determination of the will, self-conscious freedom, and all the stress is laid on the inward side, on motive, intention, and responsibility. The law is binding because each subject lays it on himself; and because of its inward character each will is free from all external interference. 'Since man wills to be judged in accordance with his self-determination, he is in this relation free whatever the external features may be. No one can break into this conviction of man within himself, no violence can happen to it, and the moral will, therefore, is inaccessible. The worth of man is estimated in accordance with his inner act, and hence the moral standpoint is that of explicit freedom.'¹

In his account of the transition in the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel traces the continuity in a way which may enable us to see how right is preserved in morality. The categories of abstract right are a gradual development of the nature of freedom. At first the will places itself directly in the external thing; I characterize the object as 'mine' and this predicate is the shape which the free will takes at this stage. In contrast the universal is developed; it is mediated by the will of another, and becomes thereby explicitly universal. Contract, however, is contingent on the agreement of private

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 106 note.

wills, and the next category makes this contingency explicit. In wrong action the inherent will is treated as a mere appearance by the individual; that is to say, it is posited as contingent by a particular will which is also contingent in character. At the standpoint of morality this very contingency takes a central position, and the universal becomes immediately one with the privacy and the particularity of the will.¹ The sanctity which attached to the will in property now inheres in the autonomy of the will itself, and Hegel speaks specifically of the right of purpose, of intention, and of conscience. Just as in abstract right the person has the right to property, so here one has the right to be held responsible only for what one purposes and intends, and to have the moral law within one as conscience. And the very externality and immediacy of abstract right have been carried up as the privacy and individuality of the moral will.

We may introduce the further analysis of the specific principles of the moral world by glancing at Hegel's conception of the nature of mind as the moral subject. Mind, we have seen, is never merely inward; it is always a mode of the 'idea', a notion which has a definite being and embodies itself in the objective world. Objective, however, is an ambiguous word, and Hegel distinguishes three senses of it in the present connexion. In the first place it may mean 'external immediate existence', and the definite being of things as facts. Corresponding to this there is the sense of subjectivity in which the mind claims any objective existent as its own, as belonging to the subjective. Secondly, it may mean the adequacy of anything to its notion; and in this case subjectivity and objectivity coincide. Thirdly, it may mean universality for all rational beings as such; and here also the corresponding sense of subjectivity coincides with it.² These three senses of objectivity are involved in harmony in perfect or absolute mind. The rational self gives itself outward expression in a world of existing things, which are transparent media and organs of the central principle, and constitute a system valid for all rational beings. In morality also these categories are present, but the concrete system of absolute mind has not yet become explicit. 'The phenomenal character or finitude of this sphere is constituted by this,

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, § 104.

² V. *ibid.* § 112.

that these features are separated at the moral standpoint, or are united only in a contradiction ; and the development of this standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their solution, which, however, can be attained only relatively within it.' ¹

Let us look first of all at the presence of the aspects. The moral will expresses itself in action, and it is aware of the action as its own ; the self is an active subject framing its own ideals and purposes. The ideal which a man sets before himself is something which he has given to himself, it cannot be forced into his mind from without, and it has power over him only if he accepts it. That is to say, the will posits its own determinations and is aware of its activity. But, at the same time, it is also aware that a mere ideal is a futility and requires to be carried out in the world. Hence mind is an active principle altering the world, and bringing it into line with the ideals which have arisen in the mind itself. This activity is an inexplicable mystery for all dualistic philosophies, and such doctrines fail to make it credible that mind should ever attempt such an absurdity as action at all. What interest it could have in a world out of all relation to it and how it sets about operating in that world are left unexplained. But for Hegel, as we have seen, mind is not mere self-consciousness ; the world which is over against it is part of its own being, and the antithesis between mind and its object falls within mind itself. If we must use spatial metaphors we ought to say that mind is both one side and the whole. Ideals and purposes arise from felt dissatisfactions ; and the contrast between the demand of the self and the content it gets from the present world is essential to this experience of dissatisfaction. Thus, in the long run, for Hegel the activity by which the self transforms its world is not the manipulation of a foreign material, but the development of the notion of mind into its ' idea '. Mind is not confined to the subjective side of purpose, it is immanent in the satisfaction as well as in the design, and it takes shape as an activity which overlaps and includes external things. This shows us the first two features of those indicated : mind gives itself external existence as action, and its activity sustains and articulates its inherent identity. ' Truth requires that the notion should

¹ *Ibid.*

have being, and that its definite mode should correspond to it. The will in right has its definite mode in an external thing ; but it is further required that the will should contain its definite mode within itself, in an inner medium.' ¹ This is explicit in the moral subject, where mind regards itself as realized in its own processes.

The third feature is also present. In the moral sphere right lies in the universal aspect of the will, in reason ; and reason is of one texture in all rational beings. Thus in spite of the privacy of the supreme principle of morality, and in spite of the self-contained and exclusive character of the moral subject, the principle which has come to light is a universal, formally identical in all men. Thus, when we carry out our individual purposes, we may be said to surrender our immediate and private being. Our actions are performed before the eyes of others who are also rational and moral agents. We give ourselves a definite existence in an order which is common to all rational beings, and hence we have to deal with the well-being of other selves as well as with our own private satisfactions. This seems to be Hegel's meaning in the following statement. ' Since in carrying out my ends I maintain my subjectivity, I thereby sublate its immediacy and individuality in objectifying it. The external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others. The field of the existence of the will is now subjectivity, and the will of others is the other existence which I give to my end. The carrying out of my end thus involves the identity of my will with other wills, and it has a positive relation to the will of others.' ² We exist in a world of actions ; we are concerned not with dead things, but with wills which include things as content. We speak as accurately as metaphor will allow when we say that for abstract right the will is in the thing which it owns, but for morality the thing is in the will as means to an end. This positive relation of wills is lacking in abstract right. Its commands are at bottom prohibitions. Even in contract and wrong the relation between wills is based on caprice, and its rightful aspect consists in not infringing the rights of others : the relation is not seen to be a necessary aspect of activity. In morality, on the other hand, our action exists in an order composed of subjects who with us make up the moral sphere.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 104 note.

² *Ibid.* § 112.

We turn now to the lack of harmony between these aspects. Briefly, the defect springs from the formalism of the moral principle. We have made a regress, as it were, from the level of consciousness to that of self-consciousness ; but we have not taken self-identity concretely. We have brought to light certain fundamental conditions of the ethical universe, but we are not in possession of the further principles by which these are conditioned. That is to say, the categories of morality are a demand which is not yet satisfied. Since morality is a level of explicit self-determination, this abstractness is apprehended by the subject itself, and a distinction is patent between the supreme principle and its actual filling. It is a standpoint of distinction, of finitude ; and the intrinsic will appears as obligation, that which ought to be. Subjectivity is the proper field of the ethical life, and the aspects of objectivity present in the moral consciousness are the materials out of which it is developed : but so far the concrete objective order is merely something which may appear in it, and which may also fail of actual attainment. The identity of different selves is formal ; they are alike in principle but they are not explicitly constituted as members of a social whole from which both the matter and the form of rational existence comes. Although formally one with it, the activities of other selves are other actions than that of this self, and each does not regard the other as a perfectly transparent medium of its own good. Duty and self-interest are not seen actually to be at one, and their coincidence is an ideal. Each aspect of objectivity is thus defective, their identity is abstract—in the category of essence—and not concrete ; and the moments of the whole which they contain exist in separation from one another.

We now proceed to the dialectical categories which constitute the moral universe as they are given in the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Encyclopaedia*. There are three such principles : firstly, purpose and responsibility ; secondly, intention and well-being ; thirdly, goodness, conscience, and wickedness.¹

In the first place, responsibility depends on purpose. The right of the moral subject is to have imputed to him only those consequences of action which lie in his foreknowledge and will. The naïve consciousness—exemplified in Greek

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, § 114 ; *Encyclopaedia*, §§ 504-7.

tragedy by Oedipus—treated the outward effect of its act as a whole ; it did not divide the consequences, but accepted the responsibility for the outcome in its totality. But the moral will draws distinctions ; it is aware that the individual is finite and that there are operative in him forces which he does not command, and with which he does not identify himself. It therefore claims that before praise or blame are allotted an answer must be given to the question, Did the individual really do the action, or did it merely happen through him ? and the question means, Did the consequences of the action lie in his purpose ? This is the first right of the moral will, and it is a necessary element in absolute mind. Absolute freedom involves that action springs from the rational content of the mind, and that the effect produced is foreseen and designed. But we have not yet reached the level of absolute mind, and the moral consciousness claims this right in abstraction from the concrete content which belongs to the higher spheres of the ethical order, religion, and perfect knowledge. From these higher points of view the significance of the category is that mind in its full truth is conscious of all that is in its world and of all that occurs there ; but at the present stage mind is not explicit in its full truth, and the category has in consequence a negative bias transcended at the higher levels. It claims that finite mind has an absolute right to hold itself aloof from all that it does not purpose.

The second category of morality goes deeper. By purpose Hegel understands a particular and immediate end before the mind of an individual. But behind the result which is directly aimed at there is a universal. Taken simply as a sum of purposes the actions of an individual would be a mere congeries of special acts, each separate from the others, and with no real significance or unity. But human action is not to be regarded in this way. Each act is a phase in the expression of a character as a whole ; there is one and the same self behind each ; and in some way or other every purpose and activity is given its shape by the permanent disposition and outlook of the agent. When we act we not only realize some immediate end, we also satisfy and articulate a relatively steady and universal attitude to things ; and our immediate end is an organ or embodiment of this ulterior principle.

Hegel distinguishes the two aspects as purpose and intention ; and intention is the second category of morality.

There are two sides to this principle. On the one hand, it is more objective than purpose. It co-ordinates the various aspects of its content, and takes some account of objective connexions which are overlooked at the lower level. That is to say, in declaring more plainly why an act is done and exposing the ulterior motive, an analysis of a man's intention indicates more truly what it is that occurs. If a man intentionally sets a forest on fire, we obtain a very inadequate account of the event if we are content to discover that he kindled the few leaves or twigs from which the fire may have originated. We ought also to see the connexion between these leaves or twigs and the rest of the wood ; and, if we would know what was the moral fact which really took place, we must note that behind the immediate purpose of producing a few sparks there was the intention to produce the widespread conflagration. The intention is the purpose made more comprehensive, more objective, more far-seeing, and in that sense more rational.

On the other hand, intention is more subjective than purpose ; it transcends the immediacy of the latter on both sides. As it takes more account of the relations of things, so it expresses a wider area of the self. It is more deeply rooted in the individual character of the agent ; it is less a casual and momentary phase of his life, and more the realization of a permanent tendency of his being. And so to gratify a man's intentions is to satisfy the relatively general ends on which he sets store. On this subjective side we can call the satisfaction of intention well-being or happiness. It includes ' the particularity of the subject ' , the tenor of his special structure and function as this individual.

Morality demands that action should be estimated from this point of view ; we have to take into account the wider end for the sake of which any particular action is performed. Thus in the case of a crime, e. g. murder, the claim of the moral consciousness requires us to consider whether or not the murder was performed for the sake of something else ; and it insists that the moral quality depends on the ultimate intention. The murder, it is argued, as a particular obnoxious effect, was undoubtedly before the mind of the agent, but

it was not his central purpose. It was done for the sake of something else. Even when a man seems to take a delight in killing, this point of view maintains that the end desired is not evil as such ; the action springs from a natural desire to exert one's power, and satisfaction of this delight is the real intention.

The moral consciousness claims that this category should be recognized as a right. A man is to be judged from the moral standpoint of his intentions, and he is to be held responsible for his acts only in so far as their fundamental characteristics were in his consciousness and sprang from his nature. 'The right of intention is that the universal quality of the act shall not be merely implicit, but shall be known by the agent and be present in his subjective will.'¹ On the other hand it claims that in a moral world there must be room for the satisfaction of the general tenor of the individual's will. He must be able to find a subjective value and interest in his deeds, and be able to reach well-being or happiness by carrying out those ideals which are nearest to his heart. The arising of this claim into consciousness, says Hegel, is the turning-point between ancient and modern thought. In its most complete form it is voiced by Christianity and made an organizing principle of the Christian view of the world. It appears in more one-sided forms in various romantic movements, when love, eternal happiness, and so forth, are set up as the supreme values.²

The claim thus made is a true element of the ethical view of the world, and the aspect of self-realization which it demands must be preserved by the highest forms of mind. Mind must be self-conscious if it is to be adequate to itself ; it must appreciate the more universal features of life. Moreover, absolute mind must contain the subjective satisfaction which comes from the achievement of intention. '*In magnis voluisse sat est* has the true meaning that one ought to will something great. But one must also be able to perform what is great : otherwise the will is null. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green.'³ The ideals of the individual, the content which his will has derived from nature and has idealized into the substance of his life, must

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 120.

² V. *ibid.* § 124.

³ *Ibid.* § 124 note.

be included in his moral realization. Natural ends are contingent and non-moral when taken at their face value, but mind spiritualizes them: it must do so, for it has no other substance. 'That man is a living being is not contingent but in accordance with reason; and so far he has a right to make his needs ends. There is nothing unworthy in being alive; and there is no higher spiritual world of subsistence over against life, in which one might exist.'¹

Intention, however, is less concrete than the categories of absolute mind. The claim which the moral consciousness makes at this stage strikes a negative note, and demands that we abstract from all that does not enter into intention and individual well-being. On the one hand, it requires moral judgement to be based only on a consideration of the situation as it appeared to the agent, excluding every phase which he may have overlooked. On the other hand, it demands satisfaction for him as he stands, without reference to the validity of his ideals or relation to higher and more adequate principles of mind.

The third category of morality is more profound than intention and brings more definitely to light the essence of the standpoint with which we are concerned in this section. In the category of purpose we found a subject designing a special act; in the category of intention we found the inherent universality of mind carried a step farther, both on the subjective and on the objective side. But the universality thus revealed is still relative: it is limited by the scope of the actual intentions of the individual agent; and the good which it contains is limited to his special well-being. The wider universality which is latent in mind forces us beyond these limits. We are led from this or that mind to the conception of mind as such, to the underlying rationality of which all particular ends are but special forms. The free mind requires absolute autonomy; it claims to have the springs of its action within it and to aim at an end which is set up by its own rational being. In order to make this position effective it must identify its essence with its highest aspect; it cannot content itself with any limited temporary or local end, but must have an end which is congruent with the independence and perfect freedom which it claims for itself. That is to say, the end to

¹ *Ibid.* § 123 note.

which it devotes itself must have absolute worth and be desirable in and for itself.

This absolute end is, in the last resort, the essence of the moral will. It cannot be a capriciously selected object, nor can it be anything quite distinct from the will itself. If it were of this latter character it would determine the will from without, and in virtue of its inherent infinite worth would override and subordinate freedom. The freedom of the will and the absolute worth of its end can be reconciled only if in the last resort the two are identical, or at least are aspects of a single whole. The end at which the will aims is that which the will seeks to become, it is the declared essence of the will. And hence the end of the free will is realized freedom.

The category which has now revealed itself Hegel calls goodness. At this level the will determines itself to an end of inherent worth in which it can be at home. The end has its place not simply because it is desired by this or that individual, but because it is absolutely desirable; and it is not an alien constraint on the mind, for it is the substance, or the rational principle, constituting the will itself. In this connexion the elements of right which have already appeared are idealized, and are contained as subordinate moments. Particular ends of well-being are not recognized as final: the validity they possess is seen to be derived from the fundamental principle within them; and if they become divorced from this supreme category they cease to be right. The individual may not set his special advantage against the highest good binding on him together with all rational beings; for this good is his true self—the universal of which his particular interests have to be the expression. And on the other hand, there must be room in the highest good for the substantial ends of rational life; this good cannot be something alien to finite purposes and intentions; for it is realized only through them, and is their own real being. 'Goodness must be realized through the particular will, and is at the same time the substance of the latter; and on that account it has absolute right against the abstract right of property and the particular ends of well-being. Each of these moments, in so far as it is distinguished from goodness, is valid only in so far as it agrees with goodness and is subordinated to it.'¹

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 130.

The category of goodness, like those which preceded it, is set forth by the abstract moral consciousness with emphasis on its negative aspect. The claim to autonomy takes the form of a claim to reject all determination which does not arise explicitly from its own self-consciousness. 'The right of the subjective will is that what it has to recognize as valid shall be seen by it as good, and that an act, as an end passing into external objectivity, shall be reckoned just or unjust, good or bad, lawful or unlawful, in accordance with the apprehension which the mind has of the act in this objectivity.'¹ The individual moral subject is a meeting-point of the finite and the infinite. His will is limited in circumstance, insight, and power; but he has in him as his own deeper nature the rationality of absolute mind itself. The attempted reconciliation which the moral consciousness offers here of these two aspects is the claim that the individual shall be judged by his insight, and that his duty is to act in accordance with what he believes to be the highest. In the ethical sphere mind grasps the objective principles through which the true nature of the subject is developed into an abiding world; and the right claimed by morality is, on its positive side as well as on the negative, a constitutive aspect of freedom. But morality makes the claim apart from this objective apprehension, and demands infinite validity for the will even although it has not brought itself into line with the concrete world outside it. The inward maxim of the will is the ultimate criterion and good, even when the will is ill-informed and is frustrated by the objective order in attempting to carry out the plans it has formed. It is enough, it is held, to aim high, even although one fails of success in making the world conform to one's end.

Hegel traces the phases which the will manifests in developing this principle. Taking them broadly, there are three in number—duty, conscience, wickedness.

Hegel's treatment of duty is based very closely on Kant's analysis. Duty is the moral law springing from the rational nature of the will: it is the counterpart of freedom and the principle governing good action. It claims absolute supremacy, and demands to be sought and obeyed for itself alone. These features, however, are not sufficiently characteristic

¹ *Ibid.* § 132.

of duty, for they belong to every form which self-conscious morality adopts. Its further characteristic is the separation of duty as a principle of action from the particular natural elements, the impulses, needs, desires, and from all the special interests which arise in the soul on account of its circumstances and endowments. Duty is sharply marked off from these : it comes from reason and not from sense ; it is indifferent to the lots and chances of individuals ; it is universal, common to all rational beings and binding on them in virtue of their common rationality.

Such a conception is an abstraction. I have already indicated generally how Hegel deals with it,¹ and a brief reference at this point will suffice. On account of its abstraction from the concrete affairs of individual life, duty is a barren form to which all particular content is alien. It has no real community with one outward deed rather than another, for *ex hypothesi* all the ends and needs which spring from nature are non-moral. Duty, thus, has no other content than itself ; it is incompetent to give rise to a doctrine of actual duties ; it remains void and aloof from action.

This defect is fatal to duty even from the standpoint of morality. If the barrenness and tautology of the mere reverence for duty in the abstract, and of the maxim ' Duty for duty's sake ', is pressed home, the whole moral sphere falls away. Kant avoided this, in appearance at least, by passing from the abstract form to more concrete principles, but his advance was partly unreal, and for the rest it was unjustified on the dualistic assumption which the abstract conception of duty involves. Morality involves movement, particularity, life ; and the principle which governs it must find some place for the natural and contingent element of human existence. On this account we are led from duty to the more concrete principle of conscience.

In order to avoid misapprehension, it may be desirable to state here that in this development from duty to conscience we do not abandon duty utterly. We carry it up and transform it. Conscience is duty itself re-interpreted, and given greater body and effectiveness. The positive features of the old conception can be identified in the new one, floating, as it

¹ Chap. III. pp. 57-61.

were, in the surrounding medium. One is therefore justified in speaking of duty with reference to conscience itself ; for conscience is duty, although it is also more. Nevertheless, the sense has changed, and the meaning of duty becomes more fully charged.

The reconciliation which conscience has to accomplish is this. It has to retain the inwardness and the autonomy which is claimed by the will which acts from the notion of duty ; and at the same time it must pass judgement on particular actions, order the details of life, and give satisfaction to the needs of actual existence. It attempts to do this by an immediate synthesis of the two sides. This statement may be more easily understood if we go beyond the strict limits of the dialectical analysis for a moment and look at the phenomenon of the moral life in which it is embodied. A rational human being reacts as a whole to the stimulus of a moral situation. His rational and his sensuous aspects do not lie in water-tight compartments ; they are not independent factors, but interpenetrate one another. The rational will is the organizing principle of his desires and impulses ; it is the form to which they rise and which is always immanent in them. Sometimes it appears to govern them from without, and such a case is found in the principle of duty which we have just discussed. But the appearance is superficial, for the divorce is never thorough. Duty can apply itself to a minor end only because in some way or other the end is allied to it, or rather is part of its proper content. When we *act* from a sense of duty, duty is concrete ; it is an embodying of our moral experience as a whole, and not the application of a barren law to an indifferent fact. An emotional sanction goes with it, the expression of our organized instincts ; and the self as a living unity brings its moral experience into focus in the judgement. Even when in estimating a situation we render a definite reason to ourselves and express a general principle—as we often do—we do not proceed in the quasi-mechanical fashion which some doctrines of formal logic suggest. The general principle is not bare and dead ; it is a living thing, on the one hand coming to us as the burden and significance of our past experience, and on the other developing itself in the new situation and binding further reaches of life into a whole. Our moral principles are our moral experience itself idealized by being

unified and universalized ; they are the meaning of the whole, the effective form in which it operates.

Conscience is this unified moral life. As Bishop Butler tells us, it is an authoritative principle. But its authority belongs to it because it is not merely a separate faculty, and because it is the whole self operating in an individual act. In every form of conscience the two aspects—universal and particular—are present. They do not merely lie side by side ; they do not merely co-operate ; they are the different aspects of a unity. The principles at work are the principles of the situation itself and are not something added to it. It has taken shape as them. And, on the other hand, the particularity of the subject-matter is the body in which these principles exist. In conscience the two aspects are only in one another ; and when they are held apart in theory by an analytic understanding they are mutilated, hardened, and distorted by the false separation.

From the concrete phenomenon we may now pass back to the category. In place of a will purged of all sense and devoted only to the bare form of duty, we have the living concrete will of a subject, full of latent content—tendencies, instincts, habits, or whatever else they may be called—ready to spring into life and assimilate any material presented to it by some objective situation. Like the will governed by pure duty, this will—conscience—is autonomous. The principles by which it is moved are its own substance. They have come from the natural world, it is true, but they have come into mind ; and they govern it not from without but by constituting it. Formally at least, the whole worth of the individual lies in conscience ; it is himself as a whole ; and hence it realizes all that duty can offer to him. To follow it is to do his duty.

In the concrete field of absolute mind, and partly at least even in the ethical world, the will is so organized that the principles which govern conscience are objective and concrete. Duty is realized, for in the motive there is nothing alien to the universal law, and conscience judges in such a way that the true essence of life is thrown into high relief and the details made subservient to it. This is true goodness. But in the abstract moral sphere which we are considering at present the negative note predominates. And the claim for supremacy, autonomy,

and inherent value is made on behalf of the individual will in the finite state in which it happens to be. The moral law, from this standpoint, is not something over against the individual, communicated to him as a command from without ; nor is it a legal code or list of virtues : it is the voice of his own higher being speaking within him concretely of the particular affairs of his actual daily life. Conscience, thus, is the direct certainty of the living subject, neither simple nor relational, but an immediate identity of universal and particular.¹ It claims 'to know in itself what right and duty are, and that it should recognize nothing but what it thus knows to be good, and also that what it thus knows and wills be right and duty in truth.'²

The negative gloss given by morality to conscience leads to the last main form which the developed moral consciousness may adopt. Conscience dialectically passes into wickedness. This statement may appear startling at first sight, but there is no real paradox involved in it. It does not mean that every one who acts conscientiously acts wickedly ; nor does it assert that conscience as it appears in the ethical world, where its negative aspect is merely the reflex of its positive and objective comprehensive content, is the principle of moral evil. It means that when due weight is given to the limitations of the conscience which remains wholly with the abstract moral sphere and fails to rise to the objective and social standpoint of ethical observance, the principle of moral evil is exposed. Abstract morality which tries to complete itself in isolation from the higher reaches of mind is a negative principle—the principle of evil.

'Both morality and wickedness', says Hegel, 'have a common root in explicit self-conscious exclusive certainty of oneself.'³ Conscience covers all forms of self-conscious moral life, for in every such case judgement is passed by the self as a whole. Sometimes, as we have seen, it offers a reason to itself, and states a general principle ; but it does not always do this, and at times it simply decides authoritatively without indicating to itself any element of universality and reason in the situation. In this latter case, which is typical of conscience *per se*, the justice of the judgement depends on the adequacy

¹ V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II. pp. 478–9, trans. pp. 645–6.

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 137.

³ *Ibid.* § 139.

with which the individual subject has gathered the meaning of his own experience and developed it in the situation before him. Nor does his claim to authority confer infallibility upon him. The self which judges may be distorted, undeveloped, and incoherent ; and from the point of view of its content it may lack the finality which its form claims. Knowledge moves as a whole in science as well as in practice, and although I may declare with fullest conviction that some physical law which I enunciate is the true significance of my experience of the physical world, I may be mistaken. Similarly, I may misread my moral experience, and stake my soul upon an error. There is no guarantee in purely moral experience that the immediate unity of universal and particular, expressed by a judgement of conscience, is sound. It lacks actual confirmation and defence ; it *may* be indefensible and false.

It is from this point that the dialectic transition proceeds. Conscience turns away from an objective unity of its elements, and presents only a subjective one. Whenever this subjective reconciliation covers real discrepancy, and cannot support an objective development, it is morally evil. That is to say, the principle of moral evil is the principle of conscience carried to the point where the autonomy of the individual is set against objective considerations ; and this *is* the nature of conscience when treated definitely within the moral sphere and in opposition to the social and ethical world.

The formalism which marred the abstract conception of duty persists in conscience, when taken as the supreme principle of the practical life, and turns it into evil. The discrepancy between the inherent universal rationality of man and the particular natural desires which move him is not removed merely by fusing them together psychically. The union must be objective and rationally coherent as well as subjective and immediate ; and until this is accomplished, finite ends remain imperfectly idealized and unregenerate. The fact that desires and impulses fall within the self and are forms of it does not imply that they are perfect revelations of the mind's deeper nature and in full harmony with it. The finite self is opposed to itself ; and its moments come into conflict with one another because they have an identical subject in them. Surrender to the lower and unrationalized elements of life is wickedness, and not merely imperfection

and misfortune, because it is the inherently supreme and autonomous mind, the self which delights in the law of God after the inward man, that is brought into captivity to the law of sin which is in its members.

This helps us to deal with an old question, whether man is naturally good or evil. Much depends on what is meant by 'natural' in this context, and many who have expressed views on the point have not stayed to define their meaning. If 'natural' is used to exclude rational and spiritual, the question becomes an absurdity; for manhood is not natural in that sense. On the other hand, if natural is so extended that it includes all that is in man, the highest as well as the lowest, then by nature he is good; for his immanent rationality is his real nature. But natural may mean something between these two extremes; it may mean that man has in him desires and impulses, which have been idealized in being given mental form, but which have not been finally subjected to his higher rational ends. In this case a conflict lies within him between the rationality of his manhood and the natural characteristics which he has failed to dominate and make coherent. And in this sense he is naturally evil.¹ The primitive state of man may, no doubt, be called one of innocence; for the intrinsic will has not become explicit over against natural inclination. But since it is man who occupies this condition, it cannot be regarded as a non-moral state—much less one of perfection; although, of course, its defect is different from that of the explicitly evil consciousness. After speaking of the innocence of Eden before the Fall, Hegel remarks that 'other primitive races have held the same belief that the primitive state of mankind was one of innocence and harmony. Now all this is to a certain extent correct. The disunion that appears throughout humanity is not a condition to rest in. But it is a mistake to regard the natural and immediate harmony as the right state. The mind is not mere instinct: on the contrary it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning and mediation. Childlike innocence no doubt has in it something fascinating and attractive: but only because it reminds us of what the mind must win for itself.'² This contention is upheld by the *Philosophy of Right*: 'The natural will is in contrast with the content of freedom; and the child and the

¹ V. *Encyclopaedia*, § 24 note.

² *Ibid.*; Wallace, p. 55.

uneducated man, who have only the former, are on that account brought down to a lower grade of responsibility. Now, when we speak of man we mean not the child but self-conscious man; when we speak of goodness we refer to knowledge of it. Of course the natural is inherently without moral character, neither good nor bad; but in relation to the will as freedom and as the knowledge of freedom it is not free and is therefore bad. In as much as man wills the natural it is no longer merely natural, but a negation of the good which is the notion of the will.¹

The opposition of these two aspects is not to be understood on the analogy of mechanical relations: we are not concerned here merely with an interaction of self-subsisting forces. The disharmony between the content and the form or intrinsic being of man enters into each aspect. The true character of each is displayed only in their congruence. The natural is inherently the proper content of the good will—its truth, as we have already phrased it, is its ideality—and, on the other hand, mind as a whole is in contradiction with itself in wicked action. When the autonomous self yields to arbitrary impulses or follows the line of the 'strongest' impulse, it represses the concrete will for which that element is an important means. The isolation of the particular moments of the entire good, the attempt to take them one at a time and apart from the rest, breaks the wholeness, and substitutes a series of petty satisfactions for the wealth of the total realization. By isolating the natural impulse we diminish its meaning and capacity. In its true context it is a vehicle of the final purpose of the whole self and has infinite value: by itself it has only a fragment of that content and worth. In wickedness, therefore, the natural content of life is not in its true form; its fuller capacities and proper functions are suppressed. The contradiction violates the substantial and immanent being both of the content and form of mind: and the actual shape which mind takes is in opposition to that harmony and fullness in which alone it can be satisfied.

Evil is not merely a regrettable flaw in the constitution of things: it is a necessity in the very notion of mind. Mind begins in nature, and apart from the content it derives from nature it can produce no substance of its own. But it cannot

¹ § 139 note.

rest in nature, for it has in it from the first an aspect which transcends the natural. We have already traced in outline the progress of subjective mind. It rises above its first immediacy and becomes aware of a world of things. Then it turns back on itself and distinguishes its own identity as a being distinct from and immeasurably superior to any mere object. This distinction must arise in the practical sphere as well as in that of pure cognition—if the two can be separated as different spheres at all—as mind becomes explicit. The story of the Fall attributes ‘the occasion which led man to leave his natural unity . . . to solicitation from without. The serpent was the tempter. But the truth is, that the step into opposition, the awakening of consciousness, follows from the very nature of man: and the same history repeats itself in every son of Adam. The serpent represents likeness to God as consisting in the knowledge of good and evil: and it is just this knowledge in which man participates when he breaks from the unity of his instinctive being and eats of the forbidden fruit.’¹

But the necessity of evil is not the last word. ‘This aspect of the necessity of wickedness is inseparably bound up with the opposite aspect that wickedness is that which of necessity must not be. That is to say, wickedness must be sublated, not in the sense that the first standpoint of difference is not to arise, for this constituted the distinction between man and the unreasoning brute, but in the sense that the will must not rest in it or hold fast to particularity as the essential aspect against the universal, and that the natural must be overcome and nullified.’² The self-contradiction of the bad will marks its unreality. Evil is not final: its truth and being lie in a wider system from which it is an abstraction, and in which it is reduced to a negative moment. The dialectic is not yet at a point of view from which we can see the ultimate relation of wickedness to goodness; we cannot yet say how evil appears in perfect mind. What we have discovered is that it is a stage or moment which must appear in mind, but that it is an inadequate stage and must also be transcended. If we try to take the relation concretely at the level of morality, it appears as a process in which evil arises and is submerged

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 24 note; Wallace, p. 55.

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 139.

again. That is not the final point of view, and the result thus attained must be reconsidered and reinterpreted at a higher level of insight.

We may conclude this portion of the exposition with a reference to the various further forms of evil which Hegel distinguishes at the end of his analysis of morality. First there is the act done with an evil conscience, involving the following moments. (a) Knowledge of the true universal, whether in the form of the feeling of right and duty, or in the form of deeper knowledge of them; (b) the willing of the particular in conflict with the universal; (c) knowledge of both moments in their contrast, so that the particular will is determined as evil for the willing consciousness itself.¹ It is not necessary, however, for a bad act that these moments should be definite and clear to the agent himself; and bad action is not always accompanied by an active evil conscience. Hegel quotes Pascal in illustration of the result of an opposite view. 'These half-hearted sinners who have still some love for virtue will all be damned. But as for these free and hardened sinners, sinners without mixture, full and complete, hell cannot hold them; they have deceived the devil by giving themselves up to him.' But although it is not the only form of evil, action done with an evil conscience may be taken as the type, the shape in which the moments of wickedness in general become explicit.

The second form of evil is hypocrisy. The evil man can find reasons, good enough in themselves, which may be distorted to justify his action; he can present these to others as the true import of his act and push the conflict of intrinsic and extrinsic into the background. To action done with an evil conscience hypocrisy adds 'the untruth of presenting the wickedness to others as good, the setting up of oneself externally as good, conscientious, and pious—features which are only an illusion to deceive others.'²

In the third form which he adduces Hegel's Protestantism leads him to give what is perhaps an undue importance from a scientific standpoint to Probabilism. The goodness of an act is called probable, according to this point of view, if it is assented to by any accepted authority—the church, the fathers, a learned doctor. And probability is accepted instead

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 140.

² *Ibid.*

of certainty and truth. We finite beings, it is said, cannot attain perfect knowledge, and we have done all that can be required of us if we adduce this kind of support for our deeds. The correlation of one aspect with other aspects of the whole situation is ignored by this attitude ; and the choice between authorities is a matter of caprice.

In the fourth form this conception is carried farther. Loyalty to the abstract form of goodness is held to be sufficient. It is not very important what content is given to a motive so long as some positive satisfaction is sought. If the ulterior end is something that is in any way good, the act is approved. This kind of evil has identified goodness with the abstractly positive ; any kind of satisfaction is good if it is intended. Objective considerations are thus thrown to the winds, and individual caprice is set in their place. 'The absolute and valid determinateness of goodness and wickedness, of right and wrong, is sublated, and that characteristic is ascribed to the feeling, imagination, and inclination of the individual.'

In the next form an act is held to be right if one is convinced that it is so. Loyalty to one's convictions is now the essence of morality, and conscientiousness is the only virtue. This is moral sophistry. 'It must be noted that the principle of justification by one's convictions applies to the modes of the action of others when they oppose my actions, and they are justified in their opposition if, in their conviction, my actions are crimes.'¹

The highest form of this subjectivity—the extreme pinnacle of moral evil—Hegel calls irony. The term, of course, is somewhat arbitrary, as Hegel himself is aware ; but that is of little importance, provided its significance is understood. The ironical self lacks all sense of the worth and substantiality of the objective world. It finds the world there as a material with which it can amuse itself, but it looks upon it as inherently purposeless and vain. The only purpose and the only value inhere in the subject, which stands above its objects and particular ends. All ends are thus regarded as arbitrary. The ironical self decides in this way and chooses these things, but it feels that it can just as well choose in an opposite way. Consequently, it does not let itself go in its

¹ *Ibid.*

object ; it does not humble itself before the greater world which includes it ; it does not know that reality is instinct with law. In this way all objectivity falls away from morality, thus apprehended ; the self regards itself as beyond good and bad, and as sanctifying whatever it touches merely because it touches it. ' You ', it says, ' actually accept a law and respect it as absolute. So do I, but, go farther than you ; I am moreover beyond this law and can alter it in this way or that. It is not the thing that is excellent but I who am so ; and I am master of the law and the thing. I play with it as I like, and in this ironical consciousness in which I let the highest be subordinated I merely enjoy myself.' ¹

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 140.

CHAPTER IX

MORAL TELEOLOGY

IN the present chapter I propose to turn aside from the direct development of the dialectic to consider some of the bearings of the principles which have appeared. In the moral world we find the human mind claiming to speak with entire authority. The imperative of duty and the judgement of conscience assert themselves categorically ; and no appeal from them is to be recognized. Here, then, we have something fixed and certain, a basis on which we can constitute an intelligible universe. However it may be threatened, the moral will can never be overwhelmed : in it man finds a path from his own frailties and from the confusion and finitude of worldly things to the infinite and eternal. Moved by thoughts such as these, men have made the principles of morality the guiding thought of their view of the world ; and in various forms a philosophy has been erected which may be called moral teleology.¹

Hegel has been charged, from this standpoint, with not finding room in his doctrine for all that is implied in morality. He slurs over the moral aspect of life, we are sometimes told ; he does not realize the infinite guilt of sin or the infinite value of holiness ; and he does not give full weight to individuality. One may conjecture that the charge is sometimes due to a misapprehension, at least in part. All that Hegel says on these topics is not to be found in this middle section of the *Philosophy of Right* : to speak of nothing else, one must take his view of religion into account in order to do justice to his treatment of sin and holiness. Nevertheless, the criticism does touch our present level, and deserves attention. I propose, therefore, to consider in the first place the nature of the theory on which it is based.

Hegel, as I shall try to make clear, does not flatly deny the claims made by mind organized through moral categories.

¹ I do not claim that this is the only sense which this term may have, but the name is convenient here.

But he does reject a certain view of life built on these principles and claims. This view, moral teleology, takes as its first principle the autonomy and infinite worth of the moral will. This, however, is only its point of departure, and it proceeds to construe the world in the light of that principle.

In the second place it draws a sharp distinction between the ideal principle and the real world which is to be interpreted. The ideal, duty or the moral law, is not of empirical origin ; it is *a priori*, coming, as it were, from heaven among men. In other words, the free and moral will is not seen to be the principle of the world itself : it is something added to the world organizing it from without.

After this point the theory may be developed in several ways. Two may be considered. The first of these is the most whole-hearted. It gives its first principle full scope, maintaining the ultimate moral character of the universe. But the world as it stands is not moral ; hence this theory expresses itself in postulates. Still retaining the sharp opposition of what is and what ought to be, it requires us to think of the world as in the last resort in harmony with the ideal. The general position is developed in a number of postulates, corresponding to the various ways in which the underlying opposition of ideal and real appears.

Firstly, the course of external nature must be in harmony with morality ; at bottom it must be a moral order. Hence we have to postulate a final end or governing purpose in the world. Secondly, the opposition between real and ideal falls with man himself. The sensuous element in human motives, the particular content of impulse and desire, must accord with the rational will, so that the former conduces in the long run to the satisfaction of the latter. The highest element in man, the ideal which utters itself in him, must be the essence of his whole being. And so we have to postulate the final end of the self-conscious agent.

These postulates, however, by no means exhaust the field ; for there are other discrepancies to resolve. When we remember that morality has its being only in and through action, we find that we have to harmonize the aspects of universality and particularity within the moral end itself. Duty, we must believe, is one and undivided. Just as Socrates in the *Protagoras* of Plato reduces all virtues to the strand of knowledge

running through them, so the moral view of the world accords final worth only to the universal principle in the various situations ; that is, to the bare form of duty. The particular content of desire as such has no inherent value : its moral character, if it has any, is derived wholly from the element of pure duty which informs it. This attitude is a direct consequence of the abstract conception of duty, and of the incapacity of the natural to supply moral ends. Only the intrinsic will is finally good. Doubtless this will must have some content, but its moral value lies entirely in the form. This attitude is abstract. A bare form of duty, wholly indifferent to its content, cannot apply to action in the world. Hence, over against the conception of pure duty, there arises a system of determinate duties in which the general principle is articulated into diverse shapes in relation to varying circumstances. It is with this latter system of definite moral duties that the agent identifies himself as an actual being, and some provision must be made for the world of pure duty. Since morality exists at all only in being self-conscious, this view of the world must provide some sort of consciousness which corresponds to pure duty in contrast with that which apprehends the determinate sphere of particular duties. This other consciousness may be variously imaged and named : it may be the higher self, the pure ego, or, perhaps, God. It is not altogether broken off from the empirical self, but nevertheless it is somehow beyond the actual ; its content is the pure moral law, and the sacredness of particular duties is derivative from it. This is the postulate of a pure moral subject.

When this conception is fairly grasped, the actual finite moral consciousness becomes profoundly convinced of its own frailty and unworthiness ; and the postulates which have already been made do not cover its need. The postulate of the final purpose of the world is made in the interest of complete morality, and it insists on the conformity of things to perfect virtue. But perfect virtue does not belong to finite beings ; in contrast with the ideal moral self the actual self is stained with sense. The final purpose of the world does not, as it stands, throw any light on the relation of happiness to existing moral beings. A further postulate is required, or a remodelling of that old one, so that some relation may exist between *our* happiness and *our* virtues. After all, morality is a matter

which concerns us, and the centre of interest is the imperfect but developing empirical self. Morality is realized only in action, and we must concern ourselves with the forms of mind which come into being in the actual world of full-blooded life. And so the abstract reflection that man is utterly unworthy before the perfect self, pales before the thought of the vitality and concreteness of human endeavour, and gives place to the conception of grades of merit. Thus we postulate that although perfect happiness cannot accrue to finite beings, yet men must obtain happiness in proportion to their merits.¹

These are the main postulates which this theory requires : the final purpose of the world, the final purpose of the self, the perfect self-consciousness wherein perfect righteousness dwells, and the attainment of happiness in proportion to virtue. The content of these conceptions is postulated : it is not taken to be actual fact ; but is demanded, necessarily demanded, by reason. It may not be knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term, like the knowledge of a thing seen or touched ; but it is a rational faith, which alone, according to this theory, renders moral experience possible.

The other form which this general attitude may adopt is, superficially at least, more modest than the first one. In face of the divergence of real and ideal, which both forms admit, it does not feel able to assert the subordination of the whole universe to the good. Instead of doing so, it sharply distinguishes value from reality, and gives pre-eminence to the moral self only in the realm of the former. It may be, this view says, that external nature is heedless of moral purpose ; the higher self may not overcome all lower tendencies ; there may be no Fortunate Isles and no perfect mind ; happiness and merit may not coincide ; nevertheless duty alone is of worth, and the good will is of surpassing excellence.

In considering Hegel's criticism of these points of view and his reply to the criticisms on his own doctrine to which they lead, we have to keep in mind the dualism underlying them. The natural and the moral are assumed to be incompatible ; and the criticism urged against Hegel is due to his revision of this assumption. But before we pass to his own treatment, we may consider the way in which moral teleology shows its defects in his hands.

¹ V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II. p. 460 f.

Hegel fastens on the conception of a postulate on which the first form of moral teleology rests.¹ A postulate is a synthesis of unreconciled elements. In the present case it brings the real and the ideal together without removing the gap between them. In trying to do this moral teleology contradicts itself again and again. It dare not take any of the parts of its complex position in full earnestness ; nor yet can it treat them as moments of a higher unity. Each is final for it, and yet none can be taken as final. And so the theory becomes a series of subterfuges, never working out the implications of any point thoroughly, and passing from one standpoint to an opposed one without committing itself to any.

Each of the postulates indicated above is open to this criticism. The first was the moral purpose of the world. In this conception there are two opposed elements. On the one hand, nature is alien to morality ; on the other, it is essentially in harmony with morality. Both must be true, and yet they are incompatible : hence the following series of untenable positions arises.

Suppose we decide to take the non-moral character of the natural world seriously. The conception of duty or obligation implies, from this point of view, that the ideal is not actually realized ; it has to be brought about, and this could not be done if the ideal already existed. This is a fundamental position in the whole view. Nevertheless, morality cannot rest content with it ; for moral action is the realization of the ideal, and in it the harmony of the two aspects is accomplished. Moral action, thus, involves the *inherent* subordination of nature to purpose. We must, therefore, modify our first statement : the discord between nature and duty is not final ; for the moral self it exists as a means to the resulting harmony. Nature by itself, we may say, is not moral ; but it is capable of being moralized, and its resistance is a spur to our activity.

But we cannot stay in this position. We have, as it were, taken one foot off our first standing-ground, and we must bring the other after it. Moral action, as we are at present regarding it, is contingent and finite. Duty itself in the abstract may come down to us from the clouds, but the particular ends and all the definite content and adjustments

¹ The account of Hegel's criticism of moral teleology is based mainly on the section, ' Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist ', of the *Phenomenology*.

by which it is fulfilled come from beneath. Nature does more than suffer moral action to use it ; it conspires to arm and aim that purpose. If the world were really indifferent to duty, moral action would be impossible ; it would have no means. Nature itself does everything in nature ; and when it realizes moral purpose it manifests that it is not indifferent to morality but is at heart in harmony with it. The discord, thus, is a false appearance, and the harmony is the truth.

We have been driven from the one term of the postulate to the other ; if we now try to accept the latter we find that we are forced back again. The harmony of nature and morality cancels moral action. If the law of nature and the law of duty are the same law, there is no need to alter nature and bring it into line with the moral ideal. Indeed, 'moral action' becomes not only otiose, but even wrong. Any alteration of nature—if such could really be carried out—would be for the worse, away from harmony to discord ; and so would be immoral. To avoid this extinction of moral action, we have to restore the negative element which we have dropped out. And so morality distinguishes between inherent and explicit ; insisting that the moral ideal is the inherent truth of the situation but not the explicit fact. Recognizing that it must maintain a conflict between what is and what ought to be, it holds that the ideal is the essential truth only if and when it is not explicit. In order that it may be at all, the moral end of the world is made unattainable. This brings us back to our initial position, viz. that only the difference between morality and nature is real ; duty is merely that which *is to be*. And so the antithesis between ideal and fact, on which moral teleology rests, ruins each attempt to make the postulate intelligible.

The second postulate breaks down in a similar fashion and may be treated more briefly. Moral teleology assumes the opposition of reason and sense ; and it believes that if the struggle between them is superseded morality falls away. But, on the other hand, sense is the element through which the final purpose of reason comes into existence ; hence it becomes moralized in moral action. Moreover, it is not only a material, which reason *may* use ; it gives reason body and constitutes the situation of action, not merely supplying means, but even suggesting the end. And so we pass from discord to harmony

in this case also. But we are driven back again in the same way as in the first postulate ; we are forced to distinguish between inherent and explicit in order to give scope for action. Imperfection is eternally necessary to moral action, and the attainment of the ideal is suicide.

We cannot save the situation by calling in the conception of progress. If we say that morality is an endless progress, we shall be told that progress involves progressive achievement and realization ; and that since any realization of the moral ideal is *ex hypothesi* its annihilation, the conception does not apply. Moral action, thus, becomes mere fact, and hence non-moral.

The other postulates fare in a similar fashion, and hardly need discussion. In the third, the contrast between the present evil world and the perfect one beyond conflicts with the concrete harmony which a real moral world requires. In the fourth, neither our finite worthiness nor our utter unworthiness can be given full credence ; and yet neither can be surrendered.

These contradictions are inevitable in this form of moral teleology. Its postulates are an underhand device to gain the apparent benefits of a separation between real and ideal without its disadvantages, and to disguise the fact that it is at once a dualism and a monism.

The other main form of moral teleology has already been criticized by implication. It rejects the postulates of the first form, and contents itself with an assertion of the value of the good will irrespective of its place in reality. Value is withdrawn from the objective world, and placed wholly within the mind. From this point of view the actual consequences of action are irrelevant to its worth ; the motive is the essence. To mean well is enough, to be beautiful in soul.

This view, in the end, involves utter pessimism. Of course, it is not willing to concede this, and claims to have an element of good in it. No one can fail to feel that his own humanity is quickened and strengthened when he sees some heroic stricken soul round whom the shades have gathered stand steadfast in his loneliness, looking death and hell itself in the face undismayed. But it is by no means clear that moral teleology can claim such an experience as a true exposition of its own principles. The hero is master of himself ; he himself is

a reality, and helps to give the world as a whole its character. But if the real were in truth alien to the ideal, the self would be utterly empty, too ghostly to be heroic.

The self governed by such an ideal Hegel looked upon with scorn. It rejoices in no great purpose carried out, no seed sown in the broad plains of the earth, and no faithful ingathering of the harvest. It fences itself from the world, shuts out the wind and the rain, and in the unhealthy atmosphere of the hot-house tends assiduously the forced growth of its delicate flowers. The 'beautiful soul' is an abstraction; it is not a reality but a shadow. Its values do not have the sanction of the world behind them; they are only the conceited measures of the individual self. Its activity is feverish; it has no work in which it can occupy and satisfy itself. Everything it takes up is trivial to it, futile, and unsatisfying. 'It lacks force to externalize itself, the power to make itself a thing and endure existence. It lives in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being by action and existence. . . The hollow object which it produces now fills it, therefore, with the feeling of emptiness. Its activity consists of yearning; it merely loses itself in becoming an unsubstantial shadowy object, and, rising above this loss and falling back on itself, finds itself merely as lost. In this transparent purity of its moments it becomes a sorrow-laden 'beautiful soul', as it is called; its light dims and dies within it; and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air.'¹

Hegel's criticism is not the outcome of an abstract wire-drawn logic; his principle is in living touch with fact. Stand fast by the sophistry of moral teleology, measure the world by the standard of the satisfaction of the finite individual, and life becomes a mockery and a sham. The world does not accept our arbitrary valuations; it grinds on all unheeding of our yearnings and conceits. We, the pure unsullied good, are but a sport in its hands tossed hither and thither by the submerged powers of nature. We are born without our choice; death will not tarry for our consent; and between these extremes we have no place and no vocation in the world except that which the world gives to us and imperiously bids us fulfil. A philosophic idealism may tell us that the understanding makes nature, but even the apostle of moral teleology

¹ *Phenomenology*, WW. II. p. 496, trans. pp. 667-8.

dare not say that individual purpose creates the world. The self which cannot find itself in the world is a substance without accidents, of all things the weakest. And Carlyle, who did not know Hegel's philosophy, has gathered much of its import when he wrote : ' The painfulest feeling is that of your own Feebleness ; ever, as the English Milton says, to be weak is the true misery. And yet of our strength there is and can be no clear feeling, save by what you have prospered in, by what you have done. Between vague wandering Capability and fixed indubitable Performance, what a difference ! A certain Inarticulate Self-consciousness dwells dimly in us ; which only our works can render articulate and decisively discernible. Our Works are the mirror wherein the spirit first sees its natural lineaments. Hence, too, the folly of that impossible precept, Know thyself ; till it be translated into the partially possible one, *Know what thou canst work at ?* ' ¹

The flaw which ruins moral teleology as a view of the world is the dualism of real and ideal on which it rests. Hegel rejects this dualism, and reaches a different result. The ideal is the active principle of reality itself. It is not something shining afar off, and receding when we try to approach it ; it is present in every phase of the moral world and is embodied by every good action. The imperfect moral self-consciousness is not master of itself ; and the world which it repudiates as non-moral is in truth its own substance. Each of its categories is abstract, and they claim from a finite standpoint what can be attained only by absolute mind. Over against each right of subjectivity there stands a right of objectivity, and the latter affirms the side of reality which morality would push away.

The first claim of the moral person is to be held responsible only for that which he purposes. But although the claim limits the moral field, it does not break the continuity of the world ; and we cannot imprint on the realm of action the clear line which we would draw at the point where finite insight stops. Our act recoils on us ; it does not hesitate for a moment when the effects we foresaw are exhausted ; and our ignorance of further consequences will not prevent them from disorganizing all our plans. There is a wider unity which holds the moral self and the rude world together ; and when

¹ *Sartor Resartus*, ' The Everlasting No. '

the self claims to be judged by its knowledge, the world sets up a counter-claim to be understood. When the moral consciousness protests, and distinguishes between its deserts and its fate, it has a right to the consolation that it is not morally responsible for all that happens to it. But lest it over-estimate the value of this admission, important as it is, we may ask it this one question, How does nature, or fate, have any power over you at all? If the sharp lines of morality were the truth, the subject would be entirely self-contained and unassailable. Fate and necessity lay hold of us only because we are more than moral agents, and because there is a deeper truth in mind than moral justice. We are not shut up within the fortress of the moral self-consciousness, but are on both sides of the battle. It is because we are not ourselves that fate attacks us and sets our protests at naught. At the level of morality mind is broken into two, and both sides are abstract. 'The two maxims, that the consequences of actions should be neglected, and that actions should be judged by their consequences and these made the criterion of its justice and goodness, are both alike abstract propositions of the understanding. The consequences are the proper immanent form of the act; they merely manifest its nature; and are nothing more than itself. The act thus cannot disavow or refuse them. But, on the other hand, they include what is only externally and contingently attached to the act and in no way penetrates to its nature. . . . The criminal benefits when his act has few evil consequences, just as the good act must submit when it has few or no results; but when a crime has developed its consequences to the full it must bear the blame of them.' ¹

Similarly with the right of intention. When a claim is made that the individual should find the satisfaction of a universal self in his activity, and that well-being should accrue to him in virtue of good intentions, the world does not recognize the claim if the intention has not taken full account of the objective order. As we have seen, the abstract moral self does not genuinely realize itself; it is filled by yearning and unrest and not by achievement. And the unrest and disappointment come from 'the infinite in man, which with all his cunning he cannot quite hide'. The collision of nature and intention is at bottom the incongruence of the explicit

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 118.

and the implicit self, and the moral intention fails because it misrepresents the immanent end. Hegel indicates the abstractness of justification through intention by showing how easily the conception is perverted into its opposite. When we begin to divide the inward aspect, the ulterior motive, from the outward accomplishment, we inevitably trace the real purpose to some petty, finite, and unworthy element. If we take our stand on the abstract moral standpoint, that of duty, we cannot avoid the conclusion that no act is done for duty's sake; for such a bare purpose is nothing real. The effective end is therefore taken to be the particular, the non-moral. This is the 'psychological view of history which minimizes and disparages all great deeds and individuals. It exalts the inclinations and passions which found satisfaction within the substantial reality, as, e.g., fame and honour, &c.—in general the particular aspect which it has beforehand decreed to be bad—to the highest position, and regards them as the actuating motives of what is done.'¹ This is not the ethical point of view; it is the judgement of the valet 'for whom there are no heroes, not for lack of heroes, but because he is only a valet.'² This attitude is itself base and mean; it is not the truth of the situation.³ The whole point of view is insufficient. The right of objectivity has been ignored and an abstraction set up in place of the whole self in its concrete activity. We are not justified in picking out special contents as the essence of action, to proclaim them either good or bad; and the philosophic judgement must consider the total act in all its bearings. We have a right, from this higher point of view, to the substantial worth of our acts, and are also indissolubly bound up with their deficiencies. We are not *morally* responsible for the whole; but moral responsibility is an abstraction.

The right to be judged by one's insight, and to have within one the knowledge of the good as good, is also abstract. Against the claim that what we consider right is right for us, there arises the claim of objectivity that what is absolutely right must be known by us. It is not enough to be sincere: our sincerity must be well informed. We are untrue to ourselves if our ideals are repudiated by the nature of things, and our moral righteousness is unethical. We must win our self-

¹ *Ibid.*, § 124.

² *Ibid.*
V. *Phenomenology*, WW. II. p. 502, trans. p. 675.

hood, our freedom, and our ends by whole-hearted submission to reality. No plans can prosper with us unless we have found them latent in our world, and satisfaction can come to us only through the denial of our narrow individuality. 'Right and duty, as the absolute rationality of the categories of the will, are essentially not the private property of an individual, i. e. sensuous knowledge, but have the form of universal characteristics of thought, of laws and principles. Conscience, thus, must submit to a criticism of its truth; and its claim to be judged only by itself is immediately opposed to that which it wills, viz. the rule of a rational, absolutely valid, universal mode of action.'¹

The dialectic must, therefore, pass from the categories of morality to the more concrete principles which moral teleology ignores, but which are the deeper conditions on which morality itself depends. This brings us to the ethical world.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 137.

CHAPTER X

THE ETHICAL ORDER AND THE FAMILY

MORALITY is an abstraction ; it is individualistic, formal, and capricious : the deeper truth which sustains it and from which it would fain cut itself off is the ethical order. We are not concerned at present with the question why reality takes shape as a self-contradictory moral world at all, we seek merely to ascertain the general features of the fuller truth in which the moral consciousness is supplemented and transformed. The defects of the moral categories which have to be overcome by the dialectic at this stage may be set forth in several ways. Morality is individualistic ; the ethical life must be social. Duty is a formal principle ; ethical conceptions must be concrete. The freedom claimed by the moral consciousness is ultimately capricious and indeterminate ; the ethical will must manifest necessity. The moral sphere is subjective ; the ethical order must be objective.

There is a sense in which the principles of the ethical world restore the objectivity of the first stage of right, but the restoration is also a transformation. The objectivity is no longer naïve and formal. The dialectic has been mediated by the claims of the free will ; the infinite value of the individual self has been discovered ; and we have become aware that the sacred will of which property is the expression is a self-contained mind and not an impersonal force. The third main stage of right maintains both objectivity and subjectivity ; it expresses neither aspect simply and in abstraction, but preserves them as harmonious aspects of the whole. That is to say, the logical principle underlying the ethical order is the 'idea' and its categories are unities of opposites. The intrinsic will of abstract right is to be found here, but it must not be maintained at the expense of individuality. Moreover, the unity must not be immediate like that of conscience, but must sustain the distinction of the aspects. The standpoint of the analysis must be behind the crude distinctions of egoism

and altruism, of right and duty, of self and others ; and at the same time it must preserve whatever truth is in these divisions.¹

How is this possible ? In order to understand the categories developed in the sequel we must recall the general view of mind outlined in the first part of the fourth chapter. The principles of morality are in truth merely claims or problems, and the moral sphere lapses into self-contradiction because it presents these problems as if they were themselves adequate solutions. Mind, it says, is free and infinite ; it forgets that freedom is not to be had for the mere asking ; it omits the analysis of the self for which freedom is demanded ; and since it is unprepared to use the connexions between the individual mind and the rest of the universe as means to freedom, it finds these connexions to be bonds from which it cannot escape. Further advance is not in a straight line. In order to satisfy its just claims mind must humble itself ; it cannot ride roughshod over nature, but must follow the path laid for its feet, and march only when nature lets and bids it go. But how can this humiliation be freedom ? It is not ; and if the humility were all, freedom would have no place. But the humiliation is not all. Mind cannot merely follow nature ; for the very effort to apprehend nature transforms it. The paths which nature opens to mind are not physical but spiritual ; they exist only for mind and in mind ; and the guidance which nature offers is a spiritual light.

But is this enough ? Has the claim to absolute autonomy been satisfied when we discover that the bonds of the individual mind are not literal chains but spiritual forces ? Are our minds not individuals, and are they not constrained and bound if they are governed by anything external, even although the impelling force turns out in the last analysis to be mind rather than corporeal substance ? Hegel's answer to these questions requires us to revise our view of the relation of mind and nature still further. Our questions still retain a dualism which cannot be justified. The category of causality is inadequate here, and the unity which comes to light in the ethical world robs necessity of its sting. The necessity which compels us is that of freedom itself.

We may again look briefly at the identity which is explicit

¹ Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, § 143.

at this stage. Mind is natural in the sense that it arises in and from nature. But it is not merely another fact external to the others. It does not stand in one place with its conditions outside it in another place and on equal terms with it. The earlier and most immature forms of mind approximate to this condition, it is true, but we are now dealing with minds of greater strength and development. Mind can recoil on its conditions ; it can understand them, use them, desire them, and abhor them, and in general idealize them as part of the explicit content of its own being. Nature has not become spiritual in a vague and general way ; it has become this mind ; and the forces which operate on and in the individual are themselves the constitutive principles of the individual. Mind is not a mere aggregate of natural conditions, and it has special laws and powers of its own ; but nevertheless there is a sense in which nature is the sole content and substance of each mind. The higher developments are not superimposed on the natural, they are evolutions of it, unities and forms to which the natural itself rises. Mind cannot, either in the realm of theory or in that of practice, maintain a pure realism ; it cannot conform to the merely natural ; for what is merely natural is utterly beyond it, the abstract fiction of a thing-in-itself. Nor are ' spiritual ' forces in a different case ; we must not imagine that we avoid the difficulties of things-in-themselves and purely external relations—or rather identities—by dubbing them spiritual. If we admit that a relation is mental, we should not weaken the force of the admission by treating the mental as infra-natural in its characteristics. Solipsism is false, but it presents one side of the truth. The will of another individual has inherently no more power over me than a force of nature, if individuals are atomic units. In one sense the individual cannot get beyond the circle of his own world as it is constituted by his feelings, thought, and will ; nor can anything, whether it be nature or mind, come into that circle unless it becomes his private possession. This self-possession is no doubt imperfect in the main. There are forces, natural and spiritual, external to any finite individual, and when these appear in him they are distorted and misapprehended. But at the same time the very alienation and otherness itself comes within the individual's world, and the conflict is as much within as without him. Moreover, this weakness is

not final. The development of the self is a victory over it and the gradual possession of the universe in its proper form.

In the ethical order this becomes explicit, and the dialectic exposes categories which are both objective and subjective at once. Unlike morality ethical theory recognizes the natural origin of all that is in the self, and its principles are explicitly idealizations of nature. Mind is now concrete and full, but it is filled with a content which is not alien to it. It is orderly and necessary, nowhere capricious and merely formal; and yet it is spiritual and free.¹ The ethical order, however, is not the highest summit of mind, and it does not contain all that mind may become; it is a phase of objective mind; it presents the absolute character of mind in a certain aspect. The ethical order recognizes and idealizes only one set of its conditions; or perhaps it might be better to say, it recognizes them only in one mode of their appearance. Unlike morality it does not isolate man from man, but nevertheless it does not concern itself definitely with nature as such, nor with the higher forms of spiritual unity which transcend the relation of the individual to society;² its object is society and the life of the individual in society.

It is needless to insist here on the dependence of the individual on society; so much may be taken for granted. Not only the developed life, but even bare existence would fail for man apart from society; and there is nothing in the whole round of his being which is not mediated by social powers. The most private and secret functions of the mind are shot through with the influences of the common life. Even emotion is not fully private: it is an aspect of instinct; and instinct is a social function. When we rid ourselves of the abstractions with which abstract right and morality begin, we see that objective mind is a social growth. We have spoken in an earlier chapter³ of the passage of natural conditions into mental substance, and Hegel has called the stage at which this transition is not consciously apprehended natural mind. But we must note that the mental traits thus produced are social as well as individual. There are natural features of tribal life, of pastoral, agricultural, and industrial occupation, of custom, of the family—even of religion. Characteristics of

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 144 and 146.

² V. below, p. 259 ff.

³ Chap. V. p. 91 ff.

this kind appear in the individual man, and if we are to relate them to the physical conditions existing in nature we must interpose the social organism as a connecting link. Men reach individuality in social groups. At first there is no clear dividing line between the individual and his society; indeed the distinction between the tribe and its physical conditions is not sharply drawn. It is not to the point here to urge that from the first men are distinct units, each within his own skin and bound only by spiritual—and if you like, artificial—ties to other men. The ties are not artificial, if that word means a conscious construction of a common life by separate atomic beings. The common life is fundamental, and one must not read the philosophy of Anarchy into the primitive mind. The tribe is of one blood; indeed its being extends beyond the range of human beings and includes totem animals and even inanimate things. Self-conscious individuality is not the datum, but a result; it is a crystallization out of an ill-defined common stream. The individual is the phenomenon of social forces, the fact in which they exist; and if this is ignored the interpretation of the individual lapses into phantasy and mystery.

At first the common life, the primitive entity, is far from the organic and systematic unity that marks the modern state; nevertheless, it is only relatively fluid, and its structure and function are not without some definition. The actions of men in society are never purely natural, they are governed by natural forces which have taken the shape of social or ethical influences. The channels which the will follows under these conditions are customs, and custom is the soul of the primitive ethical order.¹ It is important not to misinterpret here. One is apt to look on customs as constructions, and to suppose that the individual first exists and then evolves customs. Such a priority is not to be justified. Custom is rather the essence and it includes the individual's actions. The antithesis between custom and the individual cannot be maintained as ultimate; for on the one hand custom exists nowhere except in individuals, and on the other individuals are shaped and constituted by the ethical forces penetrating them. Hegel takes his stand on the whole, the universal articulated into particulars: that for him is the

¹ *V. Philosophy of Right*, § 151.

reality, and anything less is an abstraction. It is a waste of time on the part of a theorist to elaborate a world of conventions or laws, proposing either to introduce separately existing individuals into it or to set them up in their freedom against it ; there is no such world, and it should arouse neither hope nor fear. Society is the organic life of individuals. Generally speaking, it cannot be superimposed on them ; for apart from them it does not exist, and apart from it they are vanishing points.

In this sense of the term, society is in the individual, and the latter is the existence of the universal. Consequently, ethical theory has to transform the doctrine of duties. Morality traced duty to the supreme principle of reason in man, but that principle was abstract. Ethical thought possesses a more concrete conception of reason, viewing it as social and articulated. In other words, duties now become virtues, and virtues are the fulfilment by the individual of social principles. In the ethical order duty becomes integrity, or loyalty to the functions of one's station ; and the claim on the individual is that he should 'do what is presented to him, expressed, and recognized in his relationships'.¹ In this conception the diversity contained but not rationalized by conscience becomes explicit. Like conscience ethical principle is removed from casuistry and the abstract balancing of one intricate set of conditions against another. The content which was immediately present in conscience is recognized and accepted by the ethical will. The constitutive aspects of social life, the institutions and ordinances of human concourse, these lay down broad lines of action for the individual, making his function and thus his duty plain to him. It will be objected to this that even in society collisions arise, and it may be as hard in special cases to know one's function and station as it would be to determine one's duty in the abstract. Hegel does not deny this. He points out that a hypercritical reflection can make trouble anywhere and waste all activity by mere irresolution, but he insists that on the whole the ordinary man's station is plain to him. Imaginary difficulties arise chiefly from the false attempt to deduce the individual's function *a priori* from some abstract principle, and they vanish when the principle is apprehended

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 150 note.

concretely and with reference to the actual structure and organization of existing social life. But, apart from morbid doubt, true collisions do arise; society is imperfect and its constitutive aspects work inharmoniously at points. In such cases the ethical order is not complete; duty is not plain; and one has to fall back on individual judgement. Private morality has its proper place in the interstices or at the frontiers of society; and where civil and common life is lacking there is need for individual heroism. But even so the task of private morality and heroism is to anticipate and bring into being the ethical observance which is lacking. The hero and sage do not create morality; they see deeper than other men and understand how to liberate the forces of the defective society itself. There is really no break of principle. Usually the line of ethical action is plain and springs at first sight from social institutions; when it is not plain more profound insight is needed, but the solution is of the same nature and comes from the same source. It is always a social principle which determines duty, and the proper station of each man is fixed by the needs of the social organism. But in imperfect stages of society the objective institution is weak, and 'the ethical and its realization is more an individual inclination and a special natural endowment of the individual'.¹

Thus in place of the abstract doctrine of duties Hegel sets a concrete one. Duty in the ethical world has two sides. On the one hand, it grows up in individuals, acquiring its content from natural impulse and desire. In other words, it is based on instinct and develops into rational dispositions. On the other hand, the instincts are largely social, and their rationalization into dispositions and sentiments is their further socialization. And so ethical theory presents to us organized social structures and functions, and these are the universals of which the private virtues are the manifestation. From this point of view the natural history of individual mind and that of social organization are two sides of the same thing.

We may put this otherwise by saying that in the ethical world duty and right coincide. In abstract right the aspects are separated; if I have a right, then the duty is binding on

¹ *Ibid.* § 150.

another person. In morality an advance is made, and duty contains the private subjective right of the individual ; but it is still abstract in that it lacks the objective side and is a mere claim over against facts. In the ethical order his duty is a man's right, and his right is his duty. The action befitting his station is both what he must do and what he must be allowed to do. And only if the two sides cohere is the ethical principle realized. Where rights are lacking, duty is a figment ; and where duty is not observed, rights are not valid.

The main principles of Hegel's view of ethics is easily discerned from what has been said, and before going farther we may summarize it. What is real is not a mere group of individuals, nor a set of bare principles. Mind, the reality of the ethical situation, is the unity of individual and universal. To those who regard society as an artificial union of self-dependent individuals Hegel seems to assert the reality of mere universals ; but they misunderstand him because they misunderstand the facts. The universal exists only in the particular, and the particular exists only as informed by the universal ; the totality, which alone is the genuine actuality, is the concrete institution, the actual mind, social and individual at once. It is only an atomistic prejudice which leads one to imagine that the actual mind manifested in a family or in a people is an abstraction from inter-related individual minds : it is the system within which they fall and which they constitute.

We must now look at the constitutive categories of this sphere. There are three main moments through which society comes to itself : (a) the family, (b) the civil community, (c) the state. The discussion of the first of these will occupy the remainder of this chapter.

The first great ethical institution is the family. Ethical principles are not spun by a superfine thought and imposed ready made on human beings ; they are rather the main aspects of the social life ; and in so far as they are products at all are produced by the facts of human nature. Thus it is that the dialectic of the ethical principles begins not with some unity of mankind but with the simplest form of the common life, one which springs directly out of nature. The natural union of male and female has an inward side ; the

instincts involved reflect themselves within mind as emotion, and these emotions broaden out into love. Love is not mere impulse, for it is a self-conscious and relatively permanent disposition. Doubtless it is in the realm of feeling, and feeling is subjective and momentary ; but at the same time it is the feeling side of a persistent social organization, and it has the durability and continuity of that outward union. Love is not mere liking or inclination, however strong the passion may be. It is the feature of a stable form of life, and renders in terms of feeling the self-conscious unity of the family. From this point of view we have to put aside much that delights the romanticist, and we must be prepared to believe that the truest love is not necessarily the most passionate. The first strength of passion is apt to diminish in the quiet of family life, and desire gives way to satiety. But if we see that with this sobering comes a deepening unity and that lives become gradually intertwined and refashioned to fit one another, we may believe that the calmer love has a greater value, and that the first fierce clasp is no longer needed where the different individuals have become of one piece. The weakening of intensity is a superficial aspect, the truth is the spiritualizing and completion of love. The high wave has become a deep current, more settled and more strong, and liable in self-maintenance to pile itself aloft again against any outward resistance.

Hegel's analysis of the family exposes three categories, and the institution cannot be understood without reference to all three. In considering them we must not forget the duty of a philosophic theory. It is sometimes a strain on human thought to keep before it all the features of a complex problem, and, particularly when there is some immediate practical end to serve, one is tempted to omit everything that appears irrelevant. Political reformers find flaws in family life as it exists ; defects of various sorts show themselves, sometimes in the existing institution itself and sometimes in special individuals. In order to redress such grievances politicians have to diagnose the disease, and in order to spare themselves and their supporters the toil of a complete review they take one or other aspect of marriage and the family as the chief one. They design the laws to conserve that end primarily, and take the risk of injuring others. This is an attitude of

compromise, and it may be necessary to choose one side rather than another in the hurry and collisions of imperfect social relationships. But a philosophic theory cannot claim such licence, and for it no abstract aspect constitutes the whole circle of the ethical institution.¹

The first of these three moments is marriage. Hegel looks at marriage both on its natural and on its spiritual side ; for in order to be complete it must have both. His view of the former aspect is somewhat unusual, but is congruent with his general position ; it is to be found briefly in his *Smaller Logic*,² and at greater length in his *Philosophy of Nature*.³ His position is too intricate for full discussion here, and a brief note must suffice. Our ordinary prejudices lead us to view such a relation as this from an individualistic standpoint, and to speak mainly of relations *between* individuals. We use the category of terms and relations. Hegel is free from this atomism. He remembers that the individual animal is not a self-enclosed unit ; it is born and dies ; it is one of a kind ; and its individual characteristics are those of its kind. Nor does he content himself by dismissing one set of these identities as 'similarities' and taking the others as external relations. He insists rather that the 'likenesses' and so forth are constitutive of each animal and that the reality before us is not understood unless we give these constitutive principles full weight. To be one of a kind is not merely to have a characteristic or two somehow fastened on to one ; it is to be a special organ of a universal. Considerable difficulty will be experienced in following this method of thought if, as is not unusual, the category of causality is given a place of false importance. A kind is not a cause, and we are apt to conclude that it is therefore an empty abstraction. But, for Hegel, it is rather the notion—even the 'idea'—of the concrete species containing the 'causal' relations as content. That is to say, his standpoint is that of the whole life of the animal species ; and the diversity of individuals, their inter-relations, and history are the articulation of the general principle. One may be apt to regard this treatment as hypostatizing a convenient fiction, but one must remember that Hegel regards it not as a deriva-

¹ Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, § 164.

² *Encyclopaedia*, §§ 220-2.

³ *Ibid.* § 366 ff.

tive abstraction but as the constitutive principle. A kind is not a force, nor a cause, but it is a kind.

The kind or species is articulated into individuals—consists of individuals, if we prefer the word—and the individuals are bound in inter-sexual relations. The kind reproduces itself in fresh individuals and is realized in a constant series of lives. As a natural process, thus, marriage is the realization of features involved in the species.

When we consider marriage as an ethical principle we must maintain this point of view and must consider its constitution and its characteristics. And we may determine Hegel's attitude by his answer to the question, Is marriage a contract? He speaks as follows: 'Marriage in its essential principle is not a relation of contract; for its very nature is to proceed from that standpoint, with its self-dependent individual persons, *in order to sublate it.*'¹ Marriage begins from the standpoint of contract, and what it does is to sublate contract. That is to say, by the choice of capricious wills a union is formed which is not itself capricious and subordinate to these wills. The one side of this statement needs little comment. Marriage involves consent, and a forced marriage is no true one. But what comes into being by marriage is a union in which the individuals lose their independence and become members of a wider and deeper whole. For the present we may ignore exceptions and consider the positive principle. The union of husband and wife is a more concrete unity than that of separate individuals; it may be called a higher person. Within this whole the individual ceases to pretend to be self-sufficient; each as a spiritual being recognizes that his own spirit is present in the other. A family has habits, capabilities, an atmosphere, as specially marked as those of individuals. No two homes are quite alike, and the difference is not a mere series of particulars but resides in an attitude of things as a whole. This attitude grows up, it is true, by the communion of two minds, and in a sense it is a construct. But nevertheless the individual minds are moulded by it; they cease to be their own and become elements in a common life. If we are not prepared to regard this as a sheer loss of personality we must believe that true individuality lies only within the common life, and that in the family the individuals come to be

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 163.

explicitly what they are implicitly. Thus Hegel says 'Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, such that I am not isolated from myself, but win my self-consciousness only by giving up my explicit being [or independence], and thereby know myself as the unity of myself with the other and of the other with me'.¹

In accordance with this Hegel sets forth his view of the ethical distinction between the sexes. The family is an organism, and the members have a diversified function. The natural physical differences pass up into a spiritual world and obtain a spiritual significance. In an adequate family the bread-winner is the husband and father; he is the representative of the family in the outer world; and it is his task to work and strive for the objective ends which are necessary to the family welfare. The life of the man calls for more thought and will, it is less that of an artist and more that of a thinker. The substantial life of the woman, on the other hand, lies within the home. She is not called upon to face the full blast of the wind of the world, but is sheltered from it by her husband. Her activity is directed to the sustenance of the internal economy of the family and the preservation of its proper life; 'and in the feeling of family piety lies her ethical disposition'.² Since the ethical existence of the family is one of love, the nature of woman is adapted less to reasoned thought and more to immediate and emotional judgement. 'Of course women may be educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy, and for certain arts which require universality. In women there is a more peaceful development, the principle of which is the more indefinite harmony of feeling.' 'The education of women occurs, one hardly knows how, almost through the atmosphere of imagination, more through life than through the gaining of information; while man obtains his position only through the stress of thought and through much specialized effort.'³ And as a natural corollary we are told that 'if women were to reach the summit of government the state would be in danger; for they act not in accordance with the requirements of universality but according to capricious inclinations and whims'.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 158 note.

² *Ibid.* § 166.

³ *Ibid.* § 166 note.

This spiritual diversity is carried a step farther by Hegel. True family unity is not a blank sameness, but a concrete totality; and for its full wealth it requires that both husband and wife should have a personality of their own. Marriage is a free surrender of the private self, and the family is the poorer if the individualities thus surrendered are not independent at the beginning. The separate selves are the raw material of this ethical unity, and the richer they are the greater is the height to which the concrete unity may rise. This is the ethical consideration which makes consanguinity a bar to marriage. Individuals of the same family traditions and atmosphere, perhaps even of the same household, do not have the initial independence required, and are not in the full sense separate selves. Hegel goes even farther, arguing that close friendship and intimacy should not precede marriage on account of the tendency to prevent the genuine difference of character which he desires. Spiritual unity must not be untimely and premature.

The same consideration on another side leads to monogamy. Polygamy is a caricature of true marriage; for in it the renunciation of individuality is not mutual. The surrender on the part of the man is partial, and the woman is denied a full personality; 'for personality attains its right of being conscious of itself in the other only in so far as the other as a person or atomic individuality is within this identity'.¹ Polygamy bears much the same relation to the family as slavery does to the rational community.

The last point we need discuss in connexion with marriage is its explicit institution. It has the form of contract, but it is more than contract; as an ethical relation it concerns a wider system than that of the two individual wills. It is constituted only through the celebration of the ceremony; and the inward union of feeling and thought and will must be consummated by an objective recognition and consent. The ceremony is not a mere formality; for there are no mere formalities in the ethical sphere; it is the actual constitution of the marriage.

Marriage is only the first moment or category of the family, and Hegel proceeds to consider its further character. The family is a relatively permanent unit in the objective ethical

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 167.

world ; it must therefore have the conditions requisite to this situation. The husband, Hegel tells us, is the representative of the family when in its outward relations it touches other families ; and he has to earn its living, care for its needs, and administer the family means. The property of the family is a common possession ; no one has a special right to it, but each can claim support for his or her needs from it. The duty of the husband and father is so to administer the family estate that the just needs of each are satisfied. This principle is not always completely carried out. For one thing, the husband may fail to subordinate his individual caprice to the ethical whole, and the state has to guard against this—provision may be made by law for certain ends, and certain funds may be ear-marked. Further, since the family is only the first ethical unity it is subject to violence and chance ; and so a marriage settlement may condition it as a security against its dissolution. In this case each individual retains a right to a definite portion of the common store contingent on special circumstances.

In this connexion Hegel insists that the ethical bond should override mere connexions of blood. Ethical love is a higher principle than consanguinity, and marriage establishes a new family with an independent position to be maintained against the original stocks from which it arose. The wider circle, connected by blood, is a feebler unity ; and the maintenance of the individual should be drawn from the family income and not from the more extended clan. The wife should be supported by her husband and not by her father or brothers.

The third moment of the family is the education of the children, and this leads to the dissolution of the family. It is in the children of a family that the inward harmony of love becomes actual ; in them it attains an outward and independent embodiment. The child is each of its parents, and in their love for it they love one another. The child is both the strength and the weakness of the family ; for by it the family is both completed and broken up. In the care for the child and its education, subjective feeling becomes objective, develops into outward relationships and actions, and builds itself into a concrete system ; and at the same time it transcends itself, since the result of the care and education is the production of a new personality for which there is no room in the family itself.

The child is potentially a free being, but its freedom is not yet actual and has to be brought into explicit being. On this the relation of the child to its parents depends. The child, unable to provide for itself, is dependent on the home which has called it into being, and has a right to be supported out of the family means. On the other side, the parents have a right to the service of the child, but Hegel points out that this right is closely circumscribed by the unity within which it falls. The child is called upon to play his part in the family circle, and minister to the ends which a proper care for the welfare of the family requires. But the nature of the child must not be forgotten, and the functions it is called upon to perform must not infringe its own rights to be considered a child. The child is not a thing, or a slave, nor yet a full personality. It should be subordinated to no private ends, and its proper duty is merely the other aspect of its right to support and development.¹ The right of the child, thus, is to be educated; and the right of the parent over the free choice of the child is limited to what is necessary to this end. The relations of abstract rights are out of place here; for the controlling conception is not justice but education. Hegel explains his view by a brief reference to the aims of education in the family. The mind begins in feeling, and, as Plato pointed out, education must first deal with it in accordance with this. Through the medium of love and obedience there must be laid down those dispositions which are the groundwork of the ethical character, and in its early years the child must live in the atmosphere of healthy family life. But the education must go farther, and its second aim is to enable the child to stand by itself and to become a free personality. This is the final end, and the purpose of authority is to cancel itself. This, however, is the end and not the beginning. A self-dependent character has to be acquired, and is not easy of attainment. Children are not born either good or bad, and their impulses and tendencies are the undyed stuff of ethical life. Education has to instil order and rationality into impulse; it must cultivate what is good and repress what is evil. An important element, therefore, is the readiness of the child to obey. It must be taught, by punishment if necessary, to forgo its momentary and capricious likings and to accept

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 174, 175, and notes.

the guidance of those wiser than itself. A premature self-dependence is evil ; for the self on which dependence can be placed comes not by instinct but through training and culture. Reverence is an emotion proper to children, and the lack of it is a fundamental defect.¹ In consequence of this, children must at first take things on trust, and their passage into the world of thought must be gradual ; they acquire proper attitudes to things before they understand the reasons for them. But it is possible to fall into a mistake on the other side. Education is not a game, and should not be made silly to children. Children are not without their own apprehension of the seriousness of life, and one ill requites their trust by building up associations in their mind between one's teaching and puerile nonsense. The very desire of children to be grown up and to understand should warn one that it is a mistake to reduce everything to childishness. Their higher and truer aspiration should be encouraged, and not stifled by a precocious mockery of its gratification.

When education attains its end the children become self-dependent free personalities, and at this point the natural disruption of the family begins. They must find a new field, acquire property of their own, and found new families. They in their turn look forwards in the stream of life, and form fresh ethical unities. The old family cannot make that reciprocal sacrifice of a separate self to them, and they must seek it elsewhere. It is natural that ' children on the whole love their parents less than the parents do the children ; for they pass on towards self-dependence and strength, and leave their parents thus behind them, while the parents possess in them the objective embodiment of their union '.²

This is not the only possible dissolution of the family. The family is not the supreme ethical principle and is subject to defect. The death of one of the parents will destroy it in large part ; or it may be broken by divorce. All ethical institutions make a claim to permanence, but the claim is not absolute. The family is not the highest ethical unity ; it is the imme-

¹ One writer, Professor Mackintosh, seems to consider that the following is a fair summary of Hegel's view of education : ' Again, to make education pleasant to children is dangerous ; we ought to break them in ' (*Hegel and Hegelianism*, p. 207).

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 175 note.

diating presentation of that unity in the medium of feeling. Hence one must admit that the permanence of marriage is relative and conditioned. The philosophy of the ethical world must deal with known institutions and not accept pious wishes for absolute laws. If total alienation has taken place, and the actual family unity been broken, not by momentary caprice, but in a permanent fashion, as through adultery, divorce should be allowed and recognized by law and religion.

With the break-up of the family the common property passes into private possession, and the principle of this is inheritance. Hegel's view is that the members of the family are the natural heirs, but that no rigid principle can be laid down, caprice and chance having a say in the matter. The chief difficulty arises from the fact that as the children leave the home and set up new families they give up their former connexions and lose their former claims to support. They can be regarded as foreign persons for many purposes, and the tie of blood is a pale abstraction in comparison with the bonds of actual family affection. When the family is dissolved this tie alone remains, and one cannot base an unbending rule upon it. Hegel does not countenance either a fixed law of succession or a complete freedom of arbitrary bequest. The institution of heirs-at-law, irrespective of the actuality of family ties, rests on a thin abstraction, viz. the family stock; and, moreover, is apt to be unjust in its incidence to other members of the family. On the other hand, complete freedom of bequest may violate actual family rights and should be conceded only when the family bond is weak and ineffective. The lines of family connexion should be followed where they actually exist, but beyond that no ethical principle can be laid down by the consideration of the family itself. This vagueness is intrinsic, and the actual lines of procedure must rest on positive law.

The dissolution of the family brings us to consider the larger sphere in which families are separate units and where ethical relationships are of a different kind, having at least the appearance of externality. This is civil society.

CHAPTER XI

CIVIL SOCIETY OR THE EXTERNAL STATE

CIVIL society is the principle or realm which we reach whenever we transcend the family. It is wider and embraces more than the family does, and it is less closely knit together. Indeed, it may seem to be more easily described in negative than in positive terms ; for, in Hegel's eyes, it is a stage of difference. Civil society is not the same thing as the state ; it is a collection of individuals, interacting with one another, but nevertheless each pursuing his own way and constituting a system apparently by accident and as a by-product. Hegel calls it the external state ; for in it we see not the essential organism and life, but the separate pieces of machinery which, when put together, are the framework and instruments of social life. Civil Society is a product. A family may grow too large and break up ; the ties of blood become attenuated, and the original unity divide into a variety of self-centred factors, which preserve many of the old relationships and continue many of the former customs, but which claim an independence and indifference to others impossible within the family itself. Or, again, the origin may be in another fashion. Members of many families drawn from separate stocks may be brought by circumstances into continual and close contact, until at length a substantial co-operation springs up among them, and sufficient identity of interest to stamp the whole as a new unit of society.¹ Whichever way it arises civil society presents the appearance of an aggregate, consisting of various wants, impulses, and ends ; cohering at one point, falling apart at another ; and yet, in spite of all the struggle and separation it contains, holding together as one community.

This society, for Hegel, is not the state ; but in the history of political theory it has often been mistaken for the state. So-called ' natural society ' is this civil society in the making ;

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 181.

and all forms of the contract theory regard this outward and artificial unification as the characteristic feature of social life. But for Hegel the state is not a product of this kind. It is a fundamental condition of social life ; and although states come into being and on one side can be called results, this is not the fundamental aspect. The state is the proper essence of ethical life, and is not merely a stage in the history of social organization. Consequently, Hegel is not led to regard civil society and the state as temporally distinct moments of the common life ; the state, for him, does not signify a stage of unity and organization to be reached only when difference and particularity have disappeared and civil society has been left behind. The state, as we shall see more fully later, is a universal ; it breaks forth into difference, and the system of self-seeking, conflicting, and co-operating individuals is an essential part of its own content. The external state is the state itself taken with respect only to some of its features.

Abstractly stated, the principle of civil society is the particular individual ; that is to say, we have to consider society as constituted by members who take a self-centred view of things and work primarily for their own private ends. But, of course, this is not an absolute chaos ; it is still a society. It is characterized by law and order, and the very chaos which it contains is a cosmos. 'The principle of particularity passes over into universality in that it explicitly develops itself into a totality, and only therein has its truth and the right of its positive reality.'¹ The particular is itself a universal ; the very self-interest of the individual is a common principle, and casts men in one mould. Sheer particularity, absolute indifference to a common life, is impossible in a rational being ; and men, in order to gain their private aims, have to look at the aims and actions of others. The social medium holds us together, and by rubbing against one another we work out certain uniformities and principles—the universals of individualism. The characteristic of this sphere, its specific difference, is the particular. In accordance with it men look at society as a means ; no doubt, they have to take their place in it and conform to the principles of its movement, but although their range and scope is thus enlarged, their point of view remains unaltered. Individualism, as a political theory,

¹ *Ibid.* § 186.

has fixed and isolated this aspect. The universal, the state, becomes for it a necessary evil, a compromise which unfortunately cannot be avoided, but which must be reduced to the lowest possible terms in order not to infringe the sacredness of individual freedom. For Hegel, however, such freedom is formal ; and it inevitably manifests itself as necessity. Men are self-seeking and free ; so runs the doctrine of individualism. This Hegel grants, but his suggestion is that if you look closely at the system in which they are and which they constitute, you will see that each presses on the others from the outside, and that the economic and social order determines the field of operation of each and even directs his activity. If you carry the matter to the end you will discover that, wriggle as they may, individuals are caught in a net, woven of the purposes and functions of other individuals, from which they cannot break away. They follow the path of their freedom : but that path is laid down for them by wills which they regard as other than their own. In unrestricted competition the individual is formally free, but is also entirely dependent on circumstances. And the proper category here is necessity because the individual does not identify himself with the controlling and governing whole, and fails to understand that the true principle of his spiritual being is that wider common life within which his narrower ends are contained and by which they are conditioned.¹

It need hardly be stated that for Hegel this freedom which is necessity is not the final word on the subject. It is indeed an essential element, and the state is not true to itself if it lacks the diversity and individuality proper to this sphere. But when we understand the state in its truth we see the organization of society in a new light. Caprice gives way to rational will, and the common weal becomes identical with his own end for every true citizen. That is to say, the necessity which comes to light here is retained but is overcome ; and in the duties of his station the individual finds an end reconciling his own interest, the articulation of society, and the common good.

But we are anticipating. So far we have only reached the general conception of the external state, the world of interacting individuals ; we have now to discuss the constitutive

¹ Cf. above, chap. IV, p. 77 f.

moments of this society whereby this realm of particularity works out its own peculiar universality. These are three in number : (a) the system of needs, (b) the administration of justice, and (c) the police and the corporation.

The ethical life is rooted in nature, and the elements of civil society develop from the impulses and needs of animal life. But in society, however crude it may be, these wants are extended : by taking thought men achieve new desires, and strive for other ends than the immediate satisfaction of primary instincts. From Hegel's standpoint it is a profound mistake to regard reason as a mere means to passion, an instrument incapable of constituting a motive, and useful only as a guide to ends laid upon it by a sub-rational side of life. Reason changes passion ; it eats into the heart of the practical life, and one of its first activities is this process of extending and transforming wants. There is no limit to human wants ; the satisfaction of one leads to satiety and ultimately to dissatisfaction, so that mind is driven onward in an endless progression reaching after a receding ideal. This ideal Hegel identifies with the English conception of ' comfort ', and its ethical weakness is manifested by the impossibility of gratifying it permanently.

Wants are developed in many ways. The very division of labour which springs up in the economic world in order to satisfy old needs begets new ones ; the conditions of labour create new tendencies ; and each phase of the vast social machinery, constructed originally as a means, invades the realm of private ends, instituting customs and opinions which in time demand fresh satisfactions. The desire to emulate our neighbours and to attain social recognition, and at the same time to assert our own individualities, are potent instruments in this process. And, as society develops, the spiritual element becomes predominant in the determination of wants ; and men are both emancipated and enslaved by conventions which mind itself produces.

Want, then, is the raw material of civil society ; it springs from nature, and is modified and spiritualized by thought and will ; but at the end it remains an indefinite endlessly increasing system, incapable of giving itself a final limit.

The satisfaction of want is achieved in the main through labour. Natural objects are seldom found in a condition fit

to fulfil our needs, and must be transformed by human agency. Work is a spiritualizing of nature, the infusion of purpose into a soulless material, and the adaptation of it to rational needs. But labour is more than a means. As we have seen, man is not a being created with a fixed number of impulses and desires, a definite empty space to be filled. His whole life is organic; and the satisfaction of one need itself creates others. Labour itself becomes a need in his life, and by it he not only satisfies original wants but also finds a mode of expression, an activity, which is essential to his character and freedom.

In this sphere the general paradox of civil society is clearly manifested. In pursuit of individualistic motives men have built industry into a system, labour has become specialized, and men's interdependence and mutual relationship has been confirmed. To gain his own end each produces for others and plays his own part in a vast social structure built up by the interactions of the aggregate of social individuals.

Through this development of universality in and through the particular we reach the conception of wealth. Private satisfaction and enjoyment of things becomes conditioned by a common process such that in order to understand the correlation of individual wants, activities, and satisfactions, we have to look at the economic world as a whole, and consider a concatenated social system both of production and of distribution. Wealth is a social product, the result of many impinging activities, and its values are measured, not directly by individual wants, but by the interplay of these in barter and exchange. The details of this sphere, however, belong to the science of economics and not to political philosophy.

Hegel contents himself here with some general observations. The first of these is that the economic world is a sphere of contingency. The individual's share of the common product depends on many features, chiefly accidental. Skill, capital, differences of endowment, fortunate circumstances, all play a part; and the result is great inequalities of wealth. These inequalities are not to be condemned as unethical. Doubtless at times they may produce results hostile to the well-being of society, and in that case the state is called upon to intervene; but in themselves these inequalities are not wrong. Mind obtains its content from nature, and ethical

mind must reflect the variety and difference which its natural medium presents to it. Civil society is a sphere of contingency, and the unity which pervades the state is not to be obtained at the expense of difference. Society is an organism, not an aggregate of similars ; and only an abstract thought can confuse the formal identity of principle in all men with an artificial sameness imposed upon them from without.

Putting aside the false statement that all men are born equal, Hegel goes on to consider one broad form of organization running through civil society. Society, he says, is divided into classes, and these classes spring from the nature of the case. He points to the distinction between the town and the country. The latter of these he calls the substantial class, for it has a direct connexion with nature, and is but slightly modified by the self-consciousness and calculating activities common to industrialism. The townsman is essentially more artificial ; his life is mediated to a greater extent by human contrivance and ingenuity, and he has less the attitude of waiting upon nature than that of manipulating and altering it. Commerce and industry are more artificial, less placid, and more sophisticated than agriculture : and these characteristics give a natural division between these classes in society. There is also another class which Hegel calls universal, consisting of those members of society whose duty it is to attend to the public and common elements of life ; the servants of the community as a whole, who do not produce goods for exchange, but tend to the organization and administration of the social organism. This class, says Hegel, ' must be relieved from direct labour for its needs either by private means or by an allowance from the state which claims its activity ; so that its private interest finds satisfaction in its labour for the universal.' ¹

The second element in civil society is the administration of justice. In the ethical world we pass beyond the bare conceptions of abstract right or of moral claims ; in the section already discussed we have considered one form of externality which must be found in objective mind—the system of needs—now we reach another and more adequate one. The system of needs is an institution, beginning in nature but growing more spiritual as it develops, by which mind gives

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 205.

itself a place in the outward course of events. But such an embodiment is inadequate; mind must attain a higher realization. The category which we now consider is that in which right becomes explicit in the medium of consciousness; i.e. right becomes established law. It may not be altogether futile to repeat here a warning given above. Hegel is not engaged in proving by an extraordinary subtle dialectic that there is no wrong, no unjust states, no absurd laws, no neglected rights. He tells us what ethical mind is, and an essential point is that in order to attain completeness the inherent rights of property, and so forth, must be recognized and established in society, or, in other words, must become explicit. A right which is not thus established is an abstraction. So, too, a law which does not realize an inherent right is also an abstraction, a counterfeit coin, a lie. But there is no warrant for supposing that such abstraction and lies do not exist, and the analysis of the notion must not be taken for an historical transcript of phenomena.

Law arises from instinct; for instincts are the primitive regularities and uniformities of animal life. Custom brings us a step higher; for custom, however mechanical, operates through consciousness and involves knowledge. When such uniformities or modes of action are consciously apprehended and publicly recognized they begin to take the shape of laws. 'The difference of customs from laws consists only in that customs are known in subjective and contingent fashion; consequently, they are explicitly less determinate, and the universality of thought is less clear in them.'¹ Hegel emphasizes strongly the ethical superiority of law to custom, and his point of view is sharply opposed to that of those individualistic thinkers who hanker after an ideal state where the natural goodness of men will render laws superfluous and obsolete. Law is not intrinsically a restraint and an evil; it is a liberation of right, a mode of freedom. Custom, no doubt, is a form of life, and may be called natural in opposition to the artificiality of law; but, says Hegel, 'Life, i.e. the identity of the principle with the subject, is not the whole essence of the matter; right must be known by thought, it must be a system in itself, and only as such can it exist in a civilized nation.'²

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 221.

² *Ibid.* note.

This necessary objectivity of right brings us to a limitation of philosophy as Hegel understands it. Law is positive in two senses : in the first place it is posited, laid down, established, explicit, in contrast with inherent and merely formal right ; in the second it is existent, contingent, empirically conditioned, in contrast with the pure notion. For Hegel these are not totally separate conceptions which merely happen to converge at this point ; they are interdependent. The objectivity of law is taken seriously by him, and in this part of the difficulty of his philosophy lies. The same point may be exemplified elsewhere. Thus the philosophy of nature is an objectification of the logic, and Hegel constantly affirms that nature is a realm of contingency and externality. Here and elsewhere the logical doctrine by which he holds fast is the achievement of unity in and through a genuine disruption into difference ; and he is not afraid to let his first abstract principle plunge itself into its opposite. Hence, when the notion of right gains externality, it contains contingent elements. Philosophic analysis cannot determine the details of this region for they depend in part on accidents and circumstance ; and Hegel does not assent to the belief that there is one all-sufficing and all-just code of laws to which all our finite codes must approximate. Something is always left to concrete experience, to the logic of facts ; and political philosophy is confined to the general outline of the categories involved.¹

Right must become law ; but, further, law must be publicly known. Hegel inveighs against the conception that the jurist, or any other person, has a private possession in the knowledge of the law. Just as right is not true to itself if it does not become law, so law is not true to itself unless it is a conscious rule for the people in general. The ethical world reinterprets, but it dare not bluntly deny, the claims of the moral consciousness ; and the right to apprehend the governing principles of one's duty is not to be rejected. 'Right concerns freedom, that which is worthiest and holiest in man, and which he himself must know in so far as it is to be binding on him.'² On this ground Hegel criticizes English law, in which the knowledge of precedents and legal decisions plays too great a part. Of course, it is not necessary—nor

¹ *Ibid.* § 214 note.

² *Ibid.* § 215.

is it possible—for every jot and tittle of the law to be known to all men. What Hegel insists on is that the general principles of law should be public, and that, although the application to new cases may be a matter of authority, nevertheless the decision should be such that men may have confidence that a general and well-known maxim has governed it.¹

Through these considerations we discern the rationality and necessity of a judicial court, an institution whose office is the recognition and establishment of the law in special cases. The law must be impartial and free from subjective bias; hence it must be administered by some one who speaks for the community as a whole and is invested with this function as his duty. It is by means of this explicitly universal institution that revenge is superseded by punishment. We have seen that revenge is tainted by subjectivity; it is the capricious act of an individual and is regarded as itself a fresh wrong. But the decision of a judge is expressly free from this particularity. His own interests are not in question, the principles of his action are laid down for him, and he acts for the whole body.

In virtue of this universal character of the court of justice the intrinsic identity of wrong and its punishment can be realized. When one member of the community suffers wrong the others suffer with him, and this integration of interests lifts the wrong from the circle of purely private concerns and gives it a direct public bearing. Wrong is an act by one member of the whole on another member of the whole; and in punishment society corrects itself.

In Hegel's view the court should be open to any citizen who has a case to bring before it, and there should be no exemption from its jurisdiction. The dispensing of justice is not the private privilege of a ruler, and he has no right to resist or influence its decisions.

This general view of the court of justice is used by Hegel to justify trial by jury in certain cases. Justice must not appear as something coming upon a man from above; in the long run it must be the voice of his own heart. This has led at times to the demand that in criminal cases the accused should confess his guilt before punishment. Hegel does not accept this literally; for, plainly, few criminals will confess

¹ English law admits Hegel's principle: cf. 4 Geo. II, cap. 26, 1731.

if a refusal to do so involves an acquittal. In order to mitigate any suspicion of externality and arbitrariness, however, the facts should be decided by the man's peers and the judge should be bound by the view of the facts which the jury finds.¹

The third section of Hegel's discussion of civil society is entitled 'the police and the corporation'. As is usual in the progress of the dialectic, we can consider this step as the development of the previous category or as the statement of a condition of it. The court is the organ of justice; but as a definite institution it stands at a distance from the mass of the people, and in order to be a true vehicle of right and law it must be supplemented by other institutions. Thus, the police and the corporation—or, perhaps, it would be better to say the trade guild—mediate between the individual and abstract judicial decision of law. Broadly speaking, the function of civil society which is exercised by the police is the securing of the rights of property, including defence against violence. Abstract right in general is negative, prohibitory in character; and in consequence the activity of the police shares that feature, its task being the removal of dangers. But it is a mistake to over-emphasize this. The distinction between negative and positive—clear enough in very abstract realms—becomes obscured in concrete social life. The removal of hindrances is too closely bound up with the promotion of positive conditions to admit any hard and fast line limiting the sphere of police intervention. Hegel points out that civil society makes itself responsible for the lighting of the streets, the building of bridges, a certain control over daily needs, and the care of public health. There are two conflicting claims to be reconciled here: the right of the individual to freedom, and the right to the conditions of a fair life. 'Both sides are to be satisfied; and the freedom of trade must not be such that the general good is endangered.'²

In this connexion civil society ranks higher than the family. Of course nothing may be done to injure the family; but society has the right to intervene in any domain, e.g. that of education, in which the wider interests of the community demand it. When the family itself is defective, as when men fail to provide for their dependants, society is bound to interfere; it must protect itself against any actions

¹ V. § 227 note, and § 228.

² *Philosophy of Right*, § 236.

which will produce in the future incompetent members of society.

Society cannot divest itself of all responsibility for a pauper class within it. Ethically the individual has the same right to the conditions of happiness as to those of freedom ; for in the last resort these coincide ; and hence on the one hand society is bound to do what it can to provide these conditions, and on the other has the right to prevent any individual from any mode of action antagonistic to the public good. Men have to be protected even against themselves, and society should guard against the creation of an indigent and shiftless class.

In this connexion Hegel points out that private charity is not necessarily a supreme social principle. Such preventive and ameliorative functions should not be sporadic and contingent ; and the ethical spirit is best satisfied not by casual sentiments and doles but by regulations binding on the whole community. It is a duty to remove any social or economic conditions which bear hardly on one section of the people. Hegel does not indicate any specific against poverty, but he insists that society should seek to discover a general remedy against it.¹

The positive side of the mediation between the individual and society is undertaken by the trade guild or corporation ; its function is not to protect property but to care for and provide the further conditions of subsistence and well-being. In the ancient Greek state this was not necessary ; for the small size of the community made it possible for every citizen to enter directly into public life and take his place in the control of general affairs. But the modern state is too large and complex ; men enter into it not as isolated individuals, but as members of mediating systems. The guild represents the interests of its members and acts as a unity with society. The guild has the right to control its members in order to carry out its proper ends. It may, if necessary, restrict conditions of employment or trade ; but it must not do so arbitrarily or at the expense of the common weal. At the time when Hegel wrote the guilds were disappearing, and since his day the situation has changed completely. The gulf between master and man, great enough as it was then,

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 240-2 and notes.

has become greater ; and the increase of capital and of large-scale industry has cut off the ordinary worker from a field which was formerly open to him. Employers' associations and trade unions have taken the place of the old guilds, so far as the place has been taken at all. And the function which these organizations seek to fulfil is the same mediation between the individual and the economic world as a whole.

Through these categories and institutions civil society is articulated. We began with the system of needs, compounded of individuals each seeking private ends. Through the interaction of economic activities we found that society became integrated ; both production and distribution being social processes. Then the objectification of law by its publication and judicial administration manifested further the inherent universality of ethical life. And, finally, this universality was made concrete, firstly by the direct application of the principles of right to individuals by the police, and secondly by the institution of guilds within society. Thus the community shows itself to be not a mere aggregate of individuals kept in order from above ; but an inherent organism, organizing itself into cohering systems. We have still to discover how these systems cohere together, and by what principles of unity they are organized into a concrete whole. The system of systems which we seek is the state, and to its analysis we now turn.

CHAPTER XII

THE STATE

THE theory of the state affords a most searching test of any political philosophy. In the state all the elements of the practical life come together, and if they are not brought into a true harmony the theory is bound to resolve itself into a paradox. The paradox may be concealed by a failure to carry the problems raised to their full conclusion. But both in practice and in theory it is sure to manifest itself in the long run. The possibilities of collision between the individual and society are so many and so important that the theory of right which they involve cannot permanently be hushed up. There is a disposition to be found sometimes—particularly among English-speaking peoples—to regard the whole question as one of expediency ; but the attitude cannot be sustained in face of the gravity of the issues involved. The state claims too much from the individual to be treated as an accidental by-product of human life. At times it claims that property and even life itself must be sacrificed at its bidding ; that is to say, it claims authority over all the ordinary rights of everyday life and sets itself above them. The theory of the state must account for the right of the state to act thus, and indicate wherein lies that higher end to which it subordinates other human interests.

Hegel's theory of the state may be better apprehended if we consider briefly the way in which other points of view fail to cover the whole situation. Sheer individualism is not a common theory, but it will give us a convenient point of departure. In its most thorough form it would involve the abolition of all government whatsoever ; the individual will would have to be relieved of every form of social constraint, and would be regarded as free only when utterly isolated. This follows inevitably if we consider individual human wills as impenetrable atoms, entirely self-contained and exclusive of one another. Such a position, however, is patently untenable, and in view of the points which we have already

established may be set aside. The individual man is not complete in himself, and the medium in which alone rights can exist is a social one.

Short of this extreme, several compromises have been put forward which deserve attention. A distinction may be drawn between two broad elements in human life : certain spheres may be declared social, and others non-social. Thus we get Mill's distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions. The state, or society—we have not yet reached the question of the relation of these two—is concerned with those actions which touch others, but not with those in which only the individual agent is concerned. This distinction, however valuable for limited purposes, is not accurate, and cannot be defended successfully. There are no purely self-regarding actions ; and no sphere of the practical life is related only to the individual agent. Even if no other connexion can be discerned, there is always a link between the individual's acts and other individuals in his own personality. What he does in any situation makes a difference to what he is as a whole, and what he is as a whole affects those other actions which are admittedly social in character. The point is trite enough, but perhaps an illustration may be allowed. At first sight it would seem that the literature by which a man recreates his mind is only his own concern, and that the paths of thought and fancy which he pursues within himself are wholly free from a social bearing. But this first impression is false. On the one hand, the material he uses, the books he reads, the conceptions among which he strays, are social. And however much he may recast them within his mind, the gist of them is a social construction which he obtains directly or indirectly from others. On the other hand, these influences mould his mind ; they inform it, rightly or wrongly, on various lines ; they enable him to deal, wisely or unwisely, with certain situations ; and they help to determine the reactions which he will give to future social stimuli. What is in the man comes out again ; for it is the nature of mind to externalize and manifest itself. This does not mean, of course, that it is the duty of the government to regulate in detail every element of individual life : but it does mean that there is no feasible distinction between the social and the non-social in human

life, and that any limitation of the activity of the state in dominating man's affairs must have some other ground than that.

But surely, it may be said, there are some inalienable rights vested in man—rights which accrue to him in virtue of his being a man at all and which society itself must simply recognize. The contention is based upon a true element of right, but it is exaggerated and mis-stated. It is difficult to see what rights of the individual are inalienable. Men, unfortunately, do alienate even the right to life itself; and what holds here holds in lesser matters also. Moreover, it is a mistake to suppose that those rights—alienable or not—have their root in the individual rather than in society. For one thing, they belong only to rational beings; and rationality is social. Take the right to freedom as an example. A child does not have the right to freedom which a man has. Its right to freedom can be granted as a reality and not as a mere possibility only when the child comes to years of discretion. And the development which it has to undergo is socially conditioned, both on its physical and on its mental side. The great principles which become the substance of its later rationality are not mere latent inward possessions of its own—they are the actual framework of the social world into which the child is born and which the child recognizes as akin to itself. Conversely, when society recognizes his rationality and grants his freedom to an individual, it does not bow itself down before a right enforced upon it by a higher but alien power. The freedom which it gives him is its own, an element essential to its own being. This right, like all others, is both social and individual at once; and it could not be the one if it were not the other also.

But there is more than this to be said. The rights of man simply as man are abstract: they are not individual rather than social. The point of view which puts them forward has abstracted from the concreteness of real life, and has set its eyes on the bare universals apart from their special manifestations. The social character of the individual and the articulation which society receives in individuals are left out of sight, and attention is given only to the undeveloped conception of man below the concrete level of the ethical world altogether. That is to say, when insistence upon these

so-called inalienable natural rights seems to set individual man in opposition to society; the real conflict lies elsewhere, viz. between the rights of abstract manhood at a level below the ethical world and the concrete rights and duties of the manhood found in society. In such a case the abstract right must give way. It could claim unconditional validity only in a sphere where nothing but abstract manhood subsisted; and such a sphere is nowhere real.

Passing from the attempt to divide life into two portions—social and non-social—we come to a second view. This view, which is held in one form or other by most theoretic Anarchists, admits the social character of the individual, and rejects only what it calls the state. It opposes voluntary co-operation to compulsion; maintaining that only the former is really ethical and that the latter is unjustified. From compulsion—that is, the state or government generally—comes tyranny, war, privilege, oppression, and slavery. The state is rooted in lust and greed, and its fruit is worthy of it. In a moral society men will work together of their own accord, and of their free choice foster the great common ends of life. The state may to-day be a necessary evil, though its necessity may well be questioned: nevertheless it is an evil, and somewhere in the brighter future the eyes of the free man can discern the true polity which will recognize the brotherhood of man.

In this view there is an exceedingly important element of truth. It recognizes the rationality and self-consciousness of the good will, and knows that the ultimate interests of mind are social and not merely private. But it, too, is abstract and ignores the full concreteness of the ethical ideal. The distinction between force and reason will not bear the weight which the Anarchist places upon it. There is a real distinction between *mere* force and rational activity; or, in other words, between external necessity and freedom. But rational activity does not lack force, nor is freedom something utterly apart from necessity. We have already seen¹ that in freedom necessity is carried up and made a subordinate element of a higher conception: freedom is determined, although what determines it is itself. The same point holds in the present connexion. Rational activity uses force; it is not a powerless

¹ p. 77 ff.

phantom, but a real agent turning the powers of nature to its own ends. On no other terms could it come into the world at all ; for nature will do nothing for mind unless mind is willing to use the forces of nature.

To this it will be objected that it is one thing to use force in the natural world, to move a physical thing either by the strength of one's own body or by directing other forms of energy upon it, and quite another to use force to constrain a man. But this objection cannot be maintained ; for it leads to an unreal division of the sphere of nature from the sphere of mind. We have already seen¹ that the attempt to draw a sharp line between the unforeseen consequences of an act and the results for which the moral agent is responsible breaks down. And the reason for the failure is that the individual's true nature is not contained within the limits of his actual self-consciousness. He is more than he takes himself to be ; and his fuller rationality binds him indissolubly to a far wider range of the external world than he suspects. The rational being of the individual lies out there in the world as well as here in his body and in his immediate possessions. So, in using force on the things of nature, each man uses force on his fellows. The point may easily be illustrated. If you plant and reap a field, you prevent me from using it for some other purpose. If you build a house, you may spoil my view. If you compete with me in trade, you may impoverish me, even ruin me. In these and in innumerable other ways one man exercises constraint on another quite as truly as if he laid hold of him physically. In making themselves masters of nature men limit one another ; and, by altering the alternatives open to these others, put a constraint upon them. It is true, of course, that they also enlarge the freedom of the others by joint-action ; but that point is not relevant here. The compulsion is real, although it is not the whole fact.

It may still be objected that in ethical society men are agreed upon the activity which each has to exercise, and hence that the compulsion or constraint is thereby avoided. The reply is not quite satisfactory. The compulsion has changed, no doubt, but it is still present. The fact that the use of a thing by one man precludes the use of it by another

¹ Chap. IX. p. 193.

was before the minds of the individuals when they agreed together ; that is to say, the constraint is a term within the purpose of each. It has been rationalized but not destroyed.

But a weightier criticism of Anarchism still remains. Its apparently extreme reverence for self-conscious freedom is really an offence against it. Suppose some men—one man is enough—do not agree to the common plan. The logical position then is that the plan has to give way : the caprice of the individual is to receive priority to the real good in the world. In the alleged interests of reason, reason has been subordinated to immoral action ; and this, as we have seen, is evil. The true duty, on the contrary, of the good man is to make the moral ideal by which he is inspired effective ; and he has to use power or force in some form or another not only against purely natural things but also against imperfect forms of mind themselves if they threaten to hinder or overwhelm the moral ideal. To deny the right of society to coerce the unruly and unsocial individual is to exalt the form of the individual good will at the expense of its true content, and to subordinate ethical to moral categories.

Abandoning Anarchism, and accepting the right of society to use force against nature and against evil-doers, we may halt in another position short of that which Hegel occupies. We may emphasize those social unities which mediate between the individual and the whole political world ; and we may try to place the substance of the ethical good in them at the expense of any higher over-ruling unity. This tendency is greatly increased by a reaction from the unsound habit of setting the individual and society in sharp opposition to one another as if they were two distinct units. When the reality of corporate bodies is discovered, it seems a facile solution of the old puzzles to take these bodies as the concrete fact and to dismiss both the individual and the state as abstractions made from them on opposite sides. That is to say, this point of view refuses to go beyond the kind of unities which have already appeared in Hegel's account of civil society, and it dismisses the conception of a system of these systems.

This attitude, which tinges a considerable range of political thought to-day, is ultimately unsound. It attempts to confer on these social groups—corporations of one kind and another—the finality which it confesses does not belong to particular

men. But every argument which can be used to show that the particular man is not complete in himself applies also to these individual groups. Each of these larger corporate personalities is a growth within a wider whole and depends throughout on that whole. It will be enough to indicate one point here, using the guilds as an example. Each of these bodies was specialized; it had a particular function of its own, differentiating it from other guilds. None of them was self-sufficing: each covered, or tried to cover, the whole field in some one respect—to manufacture all the rope, spin all the yarn, make all the glass, &c.—but none could pretend to deal with the whole range of the practical life. This differentiation did not rend human life; and the underlying unity brought the guilds into relation to one another, connecting them by economic relations, defining the rights and privileges of each by law and custom, and constituting a totality which transcended each. The same thing is true of other corporate bodies. A trade-union, a church, a university, a political party, and so forth—each of these is an organ which obtains a purpose and a field only within the wider social whole which it articulates in one direction. It is an organism, no doubt; but it is so because it is also an organ of a wider organism within which alone it can exist.

The force of this contention is not to be avoided by the assertion that this wider social whole is simply the sum of these corporate bodies. The real community is not a mere sum or aggregate, any more than these bodies themselves are mere aggregates of particular people. The institutions of which society is comprised do not simply lie alongside one another, but are interdependent; for each is meaningless and impossible apart from the broad stream of social life in its entirety.

The deeper unities which bind the lesser systems of civil society together must—like all other forms of spiritual life—become explicit. As forms of objective mind, they must become real social organizations, manifesting and achieving the reconciliation of the interests which develop within them. That is to say, they demand realization in an institution which will be supreme over every other phase of society. The right and duty of this institution is to bring to a real and objective harmony the various interests which are

involved in one another, and which by their conflict and confusion would otherwise mar the whole from which they come and on which they depend. Civil society implies the state.

From this point of view the state is not an abstraction from the whole stream of life ; it is society itself brought to its final unity and made harmonious. It is not limited to the officials who are most obviously its servants, the king, the members of the government, the police, and the like, but comprises every citizen within the community. The lesser organizations within it are the substance of which it is composed, and it cannot be separated from them.

.. The state in relation to its contents can be regarded from two points of view. On the one hand, it is the unity to which they rise. It is not a form forced upon them from without, but the outcome of their own nature and needs. As it comes to be in the course of history its special characteristics are conditioned and determined by the lower principles of organization which run through society. The precise functions which it undertakes, and the special machinery which it uses, depend on the structure of the social life of the time. And the very alterations and regulations which it produces are those which are inherent in the social fabric itself. That is to say, it is the 'idea' of which the various forms of civil society are the moments. On the other hand, it is the principle, the 'notion', which is realized by these lesser institutions. It determines their functions, limits their spheres, and co-ordinates them in accordance with its own character. The relation is two-sided—integration and differentiation ; and the two aspects are complementary.

From this point of view the opposition between patriotism and political freedom disappears. The state has the same double relation to the individual. On the one hand, the individual must be aware that the state is something external to him, determining him, and even constraining him. The state must stand above every private interest within it and must have power to mould any of its factors, however powerful that factor may be. To it any member may appeal for protection and defence against any other ; it is the supreme judge and has supreme right. On the other hand, the individual must know that the state is not an alien power,

but the expression and realization of his own rational principle. It is only his caprice which is constrained ; his genuine will is emancipated and maintained. In the state and the various organizations which it contains the individual is universalized ; his purposes obtain their content and significance from the social world ; and the ends which he seeks are social. Consequently he can achieve these ends in their fullness, that is to say, can realize himself, only if he takes account of the nature of society and the principles by which it is constituted. An anti-social act attacks its own substance and is opposed to itself.

The individual, however, does not lose his identity in becoming aware of his universal character. It has often been pointed out that, as we rise in the scale of organic life, diversity of function and organ increases. The members become less like the whole or like one another in becoming more closely bound up with the whole. And in the state the universal principle realizes itself through the widest diversity. The differences of nature, capacity, climate, and circumstance in general are carried up into the state and are used by it. The various natural differences of civil society are themselves the reflection of the characteristics of the men who constitute it, and the state preserves these features. It is in virtue of this preservation and idealization of natural differences that the state claims the loyalty of the citizen. It is the organized common life in which all that he is and all that he holds dear are sustained, and of which they are phases. True patriotism rests on this identity of the individual and the state ; it springs from the various institutions and spheres in which the individual lives, and is his participation in the common life expressed in the medium of feeling. It is not a sporadic emotion called into play only in the crises of the state's history—though no doubt it is of the utmost value there. It is rather the firm devotion to the state pervading the common life of citizenship, and it is found in every act which builds up and sustains the fabric of our common institutions.

Taken from another side this is political freedom. Everything that builds up a man's self and provides a field for the powers thus constituted is a means to freedom ; and it is only in the state that man can find and fulfil his practical

ends. Necessity, as we have seen, is hard and sad only when it is external; when that which contains the individual and into which he passes is seen not to be an other but his own substance, necessity becomes freedom—and this is the only freedom that counts. The restraints of public life are the articulations which the state requires in order to attain its proper unity and organization, and the citizen who is conscious of his identity with the state is made free by them.

This is the general standpoint from which Hegel regards the state: his task is now to set forth the principles through which it is realized. I do not think that he is completely successful in his attempt to do this, and the course of the dialectic is not altogether clear in this region. We saw at an early stage of our discussion¹ that the dialectic, although a thoroughly rational method, is not *a priori* or independent of experience. In the order of learning, though not in the logical order, experience is prior to philosophy. Each of us comes into life, as it were, at a corner; and before he can map the main features of the whole, each must travel over the area and have some sort of contact with it all. Philosophy, as Hegel has told us, must wait until reality has completed itself; and so long as some essential form of reality has not yet come to light, the philosophy of the sphere to which it belongs must be imperfect. Hence, in his account of the state, Hegel has to deal with it as it had already manifested itself in history; it was no part of his philosophic task to evolve a 'perfect' state out of his own inner consciousness. He has laid hold of some of the essential characteristics of the state, and in many respects his account is valid for all time. Nevertheless, all that a state can be had not appeared in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and Hegel's insight was limited.

In addition to this, Hegel stood too near the object he was studying. He lived in stirring political times, and he, like a good citizen, tried to play his part in the mighty struggles around him. When he was a student at college the French Revolution broke out. Then came the war of the old order against the new. The struggle between the reforming king and the conservative people in his native state of Würtemberg focussed his ideas, and led to his earliest political writing.

¹ E.g., p. 53.

Before his mind was fully mature—Hegel ripened late—and when his view of the world was still gradually falling into shape, his eyes were opened to the radical weakness of Germany, and, probably after the shock of the treaty of Lunéville, he indicated the unreality of the German Empire. The Empire was dissolved in 1806; three months later Prussia was overthrown at Jena, and Hegel had to leave the university there to turn schoolmaster at Nürnberg. These stirring events before his eyes are reflected in his writings. The *Phenomenology* was his most mature work up to this point, and one looks in vain through it for a satisfactory appreciation of the state. He saw the weakness of the states of Germany; and he was convinced—with the facts before him—that nothing but the shock of war would reorganize them. But his material did not present to him the clear outlines of the ideal on which that reorganization should depend. To this is largely due the way in which he passes from conscience to religion in the *Phenomenology* without developing the higher reaches of the ethical world. Like most other great thinkers, in the failure of the objective world to manifest its full rationality he fell back on the deeper rationality of the world as a whole in its direct relation to the individual.

While Hegel was at Nürnberg the political tide turned. In 1812 came Napoleon's Russian campaign; in 1813 the battle of Leipzig, and in 1815 Waterloo. The regeneration of Germany had begun through the War of Liberation, and Prussia had redeemed herself. In 1817 Hegel, now at Heidelberg, published the *Encyclopaedia*, and in it the change of his thought is plain. The state had again become manifest to him, and in Prussia he saw the outlines of the political state which his thought required. Prussia was the political soul of Germany, and to it Hegel turned like most of the great German thinkers of that and the next generation. But although Prussia had a political organization and strength which served Germany well in her time of need, she had not all the elements of strength which a true state must have. She was strong for the essential purpose then, but she was far from perfect. Hegel was too much immersed in his times to see this clearly. He had seen how much Prussia could give, and had given, to Germany; and although he did not,

as is sometimes supposed, simply write down the Prussian constitution as the outline of the state, he failed to separate distinctly the essential and universal from the accidental and local. The lesson of the times seemed so strong : the weakness of south Germany in political activity in contrast with the strength of the north ; the particularism of the smaller states in contrast with the unity of Prussia ; and behind this there was, as Hegel saw it in his more mature years, the futility of the populace in the French Revolution till a strong man took things in hand and a real government was restored. Napoleon, as well as Germany itself, both in his strength and in his weakness, helped to form Hegel's political theory ; and it is not at all surprising that the violence with which all these tendencies pointed in one direction prevented Hegel from seeing that he had not measured every force which political life has to put forth.

Hegel saw clearly what he had to do : he had to describe the essential nature of the state as such, to explain what it is to be a true state. He did not falter in his attitude to the immanent reality of political life. The principles of reason are as settled and necessary here as elsewhere. A glance over the various political organizations which have appeared in history seems, at first sight, to reveal a diversity of kinds of state. These have been classified into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy ; and it has been alleged that there is no perfect kind of state, but that each must be considered appropriate to its times and conditions. Hegel's reply is that this classification is partly superficial and partly—as Plato thought—an account of inferior and imperfect expressions of the truth. The distinctions apply to undeveloped states, where antitheses between one ruler, a few, and a multitude have a fairly clear meaning. But in a true state the government is one *and* several *and* many. The politics in which these aspects are separated may be adjusted to their circumstances ; but this is because the social world has not fully developed itself in them, and its higher characteristics are still latent. In any case, distinctions of quantity, even if relevant, would not go to the root of the matter : they could not explain adequately the essential differences of such concrete expressions of mind as types of state would be—if there were more than one type of state. As it is, ' those three

forms are indifferent from the point of view of the 'idea' in the opposite sense [opposite to the view that it does not matter which is adopted], because one and all they are not adequate to the "idea" in its rational development, and in none of them can it obtain its right and reality.'¹ From the philosophic point of view we are not concerned with the historical origin of the state, either as a whole or with reference to particular states; we have to indicate its rational and universal categories, the principles which are implied in its nature.²

Of course, on the other hand, the constitution of the state is not divorced from the world of fact. A constitution cannot be imposed upon nations from without.³ Nor is it ever 'made', if making means some artificial work of thought. 'A constitution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development, and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its conception. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and, be it added, the history is only that spirit's history) by which constitutions have been and are made.'⁴ But behind the spirit of each particular people and its polity lies the one universal rational mind, and each form is a manifestation, more or less imperfect, of the ultimate immanent truth. It is with this inherent form, this final reality of the state, that we have to do at present.

The basis of the state is the nation. Napoleon made this clear to Hegel if nothing else did. But a nation in itself is not a state: and here again Hegel could draw on his own experience. A nation is held together by natural and emotional ties: kinship, propinquity, language, and so forth, are the modes of its union; and although the state ought to preserve these it must have more. By themselves national ties are indefinite and subjective. The unity of the people has to be given real existence through objective forms. The differences which develop in the community in the realm of civil society must be subordinated and brought back into unity; and this can be done only by the state. Social life will not fall into harmony at a mere shake of the hand, and

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 273

² *V. ibid.* § 258.

³ *V. ibid.* § 274 and note.

⁴ *Encyclopaedia*, § 540; Wallace, p. 137.

it is vain to expect it to present itself as truly organic unless the actual syntheses which constitute it are allowed to come into being.

Hegel's treatment of the state falls into three parts: firstly, its internal structure—the constitution; secondly, its relation, as a particular state, to other states beyond it—international law; thirdly, the wider development of mind in the world, of which each particular state is only a special phase—universal history.

The constitution of the state is the way in which it brings its various component parts into focus, or, to look at it from the other side, develops itself into the diversity of concrete life. In relation to the individuals within it, its work, as we have seen, is two-fold. 'Firstly, it maintains them as persons, thus making right a necessary reality, then it promotes their welfare, which each originally takes care of for himself, but which has a thoroughly universal side; it protects the family and guides civil society. Secondly, it carries both back, and the whole disposition and action of the individual—whose tendency is to become a centre of his own—into the life of the universal substance; and in this direction, as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and retains them in substantial immanence.'¹

The constitution is realized in the government. It is through the government that the natural differences which arise in the community are brought back into unity, and 'those general aims of the whole which rise above the function of the family and of civil society' are carried out in the lower spheres. To this end the government must be a complex whole, with various aspects depending on the main functions which it has to perform, but not divided into parts entirely independent of one another.

It is easy, but fatal, to simplify the conception of the government by dropping one or other of the two sides. On the one hand, it has been held that the main departments of government should be independent of one another—legislature, executive, and judiciary, and that these should be balanced against one another to provide a check on each. Hegel rejects this. He insists, as we shall see, on the element of truth which it contains—the development of the unity

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 537; cf. Wallace, pp. 131-2.

of the whole into real difference—but he points out that it overlooks the essential unity of the state. In some way or other we must be able to regard the parts as articulations of one whole and as having the spirit and authority of the whole in them. They do not merely comprise a mechanical system; each speaks with the authority of the whole. The legislature enacts laws for and in the name of the whole state; the judiciary defines them by the same authority; and the executive acts on behalf of the same common will. These powers do not act each for itself; they stand for the whole, and run back into it.

On the other hand, the government must branch forth into real differences, and its moments must have organizations of their own. 'The one essential canon to make freedom deep and real is to give every business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organization wherever they are essentially distinct: for freedom is deep only when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differences manifested in existence.'¹

At this point an ambiguity creeps into Hegel's exposition. There are two—perhaps we should say three—accounts given by him of the categories involved in the further development of the constitution, and they do not altogether agree. We may state the data before considering the problem they raise.

According to the *Encyclopaedia* the constitution realized in the government has two moments. In the first place, the unity of the state requires an ultimate point of reference, a supreme will in which the will of the whole can be expressed. This, in the true state, is not 'a so-called "moral person", or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which the unity of the decreeing will has not a *real* existence), but a real individual—the will of one decreeing individual'—a monarch.² 'The monarchical constitution', Hegel adds, 'is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.' In the second place, the differentiation of the unity of the state leads to the distinction of the various branches of the government—'legislative power, administration of justice or judicial power, administration and police, and its conse-

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 541; cf. Wallace, p. 138.

² § 542; cf. Wallace, p. 139.

quent distribution between particular boards or offices, which having their business appointed by law, to that end and for that reason, possess independence of action, without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision.'¹ Moreover, a special official class comes into being, fulfilling the duties of these departments and looking after the general purposes of the community committed to them. Hegel's conception, as we shall see, is meant to be that of a constitutional monarchy and not a despotism. But we are concerned at present with the form rather than the content of his exposition.

When we turn to the *Philosophy of Right*, we find a different analysis. In § 273 Hegel gives an outline of the elements of the constitution. These are: '(a) the power of determining and establishing the universal—the legislative power; (b) the subsumption of special spheres and individual cases under the universal—the administrative power; (c) subjectivity as the final decision of the will—the power of the prince.' That is to say, the first moment of the *Encyclopaedia* is the third here, and the second of the *Encyclopaedia* is divided into the first and second of this paragraph.

But when Hegel goes on in the *Philosophy of Right* to expound these categories, he turns them round and brings the arrangement into line with the *Encyclopaedia* in some respects, taking as the first moment the power of the prince, as the second the administration, and as the third the legislature.

I do not know how Hegel would have accounted for these different presentations. They do not seem capable of reconciliation as they stand; and it is obvious that from the point of view of the dialectic they cannot all be true, however far each of them may rest on genuine phases of the facts. I think that Hegel has fallen into error here, and that none of these accounts is satisfactory, and I shall try to indicate the element which perverts them. Broadly speaking, the categories of this sphere should be three: firstly, the universal element; secondly, the particular one; and thirdly, the union of the two. The analysis in § 273 of the *Philosophy of Right* seems to be the soundest in principle of the three offered.

The first moment of the state is the establishing of the universal; the defining of the rational and common principles

¹ § 543; Wallace, p. 140.

of social justice and duty. This category is not the law itself, nor the legislative assembly, nor the electors, nor the law courts. It is a movement of the whole state, and the entire community is therefore immanent in it. 'The constitution is rational', says Hegel truly, 'in so far as the state distinguishes and determines its activity within itself in accordance with the nature of its notion; that is to say, in such a fashion that each of its functions is itself the whole in that it has the other moments active and operative within it.'¹ The first moment is the whole state in one aspect: it is the law growing and developing from the body of the people, including all the forces which produce it—custom, judicial decision, electors, assemblies, and king, taken together as one organic totality.²

The second category of the constitution is the aspect of differentiation whereby the laws are put into force, the general ends they prescribe cared for, and society regulated in accordance with them. It includes an analysis of the distinction between various administrative bodies, indicating the general ways in which social life calls for regulation and supervision. It, too, is to be regarded concretely, including the whole range of activity directed definitely to the common good, from the acts of the supreme head of the state down to the duties of the ordinary citizen to assist the police and prevent the commission of crime.

The third category is the whole state, sovereign within its own borders, making and enforcing law, and building up a common life in every fibre of the social tissue. It is not the prince, but the entire concrete organism.

Why does Hegel depart from this line of thought which he has himself so nearly indicated? The answer will take us back to his historical conditions. In § 274 of the *Philosophy of Right*, he has indicated—correctly, I think—two of the moments of the state. But the third is slightly distorted. In order that universality and particularity may come together, he thinks, they must meet in a particular man, the king; and thus the highest reality of the state is identified with the monarch. This last point is unsound, as I shall try to show, but we may first ask what led Hegel to express such a view.

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 272.

² V. *Encyclopaedia*, § 544.

In his native state of Würtemberg he had seen the inability of the old feudal nobility and the other classes of the community to rid themselves of the encrusted traditions and private rights of a dead past and organize themselves in accordance with the changed times. The king had sought to give a new and what appeared to be a more rational constitution, and Hegel had sided with him. The king had failed, but what struck Hegel most was the contrast between the impotence of the parts of the state to form a living unity and the reforming zeal of the ruler. Then, there was the chaos of the French Revolution, even under the Directory, until a new point of focus was obtained in Napoleon. Again, the weakness of the Holy Roman Empire was vividly before him—an Empire where the Emperor did not rule and where the parts destroyed the whole. Lastly, there was the power of unified Prussia with its autocratic king and its centralized government. The obvious lesson was the need of a single supreme authority—advised by ministers and constitutional in action, no doubt, but nevertheless supreme, and a centre for the whole life of the state. Collective bodies with majority rule, Hegel thought, had failed, and must fail: in any stress they showed that they were not real unities. To be a reality the unity of the state must be embodied in a single man.

Taking this view, Hegel over-emphasized its importance; and it led him to make the king one of the three moments of the constitution. The only moment with which the monarch can plausibly be identified, so long as the general analysis we have made is adhered to, is the third—the whole state. 'The princely power', Hegel tells us, 'contains in itself the three moments of the totality, the universality of the constitution and the laws; deliberation as the reference of the particular to the universal; and the moment of the final decision as self-determination into which everything else goes back, and from which everything receives the source of its reality.'¹ But why, we may ask, does Hegel not adhere to this identification in practice? Why do we have two other accounts in which the power of the prince comes first and not third? The reason is that the conception of the monarch, as Hegel takes it, is an abstraction and not the real synthesis which is required. It is the particularity of the king, his existence as

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 275.

a single person, that Hegel is upholding; and this would lead to the conception of an absolute autocrat. But such a king is not the state itself, and it is false to say that his decision is the real will of the state whatever he may say. The royal will, for Hegel, is the real will only if it is free from the caprice of the individual. And so Hegel tells us that the king only gives the form and not the substance to the acts of the state. He dots the 'i's', and says 'yes' when he is told.¹

Hegel thus is faced by a dilemma. On the one hand, if he stands fast by the contention that the third moment of the state, the final truth of it, is the individual monarch, he will be forced to treat his will as complete in itself and as having absolute right. The king's decision will be law of itself, and the royal prerogative will cover the whole field of political life. Such a monarch is not bound to act constitutionally—in the ordinary sense of the term. It is not the King-in-Council or the King-in-Parliament that is supreme; but the king by himself. On the other hand, if Hegel tries to take the conception of sovereignty concretely, the king becomes only one aspect of the whole notion, the mere form. His councillors, his people, the whole system of law and order are implied in his will as a constitutional monarch, and he, as a particular person, is a mere abstraction, the form without the content. In face of this difficulty Hegel is forced to compromise. He retains the individual monarch as one of the three main dialectic principles, but recognizes its abstract character; and he begins with sovereignty, thus understood, as the first category instead of treating it as the last.

Hegel is not altogether wrong in setting sovereignty in the foreground in this fashion. Each category of the state is a phase of sovereignty. The legislature is sovereignty in its abstract universal form; the administration is sovereignty in relation to detail; and the totality of the state is real sovereignty. This last category is sovereignty as individual; not as a particular person of course, but as a real self-conscious unified world of social good. Hegel's mistake is to confine sovereignty to the king, that is to say, to take it only abstractly and not concretely.

In the light of this criticism it is desirable to reverse Hegel's actual treatment in the *Philosophy of Right* and consider the

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, § 280 note.

categories in the proper order: The first of these is the legislature.

There is a line of thought which traces all law back to the people, and which expresses its faith in the ultimate authority of the whole body of the citizens by the watchword 'the sovereignty of the people'. In a sense the position is sound, but it is often interpreted in an individualistic fashion. In this latter case it is made the basis of appeals away from the organizations which normally legislate, to the mass of the electors; and it goes behind parliament by means of the Referendum and similar conceptions. According to this point of view the state is an aggregate, and one must simply count the units on each side in order to decide an issue. Hegel rejects this doctrine. 'The people, apart from its monarch and from the organization of the whole, required by and bound up with its connexion with him, is a formless mass which is no longer a state and lacks all the characteristics found only in a whole having a definite structure.'¹ The people or nation, in this sense, is an abstraction which has dropped exactly those social and ethical elements which constitute right in this realm. It is the *vulgus* and not the *populus*; 'and in this direction, it is the sole aim of the state that a nation should *not* come to existence, to power and action, *as such an aggregate*.'² It is a mistake, Hegel insists, to identify political freedom with such a conception; for it attempts to make the individual prior to the state and, indeed, to deny the reality of the state itself. On the contrary, the individual does not enter directly into the state, but through mediating systems; and he shares in the sovereignty of the whole, not as an independent unity, but as modified and conditioned by his whole status in the community. The people is sovereign only as so organized. Accordingly the legislature is not a mere representative body, mechanically registering the dictates of the multitude. Its roots are in the deep formative agencies of the common life, the customs and modes of being which characterize the nation as a living whole. Common law is law as well as statute.

In parliament, however, we have the most definite and powerful organ of the legislature. It is self-conscious, and can look forwards as well as backwards; it can over-ride the

¹ *Ibid.* § 279.

² *Encyclopaedia*, § 544.

common law ; and it is thus the most complete embodiment of the legislature. For Hegel it, too, has to be conceived as a unity of differences ; and the conception by which his account is governed is that of mediation. On the one hand we have the crowd, on the other the king ; the legislative chambers lie between and unite the two extremes. The legislature, Hegel says, contains the other two moments of the constitution within it, viz. the executive and the monarch. The monarch makes the ultimate decision—gives his name to the law—and the executive guides and advises the deliberations. The executive should not be separated from the legislature ; it is better that it should have a place in the latter and be held responsible by it. Further, Hegel divides parliament into two houses ; one consisting of the substantial and landed classes, the other of representatives of the various industrial and social organizations within the state. The former section of the community Hegel regards as naturally set apart for political service. The institution of primogeniture prevalent in it gives it something in common with the prince, and at the same time it shares the wants and rights of the mass of the people. Thus it mediates between the monarch and civil society, and is a support to each. The house of representatives, as we may call it, contains the spokesmen of the various civil institutions. Hegel puts aside the notion of a purely democratic equality. What is to be represented is not the individual as such, but the institution or interest ; and class representation is the right principle. Of course, the delegates chosen must be fit for the post, and must regard the common weal as the supreme interest ; and to that end Hegel favours a property qualification. But they are not *mere* representatives ; they embody the class interest itself, and it is desirable that they should be members of the class concerned. Every substantial interest ought to be present in this house of representatives and fulfil its part in governing itself and the country.

Some points in this view call for remark. In the first place, Hegel is right in rejecting the conception of the sovereignty of the people in the sense of the mob. Whether or not the plebiscite and similar measures are to be recommended in certain circumstances, they are not the ultimate and highest form of political right. Public opinion is, of course, behind

the legislature, or rather is in it as its lowest stratum ; but as a form of sovereignty it is organized in parliament.

Secondly, Hegel recognizes the real basis of the popular franchise—that it is not an off-set against paying taxes, but that it springs from ‘ the right of the collective spirit to appear as an *externally universal* will, acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public concerns ’. Through it the individual citizens are definitely recognized as part of the whole and sharers in its government. He also points out the need for the action of public opinion on officialdom in order to keep the administration in touch with the sources of the national life. At the same time, it is at least doubtful if Hegel grasped fully the value of this element, and he was rather impatient of it in practice. He was not entirely blind to the educative influence of participation in government on the citizen, but the weakness of democracy in his age is reflected in his tone. He reserves questions like peace and war from popular control,¹ and he qualifies the freedom found by individuals in this field as ‘ subjective ’. Hegel tended at times to under-estimate the solid rationality of the populace and to over-estimate the ability of disinterested officials to recognize the real tendencies and needs of the nation. Where he stood he could not see all that the French Revolution produced, nor the limitations of the Prussian regeneration of Germany. Reality had not completed its formative process—nor has it done so yet.

In the third place some of the elements of Hegel’s parliament are reflections of his own time, and do not correspond to more modern conditions. The position of the landlord and noble has changed in the more industrialized communities ; the guilds have disappeared ; trade has become more indifferent to national boundaries, and even in these days it would be rash to suppose that the hands of the clock will turn back again. The representation of the people by classes and guilds is less feasible now than in Hegel’s time, for the ordinary citizen has a larger number of allegiances than before and is less easily swallowed up by one of them. It is difficult for any man to separate the accidents of his age from the essential and timeless, and Hegel does not entirely surmount the difficulty.

Lastly, the distortion of the dialectic which we have noticed gives the whole conception of the legislature a

¹ *Encyclopaedia*, § 544.

mechanical look. The king and the people enter it at opposite ends, and they are brought together by suitable connecting links. By reason of his emphasis on the individual reality of the king, Hegel fails to treat the phases of the legislature as the inherent differentiation of the whole sovereign body in this its first phase, and his thought needs recasting.

The second of the three moments of the state is the administration. It consists of the various officials who work out the will of the prince, bringing matters before his notice and carrying out his decisions. Its members, Hegel says, constitute the most considerable part of the middle class, and by their action the general spirit of the state is realized. Their task also is essentially that of mediation ; they stand between the prince on the one hand and the various individual constituents of the popular life on the other. They have to busy themselves with the ends of private persons and with the phases of civil society ; regulating things so that private welfare is cared for on the one hand, and the common good realized in individual activities on the other. They are both administrators of the prince's commands and advisers to him. These officials have no private right to their offices : their appointment depends on the one hand on the will of the prince, and on the other on their fitness for the discharge of the duties of their offices. They are members of the universal class, working not for private gain, but carrying out objective ends. The performance of their functions is directly both a duty and a right, and the failure to perform them an offence against the state. Since they are organs of the whole they can be regarded as limiting and limited by the other organs. On the one hand they define the activities of the prince and give them existence, and also supervise and control the activities of private persons and associations. Voluntary associations sometimes act as if they were fully independent, and set themselves up as states within the state. The administration must prevent this. One method of dealing with the difficulty is to mingle the free choice of interested persons in the election of the officers of such associations with some ratification by a higher authority ; but the sphere, Hegel says, is always open to a certain amount of contingency, and is the less efficiently supervised by the executive the more trivial are the interests at issue.

The other side of this is the limitation of the administration in turn by the other aspects. Civil society, with which the executive is in direct contact, exercises a certain influence, and opposes some friction to its efforts. And in the last resort the prince may interfere from above and overrule any act which is not in accordance with the general weal. This intervention is needed particularly when social institutions are still in the making, and the organization of the lower grades of society is defective or altogether lacking.

In view of the considerations which we have urged in connexion with the legislature, little comment is needed on this conception of the administration. Hegel conceives it too narrowly and too mechanically. It is really the articulation of the law, the whole system by which the common will is enforced. Like the legislature it includes the whole nation, from the king to the ordinary citizen. Hegel treats it too much as a class of officials—as a certain *part* of the state lying intermediate between two extremes, and bounded by the other functions. But surely this conception of definition, limitation, balance, or however else it is named, falls *within* this category. The conception of the administration should be articulated by Hegel so that king, parliament, judiciary, police, and ordinary citizen are shown to have different phases of the administrative work committed to them by the nature of society itself. Their inter-relations fall within the administration itself; making it something greater than a mere class in the middle reaches of society. Hegel is misled here by the general error which marks his treatment of all these categories. Instead of articulating a real movement of society as a whole, he has begun by fixing two end points, and he puts in the administration to fill up the gap between them.

One further suggestion may be made in this connexion. Hegel might have taken up his theory of punishment again at this point. In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that the fundamental aspect of punishment, retribution, is only its abstract notion; and in the social world it develops new phases and becomes more concrete.¹ This is the point at which the transformation should have been brought out; but Hegel's false step makes him overlook it. He thinks too much of the official and too little of the transformed society.

¹ Chap. VII, p. 151.

The third and final aspect of the constitution includes the first two: we may call it concrete sovereignty. Sovereignty has been a perplexing conception in the history of political thought; and the 'understanding', as Hegel would call it, has always sought to identify sovereignty with an abstraction, and has awarded it a 'seat' in various parts of the body politic. From this point of view sovereignty is looked upon as power over the rest of society; that is to say, as the rule of one over another. But in the end this is the essential conception of slavery; and the criticism which holds of slavery holds here also.¹ Against this we must urge that sovereignty in an ethical state must ultimately be the same thing as freedom; and what is true of freedom with regard to the self holds of this larger freedom also. If it is false to locate freedom in some irresponsible, or superlatively powerful, *part* of the self—impulse, will, caprice, and so on—on the ground that nothing less than the whole self is free; then it is also false to find true sovereignty in anything short of a whole self-governing system in which the governor and the governed are two aspects of the same whole. The distinctions drawn by the 'understanding'—the 'seat' of sovereignty and the like—are no doubt true distinctions; but they imply a deeper unity through which alone the abstract sovereignty they express is made possible. Freedom in the state ultimately rests on will; and no part of the whole is strong enough to govern the whole if the will of the whole is not on its side.

Hegel, however, moved by political considerations which I have already tried to indicate, does not give full weight to this point. He identifies sovereignty with the prince. He sees, of course, the weakness of any conception of sovereignty which does not carry up the whole people into it; and it is essential to his view that the monarchy should be constitutional. Thus he says: 'Although the monarch appears as the highest point of the constitution, still one must grant that a conquered people is not identical in the constitution with the prince. A rising in a province conquered by war is different from a rebellion in a well-organized state. The conquered are not in revolt against their prince, and they commit no offence against the state, for they are not united in the "idea" with the lord, nor in the inward necessity of the constitution:

¹ Cf. above, p. 96 f.

there is only a contract and not the bond which holds a state together. "I am not your prince; I am your master," said Napoleon to the deputies from Erfurt.¹ Nevertheless, by his over-emphasis of this pinnacle or summit of the constitution, as he regards it, Hegel makes the sovereign an abstraction and not a concrete reality; and he distorts his notion by applying features which properly belong to the whole of society taken concretely to a single individual person within it.

His exposition takes the following form. In the first place, sovereignty involves the ideality of all the other powers of the state. They refer back to a single unity of which they are functions and representatives. Moreover, there is no private property in public offices. Official powers are not based in private wills, and those who exercise them are appointed not on account of any right of possession but through the will of the sovereign. In a community where the various functions of public life are not referred to the whole but are vested in independent communities or even in individuals, the true nature of sovereignty is not present, and the state is not realized. The true sovereign is the life of the social organism from which no element can be isolated without political death.

The second element of sovereignty is that of particularity. Sovereignty exists, of course, only in the medium of mind, but it is not a mere universal; for the state exists only through the real unity and identity of this its highest truth. Accordingly the sovereign must be a mind in which the various moments of the state have an explicit and independent realization. That is to say, the sovereign is not 'individuality in general, but one individual, the monarch'.²

In the third place, the sovereign acquires the dignity of monarch by a right of nature, viz. birth. Hegel's treatment of this point is curious. A hereditary monarchy is not merely a device to avoid contests for supreme power; it is the rational conception. The sovereign is an existing individual; the self of the state, as it were, has come alive and taken shape as a natural fact. But since the entire content of sovereignty is the common will, the authority and power which accrues to the prince is not his in virtue of any private excellences or faculties. It comes into being in and as him, but all that it requires of him is bare natural existence. It is not his

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 281 note. ² *Ibid.* § 279.

private possession, and its material is objective and common. The monarch cannot be capricious in his acts ; for his power is grounded in will and not blind force. ' He is bound to the concrete content of the councils, and when the constitution is fixed, he has often no more to do than to sign his name.' ¹ Now, what the state requires of the monarch is natural existence ; it must not withdraw half-way and cancel its loan. The monarch comes into being by birth, and the process of generation is an essential ingredient in the conception of him as a particular existing fact in nature. Thus, having abstracted from all his special qualities, we can connect him with his office only by that aspect which he adds to the common will, namely his natural existence ; and so he takes his place on the throne simply because he is the son of his father.

The weakness of Hegel's whole treatment of sovereignty comes to a head in this doctrine. He generalizes from too narrow an experience when he says that a real unity must be a single particular man. The state does not come into existence in the *king taken by himself* ; and on the other hand, it does become real in any and every good citizen taken in his proper context. The state gets natural existence at many points and not at one alone ; consequently all that Hegel says about hereditary monarchy is wide of the mark.

Hegel's treatment of the sphere is not valid for all time. Nevertheless, it contains much that is true and suggestive. There is much to be said for the contention that the constitutional monarch, as the pinnacle of the state, is a satisfactory means of giving coherence to the whole and bringing the elements into unity. It does not really matter whether the individual who fills this position is called a king or a president, and holds it for life or for a shorter period ; nor yet whether the office is elective or hereditary. These are things of local time and circumstance, forms which the reality may wear differently in different ages. Although Hegel did not see this, and exalted the office of the king to a higher place than it can rightfully claim, we can say of him as Ranke said of Bacon : ' He loved the monarchy because he expected great things from it.'

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 279 note.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LIMITS OF THE STATE

IN the previous chapter we saw that Hegel's theory of the state falls into three parts: the constitution, international law, and universal history. We have already discussed the first of these, and in this chapter we have to consider the two remaining divisions.

In the first place we have to deal with his view of the relation of states to one another from the point of view of right. Each state is an individual, and it implies other individuals beyond it. The final category of the constitution was, although Hegel disguises the fact, real sovereignty; and in it the state is presented as a self-determining system, rounded on itself, and standing forth in the world as a self-dependent unit. From this point of view all the internal differences of society become submerged, and the solidity of the citizen and his state stands out. This is most obvious in the case of war. The purely civil state, Hegel thinks, is apt to lose vigour; the differences within it tend to harden into open conflict and strife; and men overlook the supreme unity pervading the whole. In relation to another state these differences dissolve again, and the individuality of the state is made manifest. In our moments of edification we speak of the transitoriness and insufficiency of mundane things, but each of us takes it as applying chiefly to other people, and thinks that he will retain his own goods and chattels. 'But if this uncertainty expresses itself in earnest in the form of hussars with gleaming sabres, that moving edification which was prepared for everything turns round and pours forth curses on the conqueror.'¹ In devotion to the state, and perhaps the sacrifice of one's life for it, the fundamental identity of the individual with the state is realized; and this devotion and sacrifice is ultimately a duty binding on the citizen. In this relation ordinary virtues are transformed, or perhaps it

¹ *Ibid.* § 324 note.

would be better to say, come to themselves. Courage ceases to be a mere individual fearlessness, and becomes an act in which the individual joins himself with his nation and opposes himself to another state. Courage becomes wider in its content in this way, and is as much a social as a personal characteristic.

Each state is sovereign, and beyond it there is no recognized higher authority on earth. Consequently, the relation of states to one another is not on the same footing as that of individuals within the state. This consideration influences Hegel's account of the moral character of the state profoundly. His view turns on two points. On the one hand Hegel cannot treat the state as a mere non-moral fact, free from all obligation and right. We have traced the forms in which mind realizes itself and makes the outward world the body of a living spirit : we have seen how each succeeding form of mind in the dialectic carries up the elements which have appeared before it. At the present level—mind realized in the state—we cannot reverse this process and look at the world in which states are individuals as if it were not governed by rational and ethical laws. The dialectic is still within the field of right, and the category which it has put forth must be instinct with all the value and good that right can command. If this be not so, the entire ethical world collapses. If considerations of right do not bind states together and control their dealings with one another ; if each state can be looked upon by other states as a mere fact, of no inherent worth and deserving of no more respect than it can exact by force ; then the ethical world culminates in a form in which mind is not revealed, and where brute fact is master. Doubtless there is a sense in which reality is a higher category than others which at first sight seem more akin to finite mind, e. g. those of the moral sphere.¹ But in this sense reality is at the opposite pole from mere fact, from the abstract world of nature which lies below explicit mind altogether. It is rather the comprehensive whole to whose character finite mind is a more trustworthy guide than any purely objective thing, and which needs those lesser categories of mind in order to make itself manifest. Reality is higher than morality

¹ Cf. Bosanquet's treatment of necessity and reality, *Logic*, Bk. I. Chap. VI.

because it is more moral ; that is to say, because it achieves all that morality aims at and more.

On the other hand, Hegel cannot allow objective mind to culminate in a form with a lower objectivity and reality than that of any preceding category. Right, at this level, must be something present in the world, something carried into effect and accomplished openly. An unrealized ideal, a mere 'ought', at this stage would loosen the hold of all objective mind on the solid world. The ethical life would be directed and organized by a principle which was not immanent in the world and upheld by the whole nature of things : it would lack authority and power.

Hegel seeks to avoid these two dangers, though not with complete success. He admits that 'the relation of states ought to be inherently right' ; but he maintains that this relation cannot be directly identified with private morality. There is a court over individuals enforcing the common interest against the divergencies of wrong-minded individuals, but there is no similar court over states to enforce any code of international law. States are self-dependent sovereign beings ; they make agreements with one another, but they do not thereby build up a body of positive, binding, and objective law.¹ Kant had looked forward to a condition of everlasting peace, and was attracted by the notion of an alliance of states which would adjudicate disputes between them. But for Hegel, with his eyes on the Holy Alliance, this conception is a dream. It forgets that each state is sovereign, and hence that its adherence to the alliance is contingent, depending on the individual will of each ruler. At the best, he argues, the contracting parties would merely be allies ; and if one broke away from the group, or in any other way infringed its treaty obligations, it would not be faced by an impartial magistrate but by other individuals on a level with itself. Moreover, he thinks, if a group of states did continue in alliance it would become a fresh unit, opposed to other states or alliances of states and possessing foreign relations of its own. Thus for Hegel the right of states against one another is inherently abstract. It is primarily a right to be recognized as independent powers by other states ; and external relations take the form of contracts. This recognition is usually

¹ V. *Philosophy of Right*, § 330 note.

granted, even where states are at war with one another ; and the relation between them is not altogether the state of nature which Hobbes assumed. The assumption made by states themselves is that war is a temporary condition, an extremity and not the normal life of the state. War itself is more humane than it used to be, and men fight under the inspiration of duty rather than from personal hate.

The form taken by the abstract right which unites states is international law. This, as we have seen, is not like law within the state itself ; for it cannot be said to be established. It is a good intention rather than an achievement. Its general doctrine is that the contents of treaties must be kept inviolate ; but this principle has no greater security than the treaties themselves ; for it is not embodied in a supreme general will, but exists only as a moment of the particular wills of the states concerned. Hegel is emphatic on this point. ' Since states in their relation of self-subsistence are opposed to one another as particular wills and the validity of treaties rests on this, and since the content of the particular will of the whole [i. e. the state] is its welfare, this particular welfare is the highest law in the relation of one state to another ; and all the more so because the " idea " of the state is simply that in it the opposition of right as abstract freedom and of the satisfaction of the particular content of welfare is sublated, and recognition first comes to states as concrete wholes.' Statesmanship is not a vague philanthropy ; it is a single eye to the special well-being of the state in all its definite conditions.

But this is not the whole of Hegel's view. Particularity and contingency cannot be the highest notes of any form of mind, and the very absence of a higher organization is a mark of the incompleteness and limitation of states. States rub against one another in the world ; they rise and fall in the course of history ; and although no present ethical institution stands over states, their fate is not in the hands of non-moral nature. The forces which govern history are spiritual, and each state, as a finite form of mind, is judged and determined by the greater mind of which it is a manifestation. Just as the forces of nature are means by which the deeper truth of a man's nature reveals the abstractness of imperfect moral categories and persons, so the chances which befall individual

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 336.

states are the doing of the universal mind which lies in them and behind them. 'Their lots and deeds in relation to one another are the phenomenal dialectic of the finitude of these minds, out of which arises the universal mind, the unlimited mind of the world. This mind wields its right—and its right is the highest—in them in universal history, the judgement of the world.'¹

This brings us to the limit of our subject—the transition from objective to absolute mind. But before we pass to it we may ask if Hegel has succeeded in avoiding the difficulties indicated at the beginning of the chapter. I do not believe that he has. He has not given way entirely to either tendency; he does not treat the state as a sub-moral fact, nor does he fly to an abstract ideal apart from the real world. Nevertheless he does not avoid either fault completely, and the conception which he sets forth is neither thoroughly ideal nor thoroughly real.

On the one hand, he says definitely that a higher ethical relationship ought to hold between states than is or can be put into force. 'Now, the relation of states ought indeed to be inherently right; but in the affairs of the world what is inherent should have power. But since there is no power present which can decide against the state what is inherently right and enforce this decision, we cannot get beyond a mere "ought" in this connexion. The relation of states is that of self-dependent beings which make stipulations among themselves, but which nevertheless stand above these stipulations.'² I do not wish to press the words of a note too far, but I do not feel this statement to be a mere inadvertence. Hegel seems aware through this section of his argument that the judgement of the world—universal history—is not a sufficient expression of the ethical relationship of states; there is a law binding on states which they ought to recognize and which should be made the explicit law of their dealings with one another. But he leaves that law without an organization adequate to it; so that it appears to be a mere 'ought'.

In consequence of this he tends on the other hand to cling to fact against the ideal. In the face of the inherent rights of the whole of organized society, each individual state is only one element of the total good, and cannot claim at its own will

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 340.

² *Ibid.* § 330 note.

the 'sacrifice of other individuals to it. Hegel is right in pointing out that true statesmanship is a care for the weal of the state in its definite characteristics and circumstances ; but he does not point out clearly enough that the good of the state is not something private to it, and that it can be secured in the long run only if a still more general good is kept in mind, namely, the good of the whole system of states. If a state pushes its own direct and apparent interest at the expense of other states and without regard to the welfare of them all as a totality, it fights against itself, and however great be its apparent gain in territory, wealth, and even culture, it suffers a real spiritual loss. Hegel does not deny this anywhere, so far as I know, but by insisting too strongly on the difference between the individual and the state, and on the special good of the particular state as the end of statesmanship, he fails to make the higher common good a real end of self-conscious objective mind, that is to say, an object of will.

It is not a sufficient reply to this criticism to point to the course of history—the judgement of the world—by which states are upheld and destroyed. Granted that in the end history does manifest a moral or ethical order, this does not remove the necessity that states must themselves self-consciously control their relations by a rightful end. It is true that if history is a moral order, the highest moral ideal does not lack power to realize itself ; but it is also true that this could not be the case if it were not the nature of the immanent ideal to work out its own realization, and if the common good of the family of nations were not a principle binding on men and the proper end of their activities. The moral order reveals itself in history only because the common good of the nations is higher than the particular good of any one of them ; and when the character and end of some state is insufficient and false it is brought down in ruin by this higher truth. There is more in the nature of objective mind than any finite state can bring forth ; and this fuller truth demands the adherence and allegiance of states themselves. So long as it is not brought into being in the world of action, and so long as the organized force of the nations is not placed behind it, the moral order has not come to itself and realized its immanent character. Hegel is right in insisting that there are important differences between the morality of an individual

and that of a state ; but he is wrong in supposing one such difference to be that although the higher good of the individual man has to be made real in the state, the good which stands above particular states need not become a present form of self-conscious will.

We have now to complete our survey of Hegel's theory of objective mind by a brief consideration of the way in which he draws the limits of that field. Objective mind passes into absolute mind ; and although we are not to examine absolute mind here for its own sake, we must discern sufficient of it to know in general what lies beyond the limit, in order to understand the limit of objective mind itself. It may be well to state that in doing this we have to draw on other sources in addition to the *Philosophy of Right*. The *Philosophy of Right* deals simply with objective mind, and does not dwell on the limitations which are appropriate in the complete survey of all mind. It emphasizes each increase of concreteness as it develops, and points out the way in which the infinite character of mind is realized in the world. In the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel keeps the complete exposition in view ; and points out carefully that the self-determination of objective mind is still limited, and its level can be transcended. We have therefore to supplement the account of the *Philosophy of Right* from the closely allied *Philosophy of History*, the *Phenomenology*, and the *Encyclopaedia*.

We begin by considering the last phase of objective mind itself. States, we have seen, are finite, they arise and fall in time ; and beyond them is the judgement of the world, the course of history itself. Hegel develops the view of history involved here in accordance with his general philosophic position. History is not chronology ; it is an attitude of thought, and is capable of profound philosophic significance. History must be written with presuppositions, and it is quite unscientific to demand that notions—*a priori* notions, if you like—must be altogether avoided. The proper demand is that the writer should have the true notions. An empty head, or a lack of the principles of thinking, does not fit a man for any intellectual activity. It is untrue to say that any historian merely records things as they come along. He does not record everything ; thought is never purely receptive ; it transforms and selects. The difference between historical

attitudes is ultimately one of different principles of selection ; and when the principle in question is uncertain, one-sided, or changing, the method is bad. For Hegel the highest and truest principle is clear. The proper object of the most profound history is freedom, and the task is to see the course of events in time in such a way that everything dealt with is set forth in its due relations to freedom. But we have found that freedom is realized in the organized community ; consequently the object of history is the life of political states. Whatever else is introduced, facts from geology, meteorology, biology—not to speak of sciences of the mind—must be bent to the supreme end and accepted only because of the light it sheds on states themselves.

The state, then, is the object of history ; the state as it unfolds itself in time and in many particular states.

It is not necessary for us to concern ourselves very closely with Hegel's historical exposition, given at length in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* and very briefly in the last few pages of the *Philosophy of Right*. But a few remarks will not be altogether out of place. History begins with self-conscious social activity, in other words, with the nascent state. It is not an accident that uncivilized peoples have no history. It is true, of course, that we know many things about them ; but we do not have such written accounts of them as we have of peoples which have risen to be states. Of China we have a long history ; and throughout it all China was a state. Of India, on the other hand, we have very little ; and in India the genius for political activity has been singularly lacking. This lack of information is not an accident : the object of history is itself lacking. Nomadic wanderings, endless individual chances and fates, and the tiresome monotony of unregulated life where, in spite of change, there is nothing new because there is nothing old and established, these are not comparable to the deep streams of organized societies where individuals are only phases and where there are definite tendencies and principles to record.

Further, history is not a mere record of change, it shows a development in human things. Freedom, or the state, is a growth. At the dawn of history, mind was but dimly aware of itself ; its nature and capacities had still to be apprehended and wrought out ; and the development takes time.

Hegel believes that the stages of the evolution can be indicated, and that in each a definite phase of the notion has been brought to light. I do not intend to discuss these stages, and it will be sufficient to name them. The first is the Oriental world, the second the Greek world, the third the Roman world, and the fourth the German world.

In the next place, Hegel insists that states have to be taken concretely. They are neither mere aggregates of individuals, nor colourless appearances of an abstract constitution. Each is itself an individual, with a definite quality or character of its own. The character of a state is as special and real as that of a private person. Each state has its own constitution to make, its own potentialities to realize, and when its work is done it dies. History is not the straightforward unfolding of a simple mind; it is complex and has a negative side. Its stages are themselves individuals, and they have to give way to make room for fresh forms. It may be true that in nature there are recurrent series, but in mind there is no repetition. Mind is more than a Phoenix arising rejuvenated from its ashes; it goes forward into higher forms, and becomes 'exalted, glorified, a purer mind'. And if so, earlier and less developed civilizations must give way before more adequate ones. The judgement of the world is just this growth and decay itself. 'Mind is essentially active; it makes itself into that which it is inherently, into its deed, its work. Thus it becomes an object to itself, and has itself before itself as a definite being. And so with the mind of a people: it is a determinate mind, building itself on its religion, its worship, its habits, its constitution, and its political laws, and the whole range of its institutions and its events and deeds, into a present world which stands and subsists now. That is its work: that is this people. . . . The people is ethical, virtuous, and vigorous when it produces what is in its will and protects its work against external violence in the labour of objectifying it. The discordance of what it is inherently, subjectively, in its inner end and essence and what it is actually is sublated; it is at home with itself; it has itself objectively before itself. But then this activity is no longer necessary; for what it wills it has. The people can still do much in war and peace, within and without; but, as it were, the living substantial soul itself is no longer active. The basis and highest interest has thus

gone out of its life ; for interest is present only where there is opposition. The people, like an individual passing from manhood to old age, lives in enjoyment of itself, in being exactly what it willed and could attain. . . . This use and wont (the watch is wound up and goes on of itself) is that which brings on natural death.'¹ And Hegel's belief is that the death of a state is always due to internal weakness. 'A people can die a violent death only when it has become naturally dead in itself, as, e. g., the German imperial cities, the constitution of the German Empire.'²

The distinction of states, however, does not break their connexion nor destroy the identity of mind in them. It is one rationality, one mind, which appears thus in history, and the nations are but phases of it. The final end of the progress in history is not merely to develop this or that nation and achieve the purposes of some individual state. It has to bring forth mind itself as it is in its truth, *the* state as such. And the state, so comprehended, is not a bare abstraction, a mere essence ; it is a concrete universal, the mind which expresses itself in moments which are themselves minds ; it is the realized idea. Individual peoples cannot set themselves against this mind : it is their substance and truth. 'The principles of the minds of peoples in a necessary sequence of stages are themselves only moments of the one universal mind, which elevates and completes itself in history through them into a self-comprehending totality.'³ The insight into history from this point of view is the deepest truth of objective mind, the point at which it achieves itself and at which it passes into the higher and final realm of absolute mind. It reveals the development of freedom in the world, sets aside every irrelevant feature, and throws into the foreground the way in which nature gathers itself up into self-conscious rational mind : or, to take it from the other side, it manifests the presence of God in the world, and shows that 'what has happened and happens every day is not only not without God, but essentially His very work.'⁴

What remains to be done here is to explain the statement that at this its highest point objective mind passes into absolute mind. Perhaps we may achieve this end most

¹ *Philosophy of History*, WW. IX, 3rd edit., pp. 91-3.

² *Ibid.* p. 93.

³ *Ibid.* p. 97.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 547.

easily by urging a criticism against the conception of history thus set forth. The whole method, it may be said, is arbitrary. I see no reason to suppose that it must falsify history in the sense that it must deny or invent facts. It is quite as able as any other method to admit the existence of whatever comes along. But it may be said to falsify facts in the sense that it picks and chooses among them in such a way that whole tracts of natural events are abbreviated or even pushed aside altogether ; and, by emphasizing the bearing of every fact on self-conscious freedom, it assigns to them another importance than that which nature itself gives. The toil of nature through centuries may be, for that method, of less account than the transactions of a few moments ; consequently, the method is not natural but arbitrary.

This criticism is both true and false. The danger of it is that its falsity is often the more powerful side. In the end the criticism urges that Hegel's philosophy of history is not empirical, and the insinuation is that history should be empirical. But we have seen that a genuinely empirical history is an absurdity, and we need not say more on that topic. When we firmly set this yearning for bare fact aside, the criticism of Hegel's method which we have suggested applies equally to any other method ; for its essence is that the method is selective and abstract. The criticism, therefore, so far as we can approve it, is that history as such is selective and does not reproduce reality as reality produces itself. Several courses are open to us here. One is simply to condemn history in contrast with the facts ; and that way lies empiricism. Another is to condemn the facts in contrast with history ; and that way, in spite of the truth in it, lies all manner of subjective vagaries. Another and more hopeful course is to admit the contrast, to admit the truth on both sides, and to hold that the synthesis which history attempts is in principle right, but in performance faulty because it is inevitably abstract. This is the attitude which Hegel adopts. There is a truth in nature which is omitted by history, there is a truth in history which the bare facts as happenings lack ; and above both is a higher truth, viz. absolute mind. Nature exists, or if one prefers the word, is actual, and in a sense it is the basis of the reality of mind. But, in spite of this, it is not coherent ; or, to put it otherwise, it is not complete in itself. Each of

its categories is self-contradictory ; they lie in the sphere of essence, and involve the characteristic defects of that sphere. This is plain in the conception of necessity, a general principle which presents the highest truth of nature itself. Time, Hegel tells us, is a form of self-externality ; and the characteristic of whatever is in time is to pass onwards into something new and other than itself. Yet the new fact is what the old one has become ; and apart from this identity the conceptions of time and change are quite unintelligible. This incoherence of identity and difference, of self and other, of inner and outer, infects the whole of nature ; and however far we extend our survey, however large we make our known world, this defect remains. A weakness of quality is not to be remedied by an increase in quantity ; for, as Hegel points out, quantity itself is an indifference to qualitative determinateness.¹

The world as a mere sequence of events or aggregation of facts is not perfectly coherent, and by no force and compass of thought can it be made so. Those who accuse Hegel of mistaking ends for realities, and of declaring *a priori* and in defiance of the obvious state of the case that the existing world must be in accordance with ideal principles of reason, seem to me to misread the situation, if by ' reality ' we mean the world as it unrolls itself in space and time. Hegel does not assert its absolute conformity to reason ; rather he insists that at its best it is discrepant with itself and abstract. The difference between the views is ultimately in the treatment of reality itself. What puts so many criticisms of Hegel out of court is the sheer assumption that the conception of reality is beyond examination, does not require to be scrutinized by thought, and must be accepted uncritically as a first principle. Hegel, on the other hand, notes that this acceptance is demanded on the part of thought itself ; and he refuses to admit the validity of any conception unless it prove valid for thought. Reality is not a datum of knowledge, but a complex interpretation of experience. Instead of being a dead wall against which thought comes, it is in truth the world made intelligible and transparent to thought. Imperfect and incomplete things—like facts in space and time—which involve hidden identities with a wide context and yet try to

¹ V. *Encyclopaedia*, § 99 ; *Larger Logic*, WW. III. p. 209 ff.

set themselves up as self-contained units, are abstractions from reality and must be transcended if they are to be known as they really are. They are dominated by inadequate categories and cannot be self-subsistent and coherent so long as these categories are unchanged. The world as it unrolls itself in space and time is not finally real ; it is not fully intelligible and cannot, as it stands, be an adequate object of thought. And so, when history does violence to nature, and brings to light a grouping of natural facts under the guiding conception of mind, it is on the right track, and is to be justified against nature.

On the other hand, history and the object it presents, viz. ethical mind, is a premature synthesis ; and the violence it does to nature is not completely justified. A most illuminating statement on this point is contained in a note to one of the paragraphs of the *Encyclopaedia*. Speaking of objective mind Hegel says : ' Thus mind has stepped out of the form of mere subjectivity. But the full realization of that freedom, which in property is still incomplete and formal, is reached only in the state, in which mind develops its freedom into a world posited by it, an ethical world. Yet mind must step beyond this grade also. The defect of this objectivity of mind consists in that it is only something posited. The world must be let free again by mind and what is posited by mind be grasped also as something which immediately is. This occurs at the third grade of mind, i. e. art, religion, and philosophy.' ¹

' The world must be let free again by mind.' What does this mean ? In brief, the answer is that mind in the ethical order fails to recognize nature as such ; nature has been treated as a vehicle of mind and only as such. Let us refer back to Hegel's criticism of morality. The moral self recognized the inadequacy of external nature, and it knew that mind can be satisfied only when its object and its field is mind itself. We saw how in pursuance of this belief the moral consciousness sought to exclude from it the crude and unmoral world. We also saw the futility of this exclusion, the internal incoherence—ultimately the emptiness—of such a self, and the reassertion of the world outside the self and conditioning it. Ethical mind makes a great advance on this attitude, but it

¹ § 385 note.

does not altogether escape from the same difficulty. Broadly speaking, the change from the moral to the ethical point of view is that of the individual to society, and the natural world, in so far as it falls within the realm of human society, has become an integral part of the ethical end. But this end, as it stands, does not explicitly include all that there is in nature. The organization of men in society is indifferent to vast tracts of being, and the common will may be realized without any overt reference to the greater portion of the visible universe. It is only as subordinate to social purposes and in the limited shapes which it assumes there that nature is recognized in the ethical sphere. Nature, no doubt, is not merely a means, a soulless thing to be dominated from without by the will—that is the abstract point of view of morality. Rightly considered, it sets the end as well as supplies the means of social life. Nevertheless, society is only one of its expressions and by no means exhausts it. Ethical life accepts the natural content which attains explicit spiritual existence in the community and its citizens; but it accepts this material only in that special mental form. Behind the immediate elements of nature which are directly manifested in society lie other elements and forces which broaden out ultimately until they cover the whole field of existence. The ethical point of view, however, does not involve the apprehension of this. Of course it may be recognized by a moral agent; and he may feel that the stars in their courses and the whole nature of things are behind him in his ethical endeavour. But in this consciousness he has gone beyond the purely ethical point of view and carries its principles within deeper and more comprehensive ones. At its own level ethical mind appears only here and there in the world. It claims, with justice, a deeper reality than any purely natural fact, and it has the right to subordinate any outward being to its purposes. But every organized society disappears in time and the best of states is liable to decay. Its weakness shows that its categories are not final: for only the finite can suffer accident. By itself it is a finite mode of the infinite, and does not explain the whole world. The distortion which the philosophy of history puts upon nature must be undone again, and the dialectic must pass on to higher principles into which the truth already brought to light is carried along with the whole range of natural fact, and by

which all the differences which objective mind neglects is incorporated and explained.

The categories of the final stage of Hegel's philosophy attempt this task. Objective mind must 'let the world free again'. It must accept the natural as such and deal with it as itself a phase of the truth. Nature, for Hegel, is a moment of knowledge; but we must not forget that in the idea there are no *mere* moments. The 'idea'—and absolute mind is constituted by the 'idea'—is a unity of opposites, and the unity is reached because of the difference. Accordingly, nature must be taken as a phase of the whole which realizes the whole in a special way; and its peculiar contribution is necessary to that whole. Nature is other than self-consciousness; and if absolute mind is not an abstract self-consciousness but comprehends the truth of the lower stage which is conscious of a world over against it, it must, whatever else it does, accept and maintain this other. From Hegel's standpoint we do not solve the difficulty by ignoring nature, or by suggesting that there is no nature at all and that what appears to be nature is in fact a host of little minds. Absolute mind needs the externality and difference of nature in order to make its content concrete, and the knowledge of it is possible only to a philosophy which allows the abstract, incoherent, and incomplete world of nature to erect itself into a whole, and which merges this whole within it as a part of its content.

The concrete conception which I am trying to indicate appears no doubt to be a direct self-contradiction, an impossible union of discordant terms. And in truth this appearance persists whenever we speak in the abstract of the identity of opposites. Comprehension of the conception is always dependent on the content in which it is realized; for there alone can we see how difference can inform and support unity. I leave it, therefore, as a demand that has still to be carried out by the science of absolute mind. The utmost that can be done here is to suggest a line along which the transition may be made; and we may find this in the consideration that, in spite of apparent paradox, it is only when the world has been 'let free again by mind and what is posited by mind grasped also as something which immediately is' that mind can present itself as the final truth of the world. For it is

when we realize that this result, these institutions, this state, are natural facts, that we begin to see that the nature which produces these is no dead mechanical world but something in which spiritual unity is itself present. And when we perceive that time and the world in time are subordinate principles of thought, and that if we would understand the world in its truth we must not over-emphasize the temporal priority of nature to mind—the externality of the two—then we are forced to a standpoint for which mind is the very essence of nature itself and is present in it.

The science of objective mind itself leads us to the verge of this position. At every stage of the analysis we have seen mind subordinating and yet carrying up the lower phases of its being into the higher. And in the consideration of universal history, the judgement of the world, we have found that states as they evolve carry forward the principles of states which have previously appeared. The very possibility of this, even in part, raises the state above the level of a mere thing in time. We are in the presence of a mind which overcomes the self-externality of time and preserves the past within the depths of its present being. The state is only a mortal God, but in its finitude it is still divine ; and it points to that further truth in which mind is raised completely from under the dominion of necessity and externality, and contains time within it.

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
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